

South Africa in Africa
THE POST-APARTHEID ERA

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ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, ADEBAYO ADEDEJI, AND CHRIS LANDSBERG

Terms, acronyms and abbreviations

ACDESS	African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (Nigeria)
AEC	African Economic Community (proposed)
AICC	African Institute for Corporate Citizenship
ANC	African National Congress (SA)
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARV	antiretroviral
ASF	African Standby Force (to be established by 2010)
ASGISA	Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative (SA)
AU	African Union
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
BEE	black economic empowerment
BNC	Binational Commission (South Africa–Nigeria)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
CNDD-FDD	<i>Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense pour la Démocratie</i> (Burundi)
Codesa	Convention for a Democratic South Africa
Comesa	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Cosatu	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSSDCA	Conference for Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DMS	development merchant system
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry (SA)
ECA	UN Economic Commission for Africa
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council (of the AU)
EO	Executive Outcomes
EU	European Union

FDI	foreign direct investment
FESTEC	Festival of Arts and Culture (Nigeria, 1977)
FLS	Front Line States
FRODEBU	<i>Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi</i>
G8	Group of Eight Industrialised Countries
Gear	Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (SA)
GDP	gross domestic product
HCB	<i>Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa</i> (Mozambique)
HDI	Human Development Index (of the UNDP)
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
IDC	Industrial Development Corporation (SA)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPA	Interim Political Authority (Lesotho)
ISSDC	Inter-State Security and Defence Committee (SADC)
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LPM	Landless People's Movement (SA)
LRAD	Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (SA)
MAP	Millennium African Recovery Plan
MDGS	Millennium Development Goals (UN)
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MPLA	<i>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho</i> (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Party of Labour)
NACOSA	National Aids Convention of South Africa (early 1990s)
NAI	New African Initiative (replaced MAP and the Omega Plan)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NCP	National Contact Point (OECD mechanism)
NEP	National Empowerment Fund
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity (superseded by the AU in 2002)
ODA	overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

OPDS	Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (SADC)
Palipehutu-FNL	<i>Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales de Libération</i> (Burundi)
PSC	Peace and Security Council (of the AU)
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (SA)
SAA	South African Airways
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SANAC	South African National Aids Council
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme (usually World Bank-inspired)
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
SETA	Sector Education and Training Authority (SA)
SIPO	Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SADC)
SLAG	Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SA)
TAC	Treatment Action Campaign (SA)
TB	tuberculosis
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SA)
Unctad	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
Unisa	University of South Africa
UNITA	<i>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola</i> (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UPRONA	<i>Union pour le Progrès National</i> (Burundi)
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Introduction

ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, ADEBAYO ADEDEJI
AND CHRIS LANDSBERG

Can a country that has brutalised and exploited its own people, and those of surrounding countries, go on to become a credible champion of human rights, democracy and sustainable development on the African continent, even after a remarkable political transformation? To what extent has South Africa been liberated to play a leading role in Africa, and to what extent is it still crippled not only by the past, but by the widely varying priorities of its 47 million people? How have these dynamics played out in the years since the 'rainbow' nation stepped out of its own shadow in 1994?

This volume offers the beginnings of some answers. It is, in part, a follow-up to Adebayo Adedeji's edited book of a decade ago, *South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart?*¹ The 1996 book was the outcome of a workshop organised in Windhoek, Namibia, by the Nigerian-based African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) in January 1994.

ACDESS organised a second workshop in January 1996 whose theme was 'South Africa within Africa: Emerging Policy Framework'. This meeting was held in Johannesburg, South Africa, and concluded that more time was required before a discernible corpus of holistic policy frameworks for South Africa's role in Africa could become available. The meeting also concluded that at least ten years was required before a credible and definitive assessment could be undertaken. Such an assessment should seek to analyse the domestic and regional factors required to integrate South Africa into the rest of the continent after decades of isolation under apartheid. This book is partly the result of this vision and is the first publication to assess comprehensively South Africa's role in Africa over the last thirteen years.²

SOUTH AFRICA AND AFRICA: WITHIN OR APART?

Given its history since 1910 when the Republic of South Africa was established – particularly since 1948 when apartheid became institutionalised – the country was not only apart from itself but also from the rest of Africa. The illegitimate, racist government in Pretoria saw Africa, and particularly its immediate neighbourhood in Southern Africa as areas for penetration, exploitation and destabilisation. This was the Africa of ‘labour reserves’ from which – from the nineteenth century – hundreds of thousands of Southern African migrants ventured to South Africa to work in mines, farms and industry for a pittance. This was also the Africa of ‘broken-backed’ states as apartheid’s marauding military bombed Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe in a campaign of awesome destructiveness that eventually resulted in a million deaths and an estimated \$60 billion in damages between 1980 and 1988.³ The collective memory of these actions is still fresh in the minds of regional states.

South Africa’s apartheid governments saw themselves culturally and politically as very much part of the West, with the country having been part of the ‘white dominions’, with Australia, Canada and New Zealand. As Hendrik Verwoerd, one of the key architects of apartheid, put it: ‘We look upon ourselves as indispensable to the White World ... We are the link. We are white, but we are in Africa. We link them both, and that lays on us a special duty.’⁴ Verwoerd claimed that whites had brought civilisation, economic development, order and education to Africa and that South Africa would determine the continent’s destiny. In a similar vein, an earlier South African premier, D.F. Malan, talked of ‘preserving Africa for white Christian civilisation.’ Long before Thabo Mbeki began promoting a more egalitarian vision for a renewed Africa, these leaders considered themselves ‘Renaissance’ men, seeking to spread ‘enlightenment’ to ‘ignorant savages’ on a ‘dark continent’. Such patronising thinking was very much a feature of South African political thought from Cecil Rhodes – the diamond tycoon, imperialist, and premier of Cape colony – to F.W. de Klerk, leaving the black-led governments of Nelson Mandela and Mbeki little choice after 1994 but to engage the region with great humility.

