Unmasking Ideology
Moving beyond the 'grand narratives' of capitalism and socialism
Johan Hattingh explores through a functional perspective prospects for overcoming ideological disputes ...
History shows that ideological differences can lead to ugly, protracted and destructive struggles. Globally there was World War II and the succeeding Cold War; more localised examples include the 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia or the slaughter in Algeria.
At a different level of intensity, but with comparable potential for violence and destruction, there prevails a long-standing struggle within South Africa between the ideologies of capitalism and socialism. Currently this is focused mainly on the organisation of the economy and the related organisation of the state.
My aim is to establish if, and how, it might be possible to avoid or overcome ideological disputes – in this case, between capitalism and socialism. My thesis is that it is indeed possible if we place the disputes in a functional perspective by clarifying the concrete human needs which each ideology tries to satisfy. This can be facilitated by gaining an understanding of the internal mechanisms by which each operates and exerts its power over the minds and actions of people.
Drawing the battle lines
The contrasts between capitalism and socialism can be summarised as follows:
Capitalism rests on the bases of private property and the competition of the free market. The free market provides for individuals to buy and sell their property by entering into voluntary transactions with one another. The basic assumption is that these individuals are rational utility maximisers, which means that they will not enter into transactions detrimental to their own well-being. By implication the government has no role to play in this free market, except to establish the conditions under which the market can function unfettered.
Socialism rejects the notions of private property and the free market. Instead of allowing the economic forces of competition to regulate the market and fix the price of labour, goods and services, socialism opts for collective ownership of the means of production and central planning of the economy. Socialism also rejects both the notion of profit and the practice of competition between individuals for personal gain. Instead, socialism emphasises that the common good should be achieved through cooperation, and that wealth produced by the economy should be distributed evenly throughout society. Socialism sees as obscene capitalism's consequence: the concentration of wealth in the hands of the relatively few while others endure comparative and even extreme poverty.
Capitalism answers that egalitarianism is a formula for disaster in the economy and therefore in society. An even distribution of wealth provides no incentive to work and guarantees stagnation. Capitalism, therefore, emphasises competition, which it claims guarantees efficiency and productivity, as well as incentives for entrepreneurship, innovation, and the accumulation of wealth.
Capitalists argue that the distribution of wealth in society should be achieved through growth in the economy. This will not only create more employment, but will also increase tax revenue available to government for, among other things, welfare (redistribution). However, capitalists argue that the tax rate should be only moderate in order not to kill off incentives to work and accumulate wealth.
At the same time, capitalists are prepared to provide goods and services for the poor only through government redistribution programmes. In contrast, socialists argue that wealth should be distributed on a far wider scale. Opting for a welfare state, socialists would institute a gradual erosion of capitalism through progressive taxes on property and wealth to whatever level is necessary for even distribution.
Clearly, capitalism and socialism are worlds apart; they are opposing extremes in the ideological dichotomy. However, my thesis is that they are irreconcilable only if their differences are seen in ideological terms. There is another, functional way to represent these differences which may avoid or overcome the clash. Before discussing this, we first have to look at the defining characteristics of an ideology, and then at its mechanisms.
Four definitions of ideology
From John B. Thompson in Ideology and Modern Culture (Polity Press, 1990 pp 28-73), the most common definition states that an ideology is a set of interwoven ideas characteristic of and shared by a group of people. As such, an ideology binds people together and differentiates them from other groupings.
This is a neutral and descriptive definition, but too general. It implies that every set of ideas and every world-view is an ideology. It does not capture the negative connotation of the term, which is necessary because we like to criticise ideologies for their perceived defects – their emptiness, idleness or sophistry. We need a definition with critical intent, one that acknowledges an ideology as being much more than the social cement of a society, if indeed it functions as that. In one of the oldest definitions with critical intent, an ideology is a set of erroneous ideas divorced from reality and misleading to people. Karl Marx summarised this succinctly when he defined ideology as 'false consciousness'.
Distortion of reality is not the only characteristic of an ideology; another is that it expresses the interests of those in power, and because of this distortion it can provide an unassailable legitimisation of those interests. As Marx pointed out, the ideology of capitalism justified the exploitation of workers by portraying it as natural fact or God-ordained given. That justification precluded criticism of such social arrangements, silencing everyone into accepting it as inevitable and inescapable fact.
Elaborating on this aspect, Thompson defined it as meaning (noun) in the service of power. He explains in his book how meaning can be mobilised, particularly by the mass media, to establish, consolidate, sustain and perpetuate asymmetrical relationships of power so that people are dominated or exploited.
