Mercenaries are a generic problem of great proportions, regardless of the specific conduct or misconduct of organisations such as South Africa's Executive Outcomes. By mercenaries I mean soldiers hired by a foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict - whether directly by engaging in hostilities, or indirectly through training, logistics, intelligence or advisory services - and who do so outside the authority of the government and defence force of their own country.
In the literature on civil-military relations, armed forces are described as "the managers of organised violence". Their defining institutional feature is the tremendous power at their disposal. This power can be used for legitimate purposes: in defence of a country and its people against aggression, or in peace operations sanctioned by an international authority.
But the power of the military can also be misused for illegitimate ends: to topple its own government; to suppress opposition to government; to kill and injure citizens; and to wage wars of aggression against other states.
Because armed forces constitute a potential threat to governments and citizens, they are subject to a range of controls in democratic countries. These controls are intended to ensure that the military does not undermine the political process, usurp the authority of government, abuse the rights of citizens, and exercise excessive force.
Mercenaries are not subject to such controls.
Consider the effort that South Africa has made to introduce or strengthen these controls with respect to the SANDF: new constitutional provisions on security and defence; amendments to the Defence Act and Military Disciplinary Code; the emphasis on civil supremacy in the white paper on defence; the establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat; oversight by the parliamentary defence committee; the training of military personnel in international humanitarian law; and the development of a civic education programme on "defence in a democracy" for the SANDF.
Can anyone argue seriously that this effort is justified in the case of South Africa's defence force but is not relevant to private companies which play a military role outside our country?
Citizens who volunteer for military service in democratic states are generally motivated by a desire to serve their country, and to do so with honour. Mercenaries, in contrast, are typically motivated by profit, as Eeban Barlow concedes in the case of Executive Outcomes, and are therefore driven mainly by self-interest.
As a result, and given the absence of strong control, the political reliability and military discipline of mercenaries are inherently suspect. Machiavelli emphasised this problem in 1513 saying: "Mercenary captains either are or are not skilful soldiers. If they are, you cannot trust them for they will always seek to gain power for themselves, either by oppressing you, their master, or by oppressing others against your wishes. If, on the other hand, they are not skilful soldiers, they will still be your ruin in most cases."
Acts of terror, looting, pillage, theft, mutiny and desertion by mercenaries in Africa have been well-documented. In the 1970s and early 1980s mercenary strike forces were involved in coups or coup attempts in Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Togo, the Comoro Islands and the Seychelles. More recently, mercenaries have reportedly propped up the dictatorial regime of the former Zaire and fought on both sides of the civil war in Sudan.
For the reasons outlined above, mercenary activity has been condemned internationally:
Executive Outcomes will tell you that the problems described above do not apply to them. They "heartily endorse reconstruction and development for a better quality of life for individuals and communities". They believe that "people's beliefs, cultures and values should be treated with the utmost respect". They are "a-political". They will work only for "legitimate governments"; and they will not work for clients involved in "organised crime", "ethnic cleansing" or "international terrorism".
These claims inspire no confidence whatsoever. They amount to this: "Trust me, I'm a mercenary."
This assertion misses the point. The various forms of control over armed forces, described earlier, exist because in a democracy, by definition, we the people do not trust officials and institutions which have power. We establish a range of checks and balances - which are complicated, costly, time-consuming, even inefficient - in order to control the exercise of power and prevent its abuse.
Executive Outcomes is not subject to these checks and balances. The best they can offer is that they operate under the principles of business law! And that "any attempt to commit crimes will lead to their collapse".
Who determines whether Executive Outcomes personnel have committed a crime? Who investigates allegations of criminal conduct? Who prosecutes if the allegations are justified? What action is taken following prosecution? The answers to these questions are no one, no one, no one and nothing of any reliability.
Of course the host government may kick Executive Outcomes out of their country; and Executive Outcomes may indeed collapse. But this is hardly reassuring, not least because many of its members previously served in 32 Battalion and the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB), which ran hit squads.
The problem is compounded by the fact that Executive Outcomes is less than forthright when describing its activities. According to Eeban Barlow in Finance Week, Executive Outcomes has somewhere between 200 and 7000 employees and is deployed in Angola, Sierra Leone, elsewhere in Africa, somewhere in Europe and somewhere outside of Europe. In Barlow's former job in the CCB, one of his tasks was to feed false information to the press.
In short, Executive Outcomes' protestations of innocence and goodwill provide scant assurance because they cannot be scrutinised and checked by a proper authority.
Executive Outcomes and others who favour the privatisation of security in Africa insist that mercenaries fill a critical need in countries whose governments or armed forces are unable to provide even the most basic security to citizens. Mercenaries may not be the ideal solution, but what other solution is there?
This is a profound challenge to African countries, regional institutions like the OAU, and the international community.
There are alternatives to private security companies:
Let me end by way of domestic analogy. In the Western Cape Pagad (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) claims, with great justification, that it is has been forced to go to war with gangs because for years the police have virtually ignored the problem of gangsterism. But we will not tolerate vigilantes who operate outside the law, no matter how righteous their cause. And if we will not tolerate this in our own communities, how can we tolerate it elsewhere?