Facing Our Shadow Side

Every time a country moves from an authoritarian, repressive government to an approximately democratic one, the question of transitional justice has to be faced. How does one deal with the human rights abuses by members of the preceding government, or by combatants in general? Should those presumed guilty be prosecuted and punished, such as the Nazi leaders at Nuremburg? Or should a general amnesty be granted to all, as happened after the collapse of Franco's Spain?

In South America, for example, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay could all qualify as severe human rights offenders. But whereas in Argentina the President ordered investigations into the destinies of the desaparecidos (those who 'disappeared'), followed by judicial proceedings against the alleged perpetrators, the Chilean President called for investigations but no prosecutions and the Uruguayan President called for neither. Although there are a number of reasons for these seemingly gross incongruities, most analysts ascribe the differences to the relative power-balances existing between the military and the civilian governments at the time.

South Africa's Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, no.34 of 1995 - the Act which created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) - was the outcome of a negotiated settlement after a military stalemate. That in itself does not disqualify the commission as an instrument of peacebuilding. Yet today it is perceived by two of the most powerful constituencies in the 'New South Africa' - the National Party (NP) and Inkatha - as biased, and a witch hunt against them.

The Afrikaans press, especially Rapport and Die Burger, have voiced their dislike and suspicion of the TRC for a number of reasons, namely:

• The composition of the TRC: according to them, 12 to 14 of its members can be called pro-ANC; possibly two commissioners are not unsympathetic towards the NP, but there are no pro-Inkatha members. The Afrikaans press compares this to the Chilean commission, which consisted of four members supporting the President and four opposing him.
• They see the same bias in the composition of the TRC staff (research and otherwise).
• They express doubt about the existence of a positive relationship between truth and reconciliation. (One commentator stated that the obverse could be seen in any divorce court.)
• They see an enormous contrast between the way that the TRC handled F W de Klerk's testimony and that of the ANC. According to the Afrikaans press De Klerk was, and is, not given credit for the appointments of both the Goldstone and the Steyn commissions and their inquiries into political violence.
• Both papers protest the procedure followed where untested evidence is used by the commission and where witnesses cannot be cross-examined. The fundamental rule of natural justice - 'audi alterem partem' (both sides must be heard) - is not adhered to.

Unfortunately, it is not even important whether these allegations are true, because as long as these perceptions hold, the Afrikaans establishment will not accept the TRC as a tool for peace. What is the effect of this on the work of the commission?

It is an accepted principle in the field of conflict resolution that in order to obtain a 'good outcome', the cooperation of every party that could veto or derail a negotiated settlement is critical. A 'good outcome' in the case of the TRC is reconciliation; thus the rejection of the TRC by two of the country's most important parties must be seen as a severe obstacle.

This may be the impact on the commission, but what does it mean for the NP and the Afrikaner community it serves? The NP is the second biggest political group after the ANC, and therefore an important player in South Africa's reshaping. But to move constructively into the future, the NP, and the Afrikaners in general, must to an extent redefine themselves.

Not only have the Afrikaners given up power, but they are being held accountable by the world and many of their fellow South Africans for the lion's share of serious human rights abuses. They feel abandoned, leaderless and do not see any ready-made leaders emerging. Many of the building blocks of their existence have been seriously damaged by the actions of the previous government.

The term 'boer' - a concept of pride since the Anglo-Boer war - became a hateful jeer; because of the actions of police and army, the Afrikaner was seen by some as 'the Ugly African'. Afrikaans, so central to Afrikaners' self-definition, became the 'language of the oppressor' - even anathema to some of the younger generation of Afrikaners.

The Church, at the core of Afrikaner life and thought, is perceived by many to have lost its moral base because of its identification with apartheid. The once powerful Afrikaner Broederbond seems without any creative ideas on how to help the Afrikaner play a constructive and creative role at present.

As could be expected, many Afrikaners in general and Nationalists in particular are suffering from a kind of post-traumatic amnesia, denying the atrocities exposed before the TRC or ascribing them to a small group of 'rogue elephants'. Many have firmly refused to acknowledge any ties between the ideology that underpinned apartheid and consequential political actions. A viewpoint often expressed in the Afrikaans press is: "Atrocities were committed on both sides, so let us just forgive and forget."

Substantial evidence from both individual and group experiences around the world tells us that no one can get away from the past without working through it. The only way to build a positive future that all groups can be part of is to fully know what happened and fully understand why it happened.

To gain forgiveness and reconciliation a number of things must occur: perpetrators have to understand the damage they have done and the hurt they have caused; victims must understand why it was done, and must receive a full confession as well as a declaration of the wish to restore the broken relationship. The victim has to see real contrition and the wish to make amends. Only then can history be neutralised; only then have the victims and their families been accorded the dignity and respect necessary to move forward.

This predicates a need for Afrikaners (and others) to fully understand the flaws in their political philosophy, in their theology, in their ideas on race and ethnicity and in the myths surrounding their own group and its destiny - which enabled the excesses of the last 40 years. This is difficult material because it means confronting our shadow side. If this is not done, however, there is no guarantee of 'nunca mas!' (never again!)

Perhaps the Afrikaners need their own truth commission where they can face themselves without feeling spied upon - something that they can't dismiss. Without coming to grips with the past they stand to lose far more than the political power they have relinquished. They may lose the strength to be a separate group, have a separate identity, a culture and a language they can celebrate.

As an Afrikaans-speaking South African, I feel co-responsible for their deeds and their destiny. Until all groups investigate their complicity in the 'old' South Africa, the New South Africa will be on hold.

Prof Ampie Muller is a senior consultant at CCR.

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