It follows that a body of ideas or a world-view can be said to function as an ideology if it:
The radical implication of these four critical features is that any body of ideas, even among those apparently intrinsically innocent, can function as an ideology.
Two levels of ideological confrontation
In South Africa, the ideological confrontations between capitalism and socialism in various political and economic contexts take place on two distinct but interdependent levels. On the visible and public level the clash is portrayed and experienced as between two opposing groupings, capitalists and socialists, each group having its own doctrine, world-view, and analysis of the principal problems of the economy and the state – and the solutions. On this level each group:
On the less visible and more subtly experienced level, rhetorical devices are employed by the protagonists to achieve the ideological effects already mentioned. This is more dangerous than open clashes because rhetorical devices function through ordinary communication processes, cleverly using the power of language so that we may not notice ourselves becoming the victims of ideological stratagems. This is clarified and emphasised if we look at typical modes of ideological operation.
Ideology and its internal modes of operation
Thompson insightfully argues that the internal functioning of ideologies is manifested in the language and symbolism used to communicate. Accordingly, general modes of operation can be discerned and linked to typical strategies of symbolic construction. These strategies are not in themselves ideological; they have this effect only if, under certain conditions, they establish and perpetuate relationships of domination or exploitation. We note that these are not the only symbolic constructions to have an ideological effect. Moreover, they are not linked on a one-to-one basis to the general modes of operation of ideologies. Any one of them may be used to serve a range of ideological functions, and it may happen that two or more of them combine or overlap in their functions.
These considerations can be tabulated as follows:
Modes of operation of ideology
(From: Thompson, J.B., 1990: 60. Ideology and Modern Culture tabulated above, Polity Press, Oxford.)
Without going into every detail, the following characteristics of the internal functioning of an ideology can be gleaned from a summary of Thompson's perspective:
Legitimisation
Dissimulation
Unification
Fragmentation
Reification
Moving beyond ideological struggle?
From the discussion so far it follows that capitalism and socialism are not necessarily ideological as such. They function as ideologies only if their respective contexts or legitimisations can be said to establish, consolidate, maintain, perpetuate and reproduce relationships of domination and exploitation. This distortion enables us to place both capitalism and socialism in a functional perspective, thereby making it possible for us to avoid the highly unproductive clashes between them and, instead, to focus on the very real problems of our social and economic arrangements which each of them draws to our attention.
Can there be any escape from ideological struggle? My submission is that other than by destroying our opponents, there is no way out of the battle so long as our differences are construed as ideological. If I see myself as a defender of the one and only truth against every other doctrine different from mine, and if my opponent reasons similarly, then violent confrontation and destruction must follow.
If I go about consolidating my interests in society in a more subtle but still ideological manner by making use of the clever rhetorical devices described above, then I may succeed for awhile. But as the adage goes, I will not be able to fool all the people all the time. Hence, open and potentially destructive confrontation always lurks just below the surface – all the more so whenever I try to prevent a critical scrutiny of my ideas, policies and actions.
However, there is a way out if I place these ideas, policies and actions into a functional perspective. With respect to capitalism and socialism this repositioning would mean two things:
First, a functional perspective requires us to look at the substance of the ideas embodied in these two ideologies, and then to establish what the functional value of each body of ideas actually is. For capitalism, this would be mainly the emphasis on individual freedom, efficiency, productivity, and the generation of wealth. For socialism it could be mainly concern for the poor and the need for a more even distribution of wealth in society.
Second, a functional perspective would necessitate taking a sharply critical look at the manner in which we propagate the sets of ideas collectively known as capitalism and socialism. By saying that we are promoting individual freedom, efficiency, productivity and the generation of wealth, to what extent are we glossing over the fact that capitalism also creates undesirable conditions – for instance the generation of obscenely excessive profits, sometimes without even any productive activity (as in the case of currency and equity speculation)? We could also be obscuring the fact that capitalism can concentrate control of resources in the hands of a small elite able to make decisions affecting the lives of masses of people to whom it is not accountable.
Similarly, by saying that we are concerned about the condition of the poor and that we should distribute wealth more evenly, we could be glossing over or denying the reality that these noble objectives cannot be achieved without efficiency and productivity in industry, commerce, and the state itself.
In short, this functional approach allows us to concede that the particular 'truths' which we support must be constantly evaluated in terms of the concrete effects they tend to realise. If we find that they can enable relationships of domination and exploitation, then we must ask ourselves how we might change the modes of symbolic construction towards transforming those undesirable relationships.
