As far back as the fourteenth century, the Basotho people lived in an area that included current day Lesotho and most of South Africa's Free State province. The Basotho followed a decentralised political system with no central authority or monarchy. This changed during the time of the difaqane¹ in the 1820s when the Zulu King Tshaka's armies invaded the highlands of the current Free State, leaving massive destruction and death in their wake. The young Sotho leader Moshoeshoe found refuge for his people on Thaba Bosiu, an almost inaccessible mountain plateau with sufficient water. There he gathered refugees around him, established the first Sotho monarchy and secured the survival of his people. The Zulu threat had scarcely passed when white Afrikaner settlers from the Cape Colony and British colonialists arrived in the area. The establishment of a British Sovereignty in 1848 and the Republic of the Orange Free State in 1854 resulted in significant land losses for Moshoeshoe and the Basotho people. Subsequent wars between the Free State Republic and the Basotho resulted in further land confiscation by the Free State. The British colonial government intervened in 1868 to declare

Basotholand a British Protectorate, which effectively ensured the survival of the Basotho as a political entity. The ensuing demarcation of the boundaries of the Protectorate, however, meant more land losses for the Basotho.

The area they were now restricted to was approximately two-thirds mountainous. The only arable land was confined to the north-western region of the Protectorate. This confinement was severe enough in the days of Moshoeshoe, but the subsequent growth of the Basotho population to its current 2.1 million people has meant that subsistence farming has ceased to be a viable means of survival for the majority of them. Severe over-population of arable areas soon occurred, accompanied by over-grazing of mountainous areas. Erosion reached crisis proportions with severe implications for current sustainable land utilisation. In addition, major dams built downstream in South Africa in the Gariep River became clogged by eroded soil.

Basotholand gained independence from Britain in 1966 and changed its name to Lesotho. The Basotholand National Party (BNP) led by Chief Leabuoa Jonathan won the first elections. Chief Jonathan became Prime Minister of the constitutional monarchy in Lesotho, which was based on the British model. King Moshoeshoe II became the Head of State.

Independent Lesotho was completely surrounded by apartheid South Africa, which had negative consequences for its political stability. South Africa would not, in light of its security concerns², tolerate a hostile African government in its midst. Chief Jonathan initially enjoyed the support of South Africa. He was to have been the first African leader to meet Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of South Africa and architect of apartheid. The meeting did not take place because Dr Verwoerd was murdered several days before the

scheduled date. Eventually Chief Jonathan became disillusioned with South Africa's dictates and looked to the People's Republic of China for financial and moral support. This led to his downfall in 1986 when South Africa closed all its borders with Lesotho, causing economic havoc that ended in a military coup d'etat.

South Africa contributed to Lesotho's political instability in more than one way. The first seizure of power took place in 1971 when it became clear that Chief Jonathan's BNP was losing the national election to the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle. South Africa's complicity in this move was widely suspected. The apartheid government viewed the BCP as a close ally of South Africa's liberation movements, particularly the Pan African Congress (PAC). Chief Jonathan suspended the election and retained power by suspending the constitution. In the 1980s Lesotho became the target of cross-border raids by the increasingly paranoid government of President PW Botha, whose agents infiltrated Lesotho to destroy ANC hideouts³.

Ironically, South Africa's destabilisation led to a strengthening of national pride in Lesotho's independence. Pride at having withstood the conquests of Tshaka and white South Africa during the 1800s, as well as opposing apartheid South Africa's machinations in the 1970s and 1980s, produced an intense nationalistic affirmation and identity. This national pride explains, to a large extent, why most political camps reject the option of Lesotho's integration into South Africa. (This option is considered by many outsiders as the only viable one for Lesotho in light of the country's extreme economic dependence on South Africa.)

Lesotho's national pride, however, was dealt a serious blow in 1998 when, over a period of two days, 600 SADC soldiers subdued the Lesotho army.

Lesotho registered an impressive average of 10% GDP growth between 1995 and 1997, making it one of the top 10 economic performers in Africa. This growth was based on the income generated by the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme and a small but rapidly growing manufacturing sector in the country. The political unrest that followed the general elections of 1998 effectively ended this period of economic growth. While the business sector and the infrastructure of the country suffered damage to the amount of R 2 billion, the damage to investor confidence was incalculable.