South Africa’s biggest trading partners were, and remain largely today, Britain, the United States (US), Germany, France and Japan. But South Africa’s trade with the rest of Africa has increased dramatically since the end of apartheid. In some eyes, this has revived fears of the visions of South African leaders like Hendrik Verwoerd and John Vorster who often invoked dreams of a South

African-led Southern African common market and a political Commonwealth. In a perverse appropriation of the term, both leaders actually claimed to be pursuing 'Pan-Africanist' policies. South African premier, Jan Smuts, captured this mercantilist, imperialist spirit well in 1940: 'All Africa may be our proper market if we will but have the vision, and far-sighted policy will be necessary if it is to be realised.'⁵

As earlier noted, the end of the first decade of apartheid was deemed the most appropriate time to undertake a frank assessment of what has been accomplished in South Africa's relations with Africa: how much of the long journey has been covered and how successfully. To undertake this task, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, along with ACDESS, Nigeria, and the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) in Johannesburg, collaborated in organising a policy seminar in Stellenbosch, South Africa, in July/August 2004.⁶ Eleven of the papers from this seminar have been reviewed, edited, and thoroughly updated, while two additional chapters on South Africa's economic expansion into Africa, and its role in the Great Lakes region and the Horn, were commissioned after the Stellenbosch meeting. This unique volume introduces new voices into debates on South Africa's role in Africa, with seven authors from Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Nigeria (two), Uganda, Canada, and Italy, joining eight South African colleagues to produce chapters; while a South African editor joins two Nigerian editors.

This volume argues that any strategy for addressing South Africa's long-term development must necessarily deal with the country's political and socio-economic structural problems. Without addressing these issues, South Africa will have very little room to manoeuvre, let alone be able to play a leadership role in Africa. Similarly, on the part of other African countries, the fundamental impediments to political stability and economic revitalisation as well as continuing obstacles to the establishment of diversified domestic economies will also be determining factors in the evolution and development of their political and socio-economic relations with South Africa after apartheid. Such relations must be devoid of the domineering and destructive hegemony of South Africa's past if they are to be mutually beneficial, and true partnerships must be forged with other African states.

The thirteen chapters in this volume have, to varying degrees, addressed these issues – taking stock of developments since 1994 and discussing the challenges that still lie ahead. One of the benefits of this book is that some contributors and participants at the Stellenbosch seminar in 2004 had taken part in one

or both of the workshops in January 1994 in Windhoek and January 1996 in Johannesburg. There has therefore been some element of continuity in the process. The process is also a dynamic one. Today's South Africa is far from becoming a 'rainbow society'. It faces serious political and socio-economic challenges and widespread and pervasive poverty despite the government's policy of black economic empowerment (BEE).

But South Africa has also made impressive strides since 1994. Human rights and the rule of law have become institutionalised, and human dignity universalised. The economy grew nearly five per cent in 2006. The government reported a surplus for the first time in the country's history in 2007, even as it announced plans to dramatically expand spending on social services infrastructure and a new social security system from R66,6 billion in 2007/08 to R78 billion in 2009/10.⁷

However, post-apartheid South Africa is still waiting to be 'deconstructed', as many of the institutions inherited from the apartheid era are still intact: the economy, universities, think-tanks, and the South African National Defence Force's (SANDF) officer corps. The land problem – in which a five per cent white minority continues to control about 70 per cent of the country's most fertile land while many historically dispossessed blacks remain landless – must still be addressed holistically; the trade union movement and civil society groups are also currently struggling to find a role in a new era in which the liberation movement – the African National Congress (ANC) – which they had fully supported and collaborated with during the struggle, has now become the ruling party. There is a widespread perception that the ANC itself is yet to transform successfully from a liberation movement into a political party. Finally, the neo-liberal economic policies of the Thabo Mbeki government and an obsession with foreign direct investment – dubbed the 'cargo cult' by Chris Landsberg – have exacerbated the skewed income distribution of South Africa rather than cultivated a culture of self-reliance and self-sustainment.

Without doubt, South Africa is yet to shed its dual heritage: the 'skyscraper economy'⁸ still co-exists with the subsistence economy. In the 1996 book, *South Africa and Africa: Within or Apart?*, it was noted that the wide disparities between white and black communities in the United States pale into insignificance when compared with the disparities between South Africa's white and black population. If white South Africa were a separate country, it would rank in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) league table as 24th in human development terms – just below Italy and Spain but above Portugal. In stark contrast,

black South Africa would rank 123rd in the world – very much below Botswana, Gabon, Swaziland, Lesotho and Zimbabwe. Yet South Africa has many attributes of the first world: good infrastructure; world-class corporate bodies and corporate governance; and world-class universities and other tertiary institutions. No wonder President Thabo Mbeki himself talks of ‘South Africa of two nations’.

Despite these constraints, South Africa has, during the past thirteen years, established solid credentials to become Africa’s leading power. Its role in the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) and its commitment to promoting peace in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Côte d’Ivoire are clear evidence that, since 1994, South Africa is not only *within* but also *for* Africa. But on what terms, it may be asked? As a behemoth or hegemon or partner or just another kid on the block? These are some of the issues that are addressed in this volume, and they will continue to evoke heated debates for many years to come. However, a small minority of people would like South Africa to remain apart from the rest of the continent, as it did during the apartheid era. Such people argue that the rest of sub-Saharan Africa constitutes South Africa’s bad neighbourhood and albatross. This reminds one of the invoking of the slogan *swart gevaar* – black peril – during the apartheid era.

Many African governments and people have also expressed unease about what they perceive to be South Africa’s protectionist trade and xenophobic immigration policies; they have accused South Africa’s leaders of ingratitude after three decades of support for the ANC at enormous cost to their own countries; and they have voiced concerns about the aggressive drive by South Africa’s mostly white-dominated corporations in search of new markets north of the Limpopo. The fact that South Africa accounts for 80 per cent of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) economy and has a nine-to-one favourable trade balance with its smaller neighbours continues to breed envy and resentment. The end of the Cold War diverted western investment to eastern Europe and Asia, leaving South Africa with surplus capital (from the era of international economic sanctions which were imposed in the mid-1980s) that has made it Africa’s largest investor. In reaction to these concerns, Thabo Mbeki has consistently stressed that South Africa will engage the region ‘as a partner and ally, not as a regional superpower’. In February 2000, South Africa established a \$30 million Africa Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund – from slush funds that were being used for destabilisation policies by the apartheid government – to promote democracy, development and security in Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA: MESSIAH OR MERCANTILIST?

