Vol.10 No.3
CONTENTS
 
Track Two Vol.10 No.3 December 2001

Amnesty International

Amnesty International is pleased to be associated with the Centre for Conflict Resolution’s (CCR’s) special issue of Track Two which highlights the dangerous consequences for humanity when governments pursue their national security goals with flagrant disregard for internationally recognized human rights and the principles of humanitarian law. We commend the courage of those involved in the endeavour to create greater public awareness and achieve accountability of governments in this field.

As a worldwide movement of people campaigning for adherence to international human rights standards, Amnesty International undertakes research and action focussed on preventing and ending grave abuses of the rights to physical and mental integrity, freedom of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination. It also seeks to support the protection of human rights by co-operating with other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the UN and regional inter-governmental organizations intent on ensuring control of international military, security and police relations and transfers, and promoting awareness of human rights.

Consistent with these objectives Amnesty International opposes “the manufacture, transfer and use worldwide of indiscriminate weapons of warfare”.1 The organization also opposes military, security and police transfers to governments and armed political groups that can reasonably be assumed to contribute to serious human rights violations. It has collaborated with other NGOs in developing a draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers setting out certain core principles and mechanisms relating to international transfers of arms.2 Among other provisions, the draft convention would prohibit Contracting Parties from authorising international transfers of arms which would violate their obligations under international law, including “transfers of arms the use of which is prohibited by international humanitarian law because they are incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”; or where there was a risk that the arms would be used to commit:

• serious violations of human rights;

• serious violations of international humanitarian law applicable in international or  non-international armed conflict; or

• acts of genocide or crimes against humanity.3

As documented in this special issue of Track Two, South Africa’s covert Chemical and Biological Warfare (CBW) programme during the 1980s and early 1990s included the development of weapons apparently intended to be used to kill government opponents and to indiscriminately kill or injure local communities and foreign nationals living in neighbouring states. The hearings in mid-1998 by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) into the CBW programme brought to public attention these activities, which clearly subverted the professional ethics of the scientific and medical professions. As the TRC noted in its October 1998 report,

“Here was evidence of science being subverted to cause disease and undermine the health of communities. Cholera, botulism, anthrax, chemical poisoning and the large-scale manufacture of drugs of abuse, allegedly for purposes of crowd control, were amongst the projects of the programme. Moreover, chemicals, poisons and lethal micro-organisms were produced for use against individuals, and ‘applicators’ (murder weapons) developed for their administration”.4

In addition, the TRC report continued, the programme “was developed and supported by scientists, health professionals, research laboratories and front companies [and] fell under the nominal control of the surgeon-general of the armed forces” and appeared to have received the “support of an extensive international network” in Europe and the United States.5

Amnesty International has supported CCR’s efforts to examine the nature and consequences of apartheid’s CBW programme as part of its commitment to working with other organizations against the transfer and deployment of arms and security equipment which contribute to human rights violations, as well as the banning of those weapons that are inherently indiscriminate, or cruel, inhuman or degrading in their effects.6 Amongst its recommendations, Amnesty International has called on all governments to ensure that all relevant research on the safety of new weapons is placed in the public domain before any decisions are taken on their deployment, a call which is consistent with CCR’s demand for transparency as set out in this report. CCR’s Chemical and Biological Research Project also makes a vital contribution to overcoming the legacies of impunity for human rights violations committed during the apartheid period in South Africa, a matter of longstanding concern for Amnesty International.

Specifically, we have been pleased to contribute financially towards CCR’s systematic monitoring of and reporting on the lengthy criminal trial of Dr Wouter Basson, the former head of the CBW programme. In August 2001 Amnesty International sent an expert delegate, Professor Alastair Hay, to participate in a seminar on Science and Ethics, organized by CCR. The seminar brought together an unusual combination of human rights researchers, representatives of medical, scientific and academic research institutions, as well as some scientists formerly associated with South Africa’s CBW programme. One of its key purposes was to reflect on the reasons why and in what ways scientists, medical doctors and other professionals became involved in a programme which was inherently in conflict with the ethics of their professions. Amnesty International regards the development of and adherence to codes of professional ethics as important tools in the protection of human rights.7 As indicated in the articles by Chandré Gould and Mafole Mokalobe in this edition of Track Two, the seminar participants recommended the development of a code of conduct for scientists, the incorporation of professional ethics components in the training of students and the strengthening of oversight mechanisms to prevent future scientists becoming involved in the kind of abuses of professional standards and human rights characteristic of South Africa’s CBW programme.

It is in this context that Amnesty International is also pleased to contribute to this issue of Track Two, as a reflection of its support for a publication aimed at educating the public in South Africa and internationally about the consequences of ‘national security’ programmes which disregard internationally recognized human rights and the principles of humanitarian law.

Andrew Anderson

Director Africa Program

Amnesty International

Endnotes

1. The decision was taken at Amnesty International’s International Council Meeting held in Cape Town, December 1997.

2. The collaborating organizations include the American Friends’ Service Committee, Amnesty International, the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress, the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), the Federation of American Scientists, OXFAM, Project Ploughshares and Saferworld. The text of the draft convention is available on the website for the working group: http://www.armslaw.org.

3. Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers (2001) Article 2(c), Article 3(b), (c) and (d).

4. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Final Report, Volume 2 Chapter 6, “Special Investigation on Chemical and Biological Warfare”, p.510.

5. Idem, pp.510-523

6. See, for example, Amnesty International, Stopping the torture trade (AI Index: ACT40/002/2001; www.amnesty.org).

7. See the Introduction in Ethical Codes and Declarations Relevant to the Health Professions, An Amnesty International compilation of selected ethical and human rights texts, fourth revised English edition, December 2000 (AI Index: ACT 75/05/00; www.amnesty.org).

 

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