Apart from limited diamond resources, Lesotho has no significant mineral wealth. Its agricultural production is severely hampered by overpopulation, soil erosion and a harsh winter climate. Its main source of income for many years has been the export of labour to South African gold mines. These mines, however, are in decline and retrenchments that began in the 1990s have had severe consequences for dependants of Lesotho's migrant workers. Nevertheless, in 1999 earnings generated by migrant labour still constituted approximately 30% of Lesotho's GNP. The national unemployment rate formally stood at approximately 35% that year. The migrant workers are mostly unskilled. Moreover, the skills they develop at the mines have no obvious application in Lesotho. Their life-long labour, therefore, means little for the development of Lesotho itself.

Lesotho's dependence on income generated by migrant labour has had devastating effects on the social fabric of the country. As with many of South Africa's former homelands, Lesotho's rural areas are characterised by the absence of men (especially fathers), creating rural societies of women, children and old people. Apart from the social and psychological damage caused to family and other social units, migrant lifestyles have also produced unsafe sexual habits. Lesotho is currently paying the price for this with an alarmingly high rate of HIV/AIDS infection. Reliable statistics are not available, but estimates put the current national rate of infection at between 25% and 30%.

Lesotho's major economic asset is water. Water gives the country strategic importance in the Southern Africa region but paradoxically also makes it politically vulnerable to external forces. In the late 1990s, the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme was started. Water from the scheme feeds the As River in South Africa, which flows into the Vaal Dam in Gauteng. The scheme is an ambitious collaboration between South Africa and Lesotho. It involves the construction of huge catchment dams in Lesotho to feed South Africa's Highveld water system through a network of tunnels and pumping stations. South Africa's industrial heartland in Gauteng is dependent on this water supply. The scheme has become a crucial source of income for the Lesotho government. South Africa's dependency on this water supply and its intolerance of any interference with the scheme was demonstrated during the 1998 political unrest in Lesotho. When SADC forces intervened in Lesotho in September 1998 following civil unrest and rumours of an impending coup d'etat, South African soldiers attacked Lesotho soldiers guarding the Katse Dam, the main reservoir of the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme. This attack occurred even though the Katse Dam was far from the unrest areas. Eleven Lesotho soldiers were killed in the attack, but the dam was "secured". Some social analysts in Lesotho refer to this incident as the first of the "water wars" predicted globally in the twenty-first century⁴.

Overpopulation, lack of arable land, dependency on migrant labour, social degeneration resulting from migrant lifestyles, and political vulnerability to external regional forces constitute structural fault-lines that form the template of socio-political instability and conflict in Lesotho. It is difficult to see a long-term solution to these negative conditions. The only viable solution, it might seem, would be the political integration of Lesotho into either South Africa (as the latter's tenth province) or a greater Southern African federal system. While Lesotho's political and economic wellbeing depends on South Africa, South Africa, in turn, cannot ignore Lesotho's political and economic instability. South Africa cannot afford to have a desperately impoverished country within its porous borders, as it will ultimately bear the consequences of that poverty. The consequences may include illegal migrancy, economic refugees, banditry, black marketeering that impacts on South Africa's formal economy, and so forth. These will generate internal security problems for South Africa. It would be untenable for South Africa to allow a highly unstable neighbouring government to control the valuable natural resource of water. It is therefore in the long-term interest of both countries to negotiate a mutually beneficial and interdependent relationship.

This will not, however, be an easy process. It is unlikely that the political elite of Lesotho will lightly surrender the financial and political benefits associated with sovereignty. In addition, the issue of land is particularly emotive. If some form of compensation for historical injustices linked to land does not occur, smooth political integration will be impossible. Attention to land issues is not only a matter of justice. Lesotho's overpopulation is a source of instability that will continue to impede development in both Lesotho and its neighbours in Southern Africa. Increased land for subsistence farming or dramatic urbanisation seems to be the only options. Regardless, the question of land redress in Lesotho has serious implications for South Africa.

Lesotho is a homogeneous society with regard to ethnicity, yet it demonstrates all the symptoms of a deeply divided society. The dominant internal cleavage stems from religious and ideological factors. The internal divisions and externally imposed structural causes reinforce each other in an extremely negative way. The poverty and deprivation caused by structural inequality heighten the desperate nature of internal competition for scarce resources. At the same time, the Lesotho government's inability to create a broad base of consensus and co-operation weakens the capacity of society to manage the challenges posed by external forces. For example, the arson and looting of Maseru in 1998, a direct manifestation of deep political intolerance, dealt an almost fatal blow to Lesotho's economic prospects and its ability to combat poverty.