In one of the greatest ironies of the post-Cold War era, South Africa has been transformed from being Africa's most destabilising and destructive power to being its most active peacemaker. After a cautious and tentative Africa policy under Nelson Mandela's presidency between 1994 and 1999, Thabo Mbeki sent about 3 000 peacekeepers to Burundi and the DRC under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). But South Africa's past still continues to haunt its present, and many analysts continue to wonder whether South Africa will play the role of messiah or mercantilist in post-apartheid Africa. Despite the emergence of a black-led government in Tshwane (Pretoria)⁹, the fact that South Africa's economy, military, academic and policy institutions remain stubbornly untransformed thirteen years after the end of apartheid further weakens its credibility to be Africa's leading power. This has sometimes denied the country the legitimacy and credibility to play a leadership role on the continent, and led to suspicions that South Africa is pursuing a western-oriented rather than African agenda.

A subregional customs union, established in 1889 and transformed into the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910, binds South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (and since 1990, Namibia) to the establishment of a free trade area, but also perfectly symbolises the mercantilist approach that Pretoria historically adopted towards its neighbours. Through SACU, South Africa pursued one-sided trade deals while restricting access to its own markets. South Africa unilaterally determined SACU's tariffs and was responsible for administering all customs, excise, and other duties. Far from promoting industrial development within SACU, South Africa often blocked its neighbours' industrialisation efforts.

In the post-Cold War era, the reluctance of western countries to intervene militarily in African countries after UN debacles in Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), led many observers to question whether potential African hegemony like South Africa could fill the security vacuum. During Nelson Mandela's inauguration in May 1994, US vice-president, Al Gore, urged South Africa to send peacekeepers to Rwanda. Based on a history in which apartheid's leaders defined the country as a European outpost, South Africa still struggles today to shake off an identity as a western Trojan horse in Africa. However, under Mandela, South Africa had a globally revered statesman, one of the most representative political systems on the continent, arguably its strongest army, and Africa's largest economy.

A democratic South Africa joined a reformed SADC in 1994. During Mandela's presidency, the country largely shunned a military role in its sub-region out of fear of arousing allegations of hegemonic domination. As SADC chair, Mandela, however, became embroiled in a spat with Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe over the structure of the subregional body's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) which Mugabe chaired. Furthermore, South Africa's first major peacekeeping mission was marred by controversy. The country undertook the intervention in Lesotho with Botswana in September 1998, but faced stiff opposition from sections of Lesotho's army and parts of the population. The legitimacy of the intervention as a SADC-sanctioned action was widely questioned. The leadership of the peacekeeping force by white South African officers from the apartheid army (the force commander had been part of South Africa's destructive forces in Angola) further fuelled passions.

Perhaps the most significant event in South Africa's post-apartheid Africa policy was the bruising battle with Nigeria in 1995/1996. After the brutal hanging by General Sani Abacha's regime of Nigerian activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa, and eight of his fellow Ogoni campaigners during the Commonwealth summit in Auckland, New Zealand, in November 1995, a deeply betrayed Mandela called for the imposition of oil sanctions on Nigeria, and advocated the West African Gulliver's expulsion from the Commonwealth. This policy failed spectacularly to gain African support, and South Africa found itself diplomatically isolated. Both Lesotho and Nigeria transformed South Africa's leaders into committed multilateralists and largely explain Thabo Mbeki's policy of 'quiet diplomacy' over Zimbabwe.

Under Mbeki's presidency since 1999, South Africa established solid credentials to become Africa's leading power. Chastened by Mandela's bitter foreign policy experiences, Mbeki consistently sought multilateral solutions to resolving regional conflicts and skilfully used both a strategic partnership with Nigeria¹⁰ and his chair of the African Union between 2002 and 2003 to pursue his goals. Mbeki has also been more prepared than Mandela to send peacekeepers abroad. He was the first chair of the AU and was also chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); he was the intellectual architect of NEPAD; and under his leadership, South Africa has hosted two high-profile UN conferences on racism and sustainable development, and won the right to host the football world cup in 2010: the first time the event will take place in Africa.

South Africa is becoming an African power, and can aspire to global middle-power status through its current policy of working with key African allies, as

well as Brazil and India, in international fora in which South Africa's voice is widely respected. But South Africa's future lies in Africa and its global status can only be achieved by being accepted as a leader on its own continent. South Africa also has many elements of 'soft power' that it can use more effectively to promote its interests and to win friends in Africa. The supreme irony is that while South Africans may be among the most ignorant people about the rest of Africa, much of Africa's elite probably know more about South Africa than about any other country in Africa. South Africa can use *Channel Africa*, which transmits to 33 African countries, to expose Africans further to South Africa and to improve the knowledge of South Africans about the rest of the continent. South African mobile giants, MTN and Vodacom, could connect the entire continent with their mobile phone network; while South African technology and capital could help build the roads, railways, and ports that Africa badly needs for its industrial take-off. South Africa already generates, by some estimates, half of sub-Saharan Africa's electricity needs and is investing in a trans-African electricity grid. South African Airways (SAA) is the most reliable aircraft carrier on the continent.