In this essay I have developed a functional perspective in which ideological confrontations can be placed and, possibly, overcome. If we take into account what the different functions of an ideology are, and if we can unmask by recognition the modes of symbolic construction through which ideologies operate in the language we use and the media which we are exposed to, then we can begin to avoid the empty sloganeering and destructive confrontations which typify ideological clashes.
As Michel Foucault has suggested, to avoid or overcome ideologies we should move beyond what they say on the surface and look at the effects achieved by them. After all, we know what we say, and we know what we do, but we tend to neglect what the thing we say says and what the thing we do does – at least when we're operating in an ideological mode.
It is perhaps high time to move beyond the grand narratives of capitalism and socialism and start to think in a post-ideological mode about efficient and effective means of satisfying our concrete and very real needs, both material and non-material.
General Modes
Some typical strategies of symbolic construction
Legitimisation
Rationalisation
Universalisation
Narrativisation
Dissimulation
Displacement
Euphemisation
Trope (e.g. synecdoche, metonymy, metaphor)
Unification
Standardisation
Symbolisation of unity
Fragmentation
Differentiation
Expurgation of the other
Reification
Naturalisation
Eternalisation
Nominalisation/passivisation
Every ideology puts forward a claim, grounded in some kind of legitimisation, that it is just and worthy of support. This may be done by rationalisation – the provision of a chain of reasoning which defends or justifies a set of social relationships or institutions in order to persuade an audience that the ideology is worth supporting.
Institutional arrangements which serve the interests of one individual can be represented by universalisation as serving the interests of all. Such institutions are then regarded as open in principle to anyone having the ability and inclination to succeed within them.
Legitimisation can also be achieved by narrativisation, in which claims to legitimacy are embedded in stories which recount the past and treat the present as part of a timeless and cherished tradition. Traditions may be invented to create a sense of belonging to a community and a history which transcends the experience of conflict, difference and division. Other story formats may include speeches, documentary and fictional films, histories, novels, everyday anecdotes, and jokes which portray our view of the world – reinforcing by laughter that which profits us at the expense of others.
Ideologies succeed also in establishing and sustaining relationships of domination by concealing or denying them, or by representing them in a way which deflects attention from them. This mechanism can be identified as dissimulation, and like other modes of operation, can be attained by using symbolic strategies. Through the strategy of displacement something negative can easily be portrayed as positive. By euphemisation, and by the figurative use of language (tropes), actions, institutions or social relationships can be described in a way which elicits a positive response.
Relationships of domination may also be set up and carried by the mechanism of unification, by constructing at the symbolic level a form of unity which embraces individuals in a collective identity, despite factors which separate them. This is often achieved by the strategy of standardisation, such as the framework of a national language, and this may at the same time legitimise a hierarchy among languages. In a deeply divided society, an illusion of collective identity may be created by a symbolisation of unity which overrides differences.
This is another mode through which an ideology may operate. Instead of maintaining domination by unifying individuals in a collectivity, this mode operates by fragmenting those individuals and groups which might be capable of mounting a serious challenge to the dominant group. Such forces of potential opposition may also be neutralised by projecting them as evil, harmful or threatening.
A typical strategy here would be differentiation – emphasising the distinctions, differences and divisions between individuals or groups, those elements constituting an effective challenge to existing relationships. The same strategy can also prevent effective participation in the exercise of power. Expurgation of the other group is another strategy often effective in neutralising potential opposition by painting it as an enemy or a threat that has to be resisted or expurgated.
This strategy represents that which is transitory or historical as if it were permanent – a natural state of affairs outside time. This entails portraying processes as things, or as events of a quasi-natural kind, so that their social or historical character is eclipsed.
This may be done by naturalisation, wherein a social institution such as the division of labour between men and women is linked to physiological characteristics. Another way is to portray this social institution as something eternal, unchanging and recurring. Both means obscure the historical origins of the social institution, creating the impression of something rigid, difficult to disrupt, and the possible end of which cannot be questioned.
Through nominalisation or passivisation the fact is obscured that people are responsible and therefore must take responsibility for policies, social arrangements and actions. In language, nominalisation is achieved by changing verbs or descriptions of actions into collective nouns – for example, "the banning of imports". Passivisation occurs when verbs are rendered in the passive form, such as "the prisoner is being investigated." In both examples our attention is focused on certain themes at the expense of others. The techniques delete actors and agency and tend to represent processes as things or events which take place in the absence of a subject who or which produces them. They also tend to delete references to specific spatial and temporal contexts, as if time were an eternal extension of the present and the location where the event takes place were not important.
Johan Hattingh is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Stellenbosch University.
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