Christian missionaries in Basotholand introduced the first serious social division in the nineteenth century. Missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society arrived in the region in 1833 and established a close relationship with King Moshoeshoe. They were thus able to convert the Basotho from their traditional faith to a westernized form of Christianity. The Roman Catholics arrived in the country in 1862 and immediately began to compete with the Protestants for religious domination. The competition was a spill-over of the historical conflict between the French Protestants and the Roman Catholics in Europe. The Catholics eventually succeeded in co-opting the royal family (post Moshoeshoe) into their fold, which led to the Roman Catholic Church becoming the dominant church in Lesotho. The impact of this unholy competition in God's name was severe as it set up social hierarchies based on religious membership. Church membership determined which school an individual attended and the type of education received. (To this day, church schools remain a prominent feature of Lesotho society.) This impacted on employment opportunities, access to land and, significantly, marriage prospects. The choice of a marriage partner was directly determined by religious affiliation. The church thus effectively managed to divide a once homogeneous community into two deeply distrustful religious groups.

With the advent of independence in 1966, the BNP enjoyed the outspoken support of the Roman Catholic Church, which they won through their anti-Communist stance and support of the monarchy and traditional chieftainship.

The Catholic Church's stance against communism during the Cold War is well known. In the BNP it found a natural ally as Chief Jonathan was initially a strong supporter of the West. However, his collaboration with the People's Republic of China in his later years (the early 1980s) led to his political downfall. He was deposed in 1986 by General Metsing Lekhanya, then an army general, and currently the leader of the BNP.

Unlike the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church encouraged and accommodated traditional systems of authority and belief. In fact, a prominent aspect of their mission strategy was to incorporate traditional elements into church liturgy and practice. This theological focus translated naturally into close bonds between the Catholic Church, traditional authorities and the BNP. The BNP championed the interests of the king and chiefs, even though there was continuous friction between the BNP government and the king over Moshoeshoe II's perceived political ambitions⁵.

The major Protestant church, the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC), tacitly supported the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) during the 1970s and 1980s. This party represented a "commoner's position", favouring democracy and the weakening of rule by hereditary chiefs. In addition, the BCP maintained close ties with socialist countries, particularly the People's Republic of China. In terms of theology, the LEC identified with the position of the World Council of Churches, supporting economic and political options that favoured the poor. Consequently, it found the democratic and socialist ethos of the BCP worthy of support.

Interestingly, even though there are more Catholic church members in Lesotho, the BCP and its "offspring", the Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD), received the majority vote during the 1994 and 1998 elections. This suggests that while the Catholic Church provided powerful moral and other support to the BNP, it was unable to convince its grassroots members to vote for the BNP. The alliance between the Catholic Church and the BNP is primarily one among elites: the chiefs and the church hierarchy. Nonetheless, these powerful elites are able to stir deep emotions and command deep loyalty among sections of Lesotho society. Their power is enhanced by the loyalty they enjoy from the Defence Force. In 1995 the army executed a coup d'etat,

removed the democratically elected BCP leader Ntsu Mokhehle from office, and declared the young King Letsie III as ruler. This situation was defused through diplomatic intervention and pressure from other SADC countries. In 1998 a coup d'etat in support of the opposition was again rumoured to be in the offing. South Africa and Botswana pre-empted the coup attempt through military intervention.

The political divisions in Lesotho are further exacerbated by a collective memory of injustice and persecution. The first coup d'etat by Chief Jonathan in 1971 was followed by the banning of the BCP. Many of its leaders went into exile and incidents of brutal oppression and killing occurred. When the BCP came to power in 1994, followed by its mutation the LCD in 1996, strategic government positions and contracts were awarded to LCD supporters. While this may elsewhere be a normal phenomenon of political transition, in Lesotho it created a strong perception in the civil service of a government bent on revenge. In a society where most civil and political actors know each other personally, the bitter political memories of the past easily translate into personal vendettas and mistrust.

The Lesotho constitution reflects that of its former colonial master, Britain. There are two houses of Parliament. Eighty constituency-based representatives elected on a "first-past-the-post" basis form the National Assembly. The Senate has 33 members, mostly Principal Chiefs. The King is the Head of State.

The political crisis of 1998 was largely a consequence of the electoral system. The national elections of that year resulted in a discrepancy between the percentage of votes gained by, and the number of seats awarded to each party. The ruling party, the LCD, captured 60% of the vote and as many as 79 out of 80 seats. The opposition parties received 40% of the vote but just one seat. This situation, coupled with accusations of electoral fraud, caused prolonged protest, leading to the serious outburst of discontent in September 1998.