Post-apartheid South Africa is neither a messiah nor a mercantilist power. It is simply an aspiring middle power seeking to punch above its weight in global politics. With its own massive domestic problems inherited from the inequities of apartheid, South Africa is attempting to reverse these problems through an effective foreign policy that promotes its trade interests abroad and seeks to attract foreign investment to its domestic market. South Africa can also not be a messiah for Africa because it simply lacks the economic and military muscle and political legitimacy to impose its preferences on its own Southern African subregion, let alone on the continent. Mbeki has grasped one basic reality: only by working through other regional states can Tshwane (Pretoria) promote its diplomatic interests within Africa. South Africa is also no longer the mercantilist power it once was under apartheid. The country is gradually loosening its protectionist policies in Southern Africa. South Africa has restructured SACU and SADC to render greater benefits to its other members, and the country is at last now conscious of the urgent need to promote investment and industrialisation policies that benefit its neighbours. But despite Mbeki's efforts to integrate South Africa into the rest of Africa, it is unclear how deeply entrenched these efforts are within South Africa's political and business elite and citizens, and questions have been raised about whether Mbeki's heirs will maintain the commitment to Africa that he has shown.¹¹

SOUTH AFRICA'S AFRICAN RENAISSANCE AGENDA

A key aspect of South Africa's foreign policy over the past thirteen years has been its role of peacemaker in Africa, promoter of democratisation on the continent, and a champion of Africa's interests abroad: all part of an African Renaissance agenda. The government of Thabo Mbeki has pursued a largely pragmatic foreign policy with a core concern: the articulation of an ambitious African posture, officially dubbed 'The 'new' African agenda' in search of development, peace, security, governance and economic growth.

South Africa has sought to position itself as a 'middle-ranked' power and its status derives from its geo-political and geo-strategic roles in Africa. Many foreign governments and investors seeking opportunities in Africa regard South Africa as a gateway to the rest of the continent. In the aftermath of its own negotiated settlement in 1994, the new post-apartheid government quickly moved to make the promotion of democratisation in Africa the central tenet of its foreign policy. Under the banner of an 'African Renaissance,' this policy stated that durable solutions to problems in the world 'can only come through the promotion of democracy throughout the world.'¹² Former president Nelson Mandela, in an address to the US Congress in Washington D.C. on 6 October 1994, advocated that '... we should cease to treat tyranny, instability and poverty anywhere on our globe as peripheral to our interests and to our future.' Mandela declared in Washington in October 1994 that 'it is perhaps a common cause among us that everywhere on our globe there is an unmistakable process leading to the entrenchment of democratic systems of government'.

A major theme running through South Africa's foreign policy became the promotion of 'democratic peace'.¹³ Under Mandela, South Africa openly subscribed to the idea that democracies do not go to war with each other, and that democracy is fundamentally more peaceful than other forms of government. Mbeki too, even before he became president, was committed to the 'building of stable democratic systems ... and [making] a contribution to the challenge of peace, democracy, development and stability in the rest of our continent.'¹⁴ For Mbeki, 'the dream of peace and stability, of democracy and human rights' are all intertwined. South Africa's president has repeatedly noted that Southern Africa must transform into a 'zone of peace' by means of 'building stable democracies.'¹⁵ Mbeki strongly criticised one-party rule and personal dictatorships in Africa. He has cautioned that 'the one party system and military governments will not work'¹⁶ and suggested that Africans must 'rebel' and 'resist all tyranny.'¹⁷ Mbeki

has often advocated for governments in Africa to ‘derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people,’ as well as become fully representative of women.¹⁸

Given its commitment to ending Africa’s international marginalisation, South Africa, over the past thirteen years, has actively promoted regional integration and development. In the 1996 *Draft Discussion Document on a Framework for Cooperation with the Countries of the Southern African Region*, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stated: ‘South Africa should strive to achieve regional economic development by utilising the instrument that is ready at hand, in the form of the Southern African Development Community.’ The document further noted that South Africa’s vision for the SADC region is one ‘of the highest possible degree of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary, and joint planning of regional development initiatives, leading to integration consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities.’

South Africa’s stance on regional integration favours a ‘cautious and step-by-step’ approach towards regional development in Southern Africa. The emphasis was thus initially on cooperation rather than full-fledged integration. Policy was based on ‘the principles of equity and mutual benefit’; a denunciation of domineering hegemony towards the region; and the belief that an emphasis on partnership and fairness would more effectively achieve the country’s foreign policy goals. South Africa put much effort and energy into restructuring SADC,¹⁹ stressing the implementation and operationalisation of protocols on free trade, politics, defence, and security cooperation.²⁰ Emphasis was also placed on boosting international investor confidence and attracting foreign direct investment to Southern Africa.

Thabo Mbeki played a key role in negotiating the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in 2001. NEPAD was an initiative to spur Africa’s development after decades of failures as a result of the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War, bad governance, unsound economic policies and management, and destructive conflicts.²¹ The NEPAD plan of action identified five critical issues as being essential to bolstering Africa’s development efforts:

- Democracy, governance and peace and security;
- economic and corporate governance;
- infrastructure and information technology;
- human resource development (notably health and education); and
- agriculture and market access.²²

South Africa adopted a strong policy in favour of continental integration and was a key actor in establishing the AU in 2002, with the death of the OAU and the birth of the AU taking place in South Africa's port city of Durban. With South Africa's influence, the AU stressed the need to strengthen its capacities and actions in conflict prevention, management and resolution. Special emphasis was placed on AU missions in Burundi and Sudan's Darfur region and on strengthening the 15-member AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) that was established in July 2004, on which South Africa won one of only five three-year renewable seats. (The other 10 seats are two-year non-renewable.) South Africa is also hosting and has largely funded the AU's Pan-African Parliament (PAP), established in Midrand in March 2004. Some of the areas through which the country has consistently sought to maximise its global prestige and influence were: campaigning against illicit trafficking of light weapons, anti-personnel landmines and child soldiers; and promoting human security. In its foreign policy, and through the AU and NEPAD, South Africa's policymakers have sought to move away from strict notions of militarily-defined state security to a greater emphasis on human security and social justice. South Africa has also been a key player in favour of new modalities for resource mobilisation such as better and more effective levels of aid to Africa. South Africa and its African partners have specifically campaigned for international support to enhance the continent's peace support operations capabilities, and to strengthen the AU's African Standby Force (ASF) which is planned to be established by 2010 around five subregional brigades.

Under Mandela and Mbeki, South Africa's foreign policy has promoted adherence to democratic benchmarks and governance indicators in order to benefit from a renewed focus on African 'ownership'. South Africa was instrumental in setting up an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003 to promote democratic governance in Africa.²³ About 28 countries have signed up to be reviewed in this voluntary, self-monitored system involving governments, the private sector, and civil society actors.

