When NATO decided to launch a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in March 1999, it was caught unprepared for the regional refugee crisis that followed. Of the various refugee protection issues that the international community had to address, admission into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) represented the most difficult of basic problems. Throughout the crisis, refugees were trapped for days in a no-man's-land between the border posts of Kosovo and FYROM.

For the government of FYROM, the refugee inflow raised fundamental issues of national security. The country's short political history was marked by divisions among its majority Slav and minority Albanian populations. While the exact number of Albanians in FYROM remains controversial, the sudden presence of Albanian refugees from Kosovo, which represented over ten per cent of the total population, had a serious effect on the country's delicate ethnic balance.

The two communities were already profoundly divided before the NATO intervention and there is little trust left following the harsh responses of the Ministries of Interior and Defense to the refugees that arrived at the border. In all fairness, it should be acknowledged that the government had to deal with a refugee inflow that would be considered destabilising in any country. Proportionally, it is as if the United States were to be confronted by the sudden arrival of thirty million refugees on its shores. The American government considers that several thousand boat people from Haiti and Cuba justifies sending the Coast Guard to intercept and send the refugees directly back to their countries of origin.

The FYROM government was well aware that the duration of asylum is often unpredictable once refugees have been admitted and it had particular concerns regarding destabilisation scenarios that did not necessitate a prolonged refugee presence. There were also no assurances that the refugees would be in FYROM only temporarily. It should be kept in mind that the Albanian refugees from Kosovo had grievances concerning their status in Yugoslavia, and that they had joined Albanians who had grievance concerning their status in FRYOM. Given that high-level diplomats discussed the possibility that another Palestinian-type situation could develop with the Kosovo refugees, it is clear that the government in FYROM was particularly concerned about such a nightmare scenario in which it could lose control over the parts of the territory inhabited almost exclusively by Albanians.

Even though the return of the refugees to Kosovo represented one of the quickest repatriation programmes in recent history,1 it is unlikely that the current constitutional arrangement in FYROM will hold for long. In fact, key NATO member embassies in Skopje are surprised that the small state survived the presence of 250 000 refugees from Kosovo. Recent history had also provided the international community with an example of a state that collapsed because of the opportunities and grievances provoked by a large refugee presence. Indeed, Zaire no longer exists because the refugee presence led to a rebellion that overthrew the central authorities and created a new state called the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In dealing with this complex situation, the government of FYROM basically maintained that the international community had some responsibility for creating the refugee problem and therefore had an obligation to solve it. UNHCR took a traditional position focusing on the granting of unconditional first asylum, while the United States initiated a solution to the asylum problem consistent with FYROM's concerns. At one level, the confrontations between these two important actors in the refugee crisis can be seen as juxtaposing refugee rights against state rights.

The border impasse was initially unblocked with a package that combined NATO-built camps with an agreement to evacuate some refugees, along with promises of economic assistance. The specific plan was developed in Skopje basically by the United States and NATO in the space of a few days.

Despite the international community's general preference to keep refugees in their region of origin in order to facilitate repatriation, the fears of destabilisation in FYROM had prompted the US government to innovate a humanitarian evacuation programme that resulted in about 92 000 refugees airlifted to 29 host countries. The threats made by the FYROM government suggesting that NATO troops would be forced to leave the strategic frontline state unless special assistance was provided to deal with the refugees were clearly considered very seriously by key NATO members. Although European governments have tried for years to deter the arrival of Albanian asylum seekers, the images of refugees stuck in a no-man's-land between the Kosovo/FYROM border posts were so strong that several western countries actually competed to bring the suddenly "popular" Kosovo Albanians to their territories for refuge!

It is important to note that several days were lost with refugees waiting at the border partly because humanitarians debated the appropriateness of the camp solution. Some humanitarians maintained that providing refuge in host families was a better solution. However, this option was unrealistic. The government had already allowed many refugees to stay with host families and it was afraid of this option precisely because Kosovo's Albanian refugees stayed with fellow Albanians while the country became increasingly divided along ethnic lines. The government argued that refugees staying with host families could not be controlled and that this was critical given the country's delicate ethnic balance and political situation. As the crisis unfolded over eleven weeks, it also became clear that dealing with an extraordinary registration exercise and addressing specific individual protection concerns were easier in the camp environment.