Lesotho's political instability must also be viewed in the context of the "politics of poverty". This term describes a common phenomenon in Africa whereby professional politics is the only means of escaping poverty. In a society with few options for achieving financial wellbeing, political positions are sought with passion and, quite often, desperation. The pain of losing an election is therefore much greater than "normal". Losing may literally mean a return to poverty. It is also important to note the extreme fragmentation in Lesotho politics. New political parties are being formed almost on a daily basis. At the last count, there were 18 political parties. In addition, political parties are, almost without exception, wracked by serious internal dissent and leadership conflicts. This fragmentation may be a sign that the historical grip of religious and ideological polarisation is slowly being broken. On the other hand, it may indicate Lesotho society's acute vulnerability to the "politics of poverty".

Lesotho's "winner-takes-all" electoral system and the conflict it has generated historically demonstrate the inappropriateness of this system in the African context. In deeply divided societies, where the stakes of winning and losing are extremely high, the constitution should discourage cut-throat competition.

Following the 1998 political unrest, political parties have been engaged in negotiations on a new electoral system. They have agreed in principle on a mixed model that combines the 80 constituencies elected on a "first-past-the-post" system with a number of representatives elected on a proportional basis. At the time of writing, the parties were still in deadlock regarding the numbers for this last category, with the LCD favouring 40 and the opposition 50.

Within LCD circles, there is a strong desire to reform the Senate. This is a highly emotive issue which, if not properly managed, might lead to violence. Essentially, reform of the Senate means curbing the power and privileges of the Chiefs. Although this issue has been publicly spoken about on a number of occasions, it has not yet been constructively discussed or negotiated. The issue of Senate reform is currently restricted to a rhetorical level and stirs dangerous emotions.

Lesotho society is characterised by many active and committed civil society actors. In 1995, following the crisis which ensued from the coup d'etat in favour of the king, a non-governmental coalition organised a "National Dialogue on Democracy, Stability and Development". The coalition managed to engage the entire spectrum of political and civil society opinion on these issues. A number of important decisions regarding the promotion of political stability were made at that forum, but not all of them have been implemented. One significant outcome was the agreement to establish an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), although the IEC was the target of much criticism following the 1998 elections. The criticism was directed at its inefficiency and perceived partiality towards the ruling party. The political parties and government reached consensus early in 2000 on the restructuring of the IEC in view of the national elections scheduled for 2001.

Civil society actors again intervened during the 1998 crisis. A Crisis Committee consisting of churches and non-governmental organisations was formed. The Lesotho Network for Conflict Management (LNCM), established earlier that year, constituted the secretariat and was responsible for administering the committee's work. The LNCM was able to engage all the actors involved in the crisis and defused a number of potentially explosive situations. However, it was not able to defuse the overarching crisis, as was evident in the dangerous collapse of law and order in September 1998.

Following the 1998 crisis, the LNCM co-ordinated civil society activities relating to conflict resolution. It offered support to the Interim Political Authority (IPA), a multi-party body created in the aftermath of the 1998 fiasco with a mandate to establish suitable constitutional and political conditions for free and fair elections in 2001. The LNCM assisted the IPA with the facilitation of discussions at a representative forum on electoral models, facilitated dialogue between members of Parliament and Principal Chiefs within the districts, and organised a conference on the question of a National Peace Accord for Lesotho. It is currently working with the IPA and the IEC to formulate a suitable strategy to ensure peaceful national elections in 2001.

A significant development following numerous mediation initiatives by external parties (the South African government, SADC, the Commonwealth) is that there now appears to be a preference for the use of internal mediators. The leading mediator is Bishop Khoarai of the Catholic Church. He enjoys the trust of all the parties and has successfully mediated disputes on a number of occasions. A panel consisting mainly of LNCM officials support Bishop Khoarai. The preference for civil society rather than external actors as mediators in Lesotho is interesting and encouraging. It suggests that local actors perceive and experience external mediation negatively. It also indicates a desire for self-generated solutions and confidence in civil society's ability to play a constructive role in bringing stability to Lesotho.