External perceptions of South Africa's conduct have impacted greatly on its policy preferences. A cursory glance at official documentation from the foreign ministry in Tshwane would suggest that the ANC-led government has sought to balance international expectations and its own fear of dominance in the Southern African region. Thus, while many outsiders viewed South Africa as a hegemon – a sort of regional superpower in the subregion and more broadly on the continent – the government, from Mandela to Mbeki, was quick to

denounce such ideas. Instead, South Africa's leaders believed that its status and prominence in Africa and in world affairs more generally, would be enhanced not by reinforcing but by downplaying such domineering attitudes. As early as 1996, South Africa's deputy minister of foreign affairs, Aziz Pahad, stated that '... we must carry our relations with the region in a way that is not a big brother relationship. This means that because of our relative strength we don't simply impose ourselves.'²⁴ Pahad further cautioned: '[t]his does not mean that we are not sensitive to the Big Brother or Big Sister syndrome. However, it also means that South Africa cannot afford to sit on the sidelines. There can be no debate about this issue.'²⁵ Pahad also noted that African leaders '... have indeed warned that if South Africa continues to hide behind the rhetoric of not wanting to play a leadership role, Africa would indeed suspect a hidden agenda.'²⁶

The deliberately cautious approach adopted by South African policymakers towards Southern Africa suggests that the best way to gain status and enhance its reputation is to reassure its neighbours that the country does not harbour any threatening or aggressive intent. South Africa has chosen to portray a strategic and defensive non-threatening military posture as the best way of enhancing security and confidence within Southern Africa and beyond. South Africa's defensive military strategy is also based on both a notion of deterrence and effective military capability. But this stance appeared to be contradicted when South Africa entered into arms deals worth more than R30 billion between 1997 and 1999. These deals involved arms manufacturers in Italy, Britain, Germany and Sweden. In justifying these purchases, South Africa's government argued that, in exchange for purchasing military equipment from these states, their private sector would directly invest in South Africa to the tune of R100 billion. This agreement would thus create jobs to reduce South Africa's unemployment rate of 35–45 per cent. The arms deals unleashed a storm of criticism from civil society groups and some parliamentarians. Many critics argued that South Africa faced no real military threats in the post-apartheid context; that the overhaul of its military may send the wrong message to its smaller neighbours; and that this could trigger a new arms race in Southern Africa. South Africa's purchase of its massive new artillery did indeed trigger anxiety in many regional quarters. Policymakers in Tshwane had to reassure their neighbours that South Africa's new weapons were not intended as a threat to them, but were acquired merely as a means to modernise its armed forces and to promote foreign investment.

While South Africa has been at pains not to be seen as a 'bully' in political,

diplomatic and military terms, it has nonetheless continued to be perceived by many as the economic ‘bully’ in the region. South Africa enjoys skewed trade relations with the rest of the region that have greatly undermined Tshwane’s political democratisation project in Africa, by making the country appear to be pursuing parochial economic interests under the guise of democracy. South Africa’s economic expansion into the continent has been both private sector-driven and government-promoted. Trade with the rest of Africa increased by a massive 328 per cent between 1993 and 2003. But, this trade was massively skewed in South Africa’s favour: out of a total R20,3 billion trade with the SADC members in 1999, R17,7 billion were South African exports to the region. Total trade with the rest of Africa in 2001, excluding the Southern African Customs Union, amounted to US\$856 million in imports and US\$3,7 billion in exports: an imbalance of nearly 5:1.

Turning from trade to values, South Africa’s *Weltanschauung* (worldview) and quest for international influence and prestige are heavily influenced by the experience of its transition from apartheid to democracy. Policy has been predisposed towards ‘quiet diplomacy’ and preventive diplomacy, notably the settlement of disputes through negotiations. Both the Mandela and Mbeki governments emphasised the need for regional reconciliation following decades of tensions and destabilisation by the apartheid state. Until 1998, the ANC-led government ruled out the military option in international affairs and the preferred strategy was brokering peace pacts among belligerents in conflict situations. Such pacts were often promoted along the lines of South Africa’s own Government of National Unity (GNU) of 1994–96.

It is important to highlight some of South Africa’s peacemaking efforts in Africa in the last thirteen years. As early as 1994, Nelson Mandela sought to broker an ‘inclusive’ peace deal in Angola’s two decade-old civil war, urging Eduardo dos Santos to seek an ‘accommodation’ with UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*) rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. Mandela similarly encouraged Savimbi to accept the government under Dos Santos instead of seeking to topple the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In the mountain kingdom of Lesotho, the Mandela government joined Botswana and Zimbabwe in a preventive diplomacy effort in 1994 to encourage elections and to stave off a constitutional crisis. Four years later, South Africa was mandated by the OAU to address the constitutional crisis in the Comoros, while the South African Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) provided assistance and cooperation to the authorities on the island. These two smaller

cases of Lesotho and Comoros increased South Africa's confidence in tackling larger cases like Burundi and Congo.

In another display of South Africa's 'peacemaker' philosophy, Thabo Mbeki (then South Africa's deputy president) played an active role in seeking an end to the rebellion against Zairian dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, in 1997. Mbeki's approach involved an application of inducement strategies to try to nudge the parties towards a settlement. He suggested that, in exchange for a peace agreement, South Africa would make efforts to help rebuild the war-ravaged country through substantial post-conflict reconstruction support. Mandela eventually became involved in an unsuccessful mediation effort with Mobutu and rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, in 1997.

A year later, South Africa refused to send military troops to fight alongside any of the two warring blocs in the Congo: the Zimbabwe-Angola-Namibia-Kabila axis and the Uganda-Rwanda sponsored rebels. Mandela instead pursued an independent line by refusing to side with any of the two blocs and instead opted for a peacemaker role. Since 1999, the Mbeki administration has singled out peace in the DRC as its number one priority. South Africa was instrumental in efforts to ensure a successful Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which it hosted in Sun City in 2002. Mbeki also played a key role in negotiating the interim government arrangement in the Congo and has consistently called on the international community to help implement the peace process.²⁷

In Burundi, South Africa has sought, since 1999, to strengthen the Arusha peace process, and former deputy president, Jacob Zuma, played a key facilitation role in supporting the efforts of Nelson Mandela. Since 2001, one of South Africa's key policies was to promote peace in Burundi by providing an armed protection unit for members of the country's interim government as part of an AU force, while successfully pushing for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force by 2004.²⁸ The transition in Burundi was concluded with the election of a democratic government in 2005, though the country remained fragile.