From the several camps that were eventually built by NATO, refugees were selected for evacuations outside the region. The selection and screening during the evacuation operation depended largely on queues that ensured a chaotic "first-come first-serve" procedure. Given the desperate humanitarian situation and the fact that the humanitarian evacuation programme was largely perceived by refugees and the local population as "a rapid way of obtaining tickets to the West", it should not be surprising that there was considerable abuse. As stated by one non-governmental organisation, "UNHCR concedes that refugees have bought and sold places on departing planes, and falsified their identities."2 A number of illegal camp entries involving non-camp refugees and locals created security problems. The local police may have played a role in aggravating this problem and this led to greater frustration among camp inhabitants. The fact that the evacuations were clearly discriminating against refugees in host families by not allowing them to participate highlights the need to emphasise the humanitarian evacuation programme's role as an exceptional offloading process rather than a process that targets vulnerable refugees.

The immigration status of the beneficiaries of the humanitarian evacuation programme who have not been repatriated continues to be a bureaucratic headache for the authorities of certain receiving countries. This is particularly problematic when it is combined with the less generous statuses accorded to previous refugee arrivals from Kosovo and caseloads from other conflicts or continents. Indeed, the differentiated treatment of refugees has led to tensions between the 'privileged' Kosovo caseload and other refugees from "less popular" conflicts. This is difficult for UNHCR to defend in terms of the non-discrimination clause found in the Refugee Convention.

The humanitarian evacuation programme remains a political option that will probably rarely present itself given the limited public support for receiving refugees from more distant continents and the likelihood that western states will be less implicated in other conflicts. On the other hand, the transfers that were attempted directly from the Kosovo/FYROM border to neighbouring Albania could have served an effective emergency burden-sharing role if UNHCR had given it the serious attention desired by some donor states. In fact, as soon as NATO made it clear that there were empty camps in Albania waiting for the transferees, delays and blockages at the FYROM border post were unnecessary and could have been avoided.

Moreover, UNHCR's stated preference for protection options within the region becomes somewhat difficult to maintain if evacuations outside the region are available and preferred by the refugees. Any reluctance on the part of the refugees to find refuge in Albania was made even greater by the availability of evacuations to western countries. It is not by chance that quotas for some 'unpopular' countries remained unfulfilled while quotas for other countries were quickly filled. In this sense, it is possible to see the humanitarian evacuation programme as having undermined the operationally less-complicated option of regional transfers to Albania. The problem is that the regional transfers may be one of the few options available in future similar scenarios. It is consequently necessary to develop and refine a coherent policy that allows emergency refugee protection of this type in cooperation with host governments. The fact remains that refugees were blocked repeatedly in a no-man's-land at a border post for days while several camps were left empty in Albania because the transferees never arrived. No supposedly "principled" arguments can excuse this missed opportunity for a pragmatic solution.

Within this context of a reluctant host state and an awkward burden-sharing exercise, it could be expected that the repatriation of refugees would be encouraged as soon as possible. This is particularly the case because NATO openly promised to continue fighting until the refugees could return. Although NATO expected a quick return movement as soon as an agreement was signed with the Yugoslav authorities, it attempted to delay the return for at least a few days so that it could enter Kosovo without the refugees congesting the access routes. UNHCR, on the other hand, prepared for a slow and prolonged repatriation operation that would last months and would be conducted according to established principles. The refugees, however, surprised all actors in their determination to return quickly and check on the properties that they had left behind. UNHCR was largely caught off-guard as refugees returned on their own while protection officers contemplated appropriate standards involving "dignity and safety". The relieved government of FYROM was cooperative in the sense that it allowed refugees to cross the border and return to collect their families after they had seen the conditions in Kosovo.

The points outlined above highlight the importance of pragmatism in providing effective protection. Despite the fact that states and international bodies are increasingly making the connection between security and refugee flows, the Kosovo emergency reveals that some humanitarian actors are reluctant to explore creative approaches to these difficult situations. The problem encountered by UNHCR and some advocacy groups in FYROM is that by insisting on obtaining protection in the first country of asylum, there was an increase in the risk of having refugees stuck in a no-man's-land at the border (that is, obtaining no asylum). There should be greater recognition by humanitarian actors that massive refugee inflows entail significant risks and burdens for first asylum countries. If necessary, burden-sharing operations modelled on the regional transfers from the Kosovo/FRYOM border to Albania should be considered and developed.

ENDNOTES

1. Approximately half a million refugees returned from FRYOM and Albania within the weeks that followed the end of the bombing campaign.
2. TALK BACK: the Monday Newsletter of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Vol. 1. No. 2, June 1999.