Lesotho's conflict is underpinned by structural problems that will continue to impact on the country's stability for as long as they are not adequately addressed. The problems intersect with sharp internal social and political divisions. The net result, at best, is a seriously fragmented response to the daunting challenges faced by the country. The inability of internal actors to achieve a sense of common purpose and act in the interest of the common good was visibly demonstrated by the devastation of Maseru and the economy in 1998. The challenge is to stop this downward spiral and establish sufficient cohesion in order to address the structural problems. The assumption is that the structural problems cannot be corrected if not addressed through united and determined action. Failing this, Lesotho will remain at the mercy of external forces. Recently concluded agreements and the preference for civil society actors to act as facilitation agents are encouraging.

This section contains a summary analysis of the role that the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), a South African based non-governmental organisation, can play in Lesotho. CCR's experience in providing support to Lesotho organisations since 1997 and its understanding of conflict resolution processes in general inform this discussion. The following outline provides the rationale for CCR's role in Lesotho:

1. CCR's ability to directly address the structural causes of conflict in Lesotho is obviously limited, as it has no access to or control over the requisite political and economic power. The only option in this regard would be to perform an advocacy role and to raise public awareness regarding historical and current conditions of structural injustice. However, there are a number of able analysts, including prominent Lesotho academics, who are already performing this function on an ongoing basis. It is questionable whether CCR could improve on this and whether this would be the most profitable use of CCR's resources.
2. The most logical option for CCR is to continue supporting the efforts of the LNCM in promoting national consensus and cohesion. CCR has played this role for the past three years. A detailed description of CCR's strategies over the next two to three years is outlined in the attached document titled "The Lesotho Programme of the Centre for Conflict Resolution: activity report and programme outline." In summary, CCR's proposed role entails building the capacity of the LNCM in conflict resolution through in-depth training and support of key LNCM officials; and through the provision of training and other support to specific programmes developed by the LNCM, such as the Local Government Decentralisation Programme and the programme to facilitate a National Peace Accord.
3. The following are the strengths of the above approach:

• The emerging desire in Lesotho for self-reliance in terms of conflict resolution will be strengthened by building the capacity of local actors. Local ownership of the peace process will be reinforced.
• CCR's role has been clearly defined as a technical one, providing training and consultation to key local actors. There will be no role-confusion or any threat to local interests.
• The approach is sustainable in that it will build conflict resolution capacity in the country, leaving the actual mediation of conflict to CCR's local partners. It creates the possibility for Lesotho actors to avoid being reliant on external mediators.

4. The approach is subject to the following limitations:

• CCR will not act independently. This means that at times opportunities identified as important in CCR's view could be missed if its local partners do not share these priorities.
• CCR will not be able to determine the pace and sequence of events. This will effect its ability to do medium-term planning and to stay within the timeframes agreed to with its funders.
• Because the approach is civil society-based, it will be relatively easy for political actors, both internally and externally, to disregard the process when it suits them.
• The peace process steered by the LNCM depends on volunteers. The chairperson and members of the LNCM are busy people; their engagement in this process stems from personal commitment rather than material reward. Such a civil society-based process is vulnerable to changes in the personal circumstances of individuals and may loose steam rather quickly if prominent leaders were unable to continue participating in the process.

5. The following are significant opportunities for the LNCM/CCR partnership:

• To contribute towards peacebuilding at the level of Lesotho's 10 districts. The tension between traditional authorities and democratic governance impacts very directly on this level because it involves issues such as the allocation of land, boundary disputes, cattle rustling and other day-to-day problems. The facilitation of a constructive mode of co-operation for local actors will have a direct impact on events at national level.
• To contribute to successful elections in 2001 by supporting mediation efforts at national level and facilitating the planning of a national strategy for peace.
• To address the fundamental division in the country through facilitating dialogue between churches, prominent political leaders and civil society actors.
• To promote a culture of constructive conflict resolution in Lesotho through successful mediation at local and national level, through exposing strategic role-players to conflict resolution training, and through providing in-depth conflict resolution training to individuals in leadership/ decision-making positions.

6. The approach is at the same time subject to the following threats:

• Local peacemakers always run the risk of being perceived by the parties in conflict as having hidden agendas. The deep polarisation of the past renders the process especially vulnerable to perceptions of partiality. Civil society actors may at times be subject to suspicion and slander campaigns.
• Because of its basis in civil society, this process is dependent on external funding. If such funding is not forthcoming, the process will fail.

The strengths of CCR's approach clearly outweigh the limitations. The limitations and threats are mostly related to the general limitations of civil society's involvement in peacebuilding. They can best be countered by an emphasis on capacity building within the LNCM. In short, there is no substantial reason why CCR should not pursue its proposed strategy in Lesotho.

NOTES