The Zimbabwe issue has attracted more headlines in South Africa's foreign policy than any other issue. Many have noted that this is perhaps due to the presence of a sizable white minority population in the country with historical roots to South Africa and the West. South Africa opted for a strategy of 'quiet diplomacy' towards Harare which many criticised without themselves being able to offer a viable alternative. Mbeki used his strategic relationship with Nigeria's Olusegun Obasanjo to try to cajole Robert Mugabe to accept a negotiated end to the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa also encouraged peaceful,

free and fair elections in March 2002 through the participation of election observers under the auspices of the SADC Parliamentary Forum and the multi-sectoral South Africa Observer Mission (SAOM) until May 2003. Mbeki consistently but unsuccessfully sought a political *rapprochement* between ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Force) and the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) and in order to ensure peace and stability, as well as to engineer an economic recovery in Zimbabwe. Finally, on the Horn of Africa, South Africa has supported and encouraged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) peace process on Sudan,²⁹ and is actively involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in South Sudan.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

The thirteen chapters in this volume are all academically rigorous as well as policy-relevant, and are written for both scholars and practitioners. We start the volume with three chapters that provide the socio-economic and political context to South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. The first chapter by Adebayo Adedeji, the Nigerian chair of South Africa's peer review mechanism, is titled 'South Africa and Africa's political economy: Looking inside from the outside'. This chapter reviews South Africa's political economy within the broader African context. It considers three key questions: What effort has been put in place to 'deconstruct' South Africa's political economy now that apartheid has been abolished? When will South Africa's leaders launch the process of moving from the 'democratic transition' of the first post-apartheid decade to 'democratic transformation?' Will South Africa's leaders opt for the business-as-usual approach of other African countries once they got rid of colonial rule? This chapter notes that since 1990 – and particularly since May 1994 – South Africa has revealed a clear intention to remain within Africa and to play a proactive leadership role on the continent. Adedeji considers how far South Africa has moved from a role of domineering hegemony to one of partnership in its relationship with other Southern African countries, and notes how far the country has been fully and dynamically reintegrated into the Southern African region.

The chapter also considers the controversies around post-apartheid South Africa's opting for a neoliberal economic strategy, and examines how the country has taken practical responsibility for the regional restructuring required for a neoliberal, export-oriented accumulation process within Southern Africa,

and indeed in the rest of Africa. After critiques of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) – implemented in 1994 – and the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic strategy – adopted in 1996 – Adedeji makes the case for building an effective and equitable ‘developmental state’ in South Africa.

In the second chapter, ‘Black economic empowerment: Myths and realities’, South African scholar Khehla Shubane makes a strong case for black economic empowerment as a necessary means of addressing a history of black dispossession that was a key feature of apartheid as well as other forms of white domination that preceded it. Shubane notes how BEE is but one measure to address apartheid’s devastating legacies. While there is still a long way to go to correct these inequalities, Shubane argues that what has been achieved in just over a decade is remarkable. For Shubane, BEE is necessary to deracialise the ownership of significant economic assets, and the initiative is founded on the belief that this is a plan through which South Africa’s economy can be effectively grown for the benefit of all its citizens. BEE thus seeks to ensure the participation of all South Africans in the country’s economy, and is a basis for normalising the economy and society. Shubane boldly asserts that BEE remains the only practical solution to a complex, practical problem. He offers a robust response to, and seeks to shatter the myths of, the ‘many and varied’ critics of BEE, including some white share-holders and those who believe that BEE is little more than a ‘grave train’ for a ‘comprador’ class of a politically-connected black bourgeoisie.

In the third chapter, ‘Race and reconciliation: *E pluribus unum?*’, Yasmin Sooka, a former commissioner in South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), addresses issues of race and reconciliation in South Africa. She considers how, near the end of the TRC process, ‘cleavages within the nation began to show’, despite the fact that, to the international community, it had become necessary for South Africa to present the face of a reconciled nation. Sooka is critical of the fact that it is not white people who have behaved nobly in post-apartheid South Africa, but the blacks who had a ‘just cause’. Black South Africans, she argues, continue to take the lead in reconciliation, while many whites continue to suffer from guilt. The author strongly asserts that race remains an intrinsic factor in debates on reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. She also provides a critical assessment of the country’s TRC process and achievements, even arguing, based on market research, that the work of the commission may have actually exacerbated tensions in society.

Having provided the political and socio-economic context of post-apartheid South Africa, the second section of the book considers the challenges faced by post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy in the areas of leadership; regional security; corporate economic expansion; land reform; and HIV/AIDS.

In her chapter titled 'South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, hegemon, partner or just another kid on the block?', South African scholar, Maxi Schoeman, addresses the question of where – and how – South Africa fits into Africa. She pays particular attention both to South Africa's role allocation internationally, and more specifically, the role assigned to it by its African counterparts. Schoeman considers how South Africa's role is embodied mainly in the expectations that other states have of the country, and examines how South Africa views its role, particularly in Africa. As the title suggests, Schoeman grapples with the key question: Is South Africa's role in Africa that of a behemoth (a colossus), hegemon, partner, or just another kid on the block? In Schoeman's analysis, South Africa is striving for a hegemonic role in Africa that also includes strong elements of partnership. In some instances, however, South Africa comes across as 'just another kid on the block': behaving just like any other country. The author also considers the activities of South Africa's business community and allegations of the country's role being that of a behemoth promoting its own rabid self-interest. Schoeman encourages South Africa 'to play the role of partner, and for the government to play the role of a hegemon with a well-developed sense of its responsibilities being based on its own long-term interests on a strong and vibrant continent'.

A leading scholar of Southern Africa from Lesotho, Khabele Matlosa, in his chapter 'South Africa and regional security in Southern Africa', assesses contemporary regional security trends, highlighting South Africa's dominant role and outlining possible trends in the next decade following South Africa's second democratic elections in 2004. The chapter emphasises the dominant role of South Africa in the region's evolving security landscape based on the country's politico-economic power *vis-à-vis* its neighbours. Matlosa also highlights South Africa's leadership role, while noting that Tshwane has not exercised its regional dominance through unilateral hegemonic designs for fear of projecting itself as a sub-imperial power whose foreign policy outreach is driven more by self-interest than by regional and continental imperatives. He supports these points with two case studies of South Africa's policies in Lesotho and Zimbabwe.

South African scholar Judi Hudson's chapter, 'South Africa's economic

expansion into Africa: neo-colonialism or development?', considers the speed at which South Africa has become the largest investor in the rest of Africa in a short decade, eclipsing even the recent increased interest from non-African investors. She describes this rush as 'one of the biggest economic phenomena of the last decade'. Hudson considers concerns that South Africa's rapid corporate expansion has led to new relations of dependency and exploitation of workers in the African operations of South African companies, and assesses how unequal exchange and terms of trade disproportionately favour South Africa.

Hudson's chapter grapples with six key questions: To what extent has South Africa become the 'big brother' in Africa? How can the country best respond to allegations of being the 'new colonisers'? Is South African capital playing a sub-imperialist role in Africa or is it a 'motor for revival'? What informs the South African perspective as its firms fan out across the continent? To what extent do South African businesses see themselves as 'ambassadors' for South Africa as they move into the continent and is the regional peacemaking role that is being played by South Africa being undercut by the sometimes predatory actions of some of its white-dominated corporations?

Sam Moyo and Ruth Hall, scholars from Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively, deal with the contentious issue of the land question in their chapter 'Conflict and Land Reform in Southern Africa: How exceptional is South Africa?' In situating the South African case in a historical context, both scholars note that 'land reform is an inherently conflictual process.' They consider South Africa's attempts at land reform in the first thirteen years of its democracy, and argue that the process has proved to be slow, with little progress made towards the goals of rural restructuring and poverty alleviation. Suggesting that South Africa's policymakers have not drawn relevant lessons about the limits of market-based land redistribution from other countries in the region, the authors advance new alternative solutions. Moyo and Hall are critical of South Africa's tendencies towards elite capture (dominance of the ruling class and its allies), moderate deracialisation of the land-owning class, and the growth of a small, black commercial farming class in place of wider agrarian reform. They warn of signs of conflicts emerging both from unmet land demands and from the process of land reform itself, as well as the emergence of rural social movements which seek to give voice to rural dissatisfaction. The authors draw comparative lessons from Zimbabwe and Namibia (noting that Zimbabwe transferred more land in its first post-independence decade than South Africa has), and also briefly assess South Africa's land summit of 2005.

The future of South Africa and the continent will be determined by the response to the new security threat of HIV/AIDS. According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), about 75 per cent of all AIDS-related deaths in the world occurred in sub-Saharan Africa in 2004. South Africa has over five million people living with HIV: probably the largest figure in a single country in the world. In their chapter, 'HIV/AIDS and the African Renaissance: South Africa's Achilles heel?', Angela Ndinga-Muvumba and Shauna Mottiar, Ugandan and South African researchers respectively, examine the nature of this new security threat and assess South African, Southern African and continental policies shaping the response to HIV/AIDS. The authors argue that HIV transmission is accelerated by poverty and instability, while simultaneously undermining the family unit and decreasing economic production. HIV/AIDS also has serious implications for military security. As the AU plans to establish an African Standby Force by 2010, peace support operations in Africa will remain heavily dependent on African troops. Yet, armed forces are particularly vulnerable to HIV infection. South Africa's future leadership on peace and security issues is ultimately tied to its domestic challenges on the HIV/AIDS front, particularly since 23 per cent of its military is estimated by the government to be HIV positive.

Ndinga-Muvumba and Mottiar also point out that the seriousness of South Africa's own epidemic calls for a more robust approach and the provision of anti-retroviral treatment (ARVs). Following pressure on the government by domestic civil society and external actors, its ARV rollout promised in November 2003 was reaching close to 250 000 people by March 2007, though civil society argued that poor monitoring and evaluation made this figure difficult to verify.³⁰ The authors contrast the strong leadership of Senegal and Uganda in the anti-AIDS fight to what they see as South Africa's inept approach. Moving from the national to the subregional and continental levels, Ndinga-Muvumba and Mottiar note that SADC and the AU have put in place their own strategies for mobilising an accelerated response to HIV/AIDS. SADC's *HIV/AIDS Framework and Programme of Action 2003–2007* seeks to harmonise policies and legislation relating to HIV prevention, care, support, and treatment. The AU's *HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2005–2007* is to be implemented in partnership with regional economic communities (RECs) such as SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The authors argue that a meaningful response to HIV/AIDS in Africa will be more feasible if governments contribute to initiatives at the national, subregional and continental levels. SADC

and the AU will require the full cooperation and ownership of South Africa in order for their plans for combating the pandemic to succeed.

The third and final section of the volume contains five case studies focusing on South Africa's role in the construction of the AU and NEPAD; as well as South Africa's relations with, and roles in, Nigeria; Angola and Mozambique; the Great Lakes; North Africa; and the Horn of Africa. South African analyst, Chris Landsberg's chapter, 'South Africa and the making of the African Union and NEPAD: Mbeki's "progressive African agenda"', examines South Africa's role in crafting the continental public policy landscape over the past thirteen years. The chapter considers Thabo Mbeki's Africa policies, particularly what Mbeki and his continental allies have referred to as the 'African Agenda' or 'African Renaissance'. Landsberg unpacks the 'African Agenda': the new progressive governance agenda in search of development; peace and security; democratic governance and economic growth; as well as the construction of the African Union, the reform of Regional Economic Communities, and NEPAD.

Landsberg also examines the Mbeki government's strategies and tactics, explains how and why this agenda is being pursued, and reveals the sensitivities about South Africa's role, objectives and agenda in Africa. He argues that Mbeki, his government and the ruling ANC all believe in building strategic partnerships with key African states. Mbeki has worked closely with allies like Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique and his successor Armando Guebuza, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania and his successor Jakaya Kikwete, John Kufuor of Ghana, and others, to pursue his 'African Renaissance' plan. Landsberg argues that South Africa is forever watchful not to appear as if it is playing into foreign expectations for it to fulfil the role of 'Africa's policeman'. He argues that, from 1999, South Africa played a key role in the transition of the OAU into the African Union, and also played the major role in articulating and negotiating NEPAD. After analysing more recent criticisms of South Africa's role in promoting NEPAD among African governments, the author concludes by assessing the progress and challenges of South Africa's peer review process that began in 2005.

Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo argues in his chapter, 'South Africa and Nigeria in Africa: An axis of virtue?', that South Africa's most strategic partnership in Africa is with Nigeria. He notes that this partnership has been built around the close personal relationship between Thabo Mbeki and former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo. Mbeki and Obasanjo worked closely in managing African conflicts through the AU, SADC, ECOWAS and the UN. They attempted

to promote norms of democratic governance and respect for human rights. Both frequently offered their personal mediation services and 'good offices' for the resolution of African conflicts. While Obasanjo energetically promoted security and democracy in Africa – despite his apparently unsuccessful efforts in 2006 to change the Nigerian constitution to allow a third presidential term – and sought to resolve crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Sudan; Mbeki sought to make peace in the DRC, Burundi, Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire.

Adebajo argues that the relationship between South Africa and Nigeria reached its nadir during the tenure of General Sani Abacha, Nigeria's autocratic leader between 1993 and 1998. Mandela called a SADC summit to take collective action against Nigeria after the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni activists in November 1995. Even his iconic status failed to rally a single Southern African state to take action against Nigeria. Instead, it was South Africa that was accused by many African leaders of sowing seeds of division in Africa and undermining African solidarity. African efforts to depict South Africa as a western stooge over Nigeria was a painful experience that the country was determined never to repeat. Mbeki was determined not to suffer the same fate over Zimbabwe. The chapter devotes much attention on South Africa–Nigeria relations between 1999 and 2007 under the presidencies of Mbeki and Obasanjo, assessing the Binational Commission (BNC) and growing bilateral trade ties, as well as the strained relationship between Tshwane and Abuja over Côte d'Ivoire; the UN Security Council; and the AU chair.

Italian analyst, Augusta Conchiglia's chapter 'South Africa and its lusophone neighbours: Angola and Mozambique' argues that South Africa's 'repositioning in the continent', though 'spectacular', has 'not been linear'. The temptation to 'use its own political experience as a blueprint for others' has sometimes 'provoked irritation among its African partners'. Conchiglia further argues that this has been particularly true in the case of Angola. In contrast, South Africa's relations with Mozambique – the other lusophone country in Southern Africa – 'have been mutually profitable, sustained by strategic economic and political interests'. Conchiglia thus argues that South Africa's patterns of relations with the two former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique are 'poles apart'. This chapter considers the reasons why South Africa became more interested in its Mozambican neighbour, since the two have historically been tied together by important strategic interests, particularly in the energy sector. In Angola by contrast, the continuation of that country's civil war after 1992, and apartheid South Africa's support for UNITA triggered suspicions around

South Africa's real intentions in the country. These tensions between Luanda and Tshwane have constituted a major hindrance to South Africa's economic expansion into Angola.

In the twelfth chapter, 'South Africa: "Exporting peace" to the Great Lakes region?', Canadian scholar Devon Curtis assesses the South African 'model' of peacemaking and its applicability to the two cases of Burundi and the DRC in which Tshwane played a leading facilitating role and deployed about 3 000 peacekeepers. The limits of 'exporting' South Africa's negotiated 'government of national unity' abroad are assessed. The chapter offers three broad arguments. First, South African policymakers have championed 'democracy promotion' in Africa as a key foreign policy goal and tend to view conflict resolution through the narrow prism of South Africa's 'negotiated revolution'. Second, the South African approach has often failed to take into account key political economy factors that are specific to the Great Lakes region. Finally, despite the limits of 'exporting' South Africa's own model to Burundi and the DRC, both countries have benefited from some of the transitional strategies employed by South African peacemakers.

The final chapter, 'South Africa's relations with North Africa and the Horn: Bridging a continent', by South African academic, Iqbal Jhazbhay, compares and contrasts South Africa's policies in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt during the Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. Issues assessed include: self-determination over the Western Sahara; Mandela and Mbeki's personal relationship with Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi; human rights and poverty alleviation issues in Tunisia; and South Africa's complex and competitive relationship with Egypt. Jhazbhay argues that opportunities abound, particularly in Algeria and Libya, for South African businesses and the NGO community. He concludes by warning of the dangers of North Africa drifting apart from black Africa and becoming further integrated into the European Union (EU) and the Mediterranean basin.

The chapter also assesses South Africa's role in the Horn of Africa, with a specific focus on Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland. Jhazbhay assesses South Africa's bilateral economic and capacity-building initiatives in Sudan, and notes that it contributed peacekeepers to an AU force in the country's troubled Darfur region. The author also assesses South Africa's role in Eritrea and growing influence in Ethiopia. South Africa's more low-profile role in Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland is also examined.

The chapters in the first section of this academically rigorous and policy-

relevant volume provide the socio-economic and political context for understanding South Africa's foreign policy, on the premise that an effective foreign policy can only be built on a strong domestic base. The second section assesses key challenges of regional leadership for South Africa involving both traditional issues of leadership, military and economic power, as well as newer and less conventional but equally important foreign policy issues of land conflicts and HIV/AIDS. The final section of the book provides case studies of South Africa's relations with strategic countries in West, Southern, and North Africa as well as the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. This final section also highlights South Africa's role in Africa's pre-eminent post-apartheid multilateral institutions: the African Union and NEPAD. All of these diverse authors generally accept the necessity of South Africa's leadership role on the continent, while highlighting the challenges and obstacles to the country fulfilling its ambitious dreams of leading an African Renaissance.