Remarks on reform of the United Nations
On the occasion of the address by
UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan,
South African Institute of International Affairs,
21 March 1997
Laurie Nathan, Executive Director
Centre for Conflict Resolution
University of Cape Town, South Africa
There is a compelling argument to reform the United Nations, and the composition of the Security Council in particular, to reflect more closely the realignment of international relations in the post-Cold War era. This is an important political perspective, concerned mainly with the problem of power.
But since the Security Council is the principal agency for preventing, managing and resolving major inter- and intra-state conflict, it may also be useful to consider the question of UN reform from a conflict resolution perspective. From this perspective the problem might be defined as follows: the Security Council, whatever its composition, does not adhere to the fundamental groundrules of professional mediation.
There are at least four reasons for this. First, the Security Council formally combines the functions of advocacy (in favour of respect for human rights and other norms); enforcement (through economic sanctions or military intervention); and mediation. All of these functions may be necessary in a given conflict, but it is not appropriate to locate them in a single body. A professional mediator cannot be a lobbyist, and certainly cannot carry a big stick.
Second, the problem of partisanship is compounded by the fact that the Security Council comprises states which frequently have parochial interests in the outcome of a dispute, sometimes even in perpetuating the dispute. A mediator who demonstrates a bias towards one the antagonists will immediately lose the trust of the others.
Third, as a result of these national interests, the Security Council is often divided on the best course of action in a specific conflict. A mediation body cannot hope to build consensus among the parties to a conflict if it does not have consensus within its own ranks.
Fourth, the factors outlined above may compromise the independence of individuals appointed as mediators by the Secretary General on the basis of a Security Council mandate. Mediators cannot do their jobs properly if they are subject to pressure and interference by a higher authority.
A solution to these problems may lie in delinking the UN's mediation function from the Security Council by establishing a panel of professional mediators who are tasked by, and report to, the Secretary General alone.
The mediators would be professional in the sense that they operate independently of national interests; in the sense that their activities are regulated by a code of conduct which encapsulates the basic groundrules of mediation; and in the sense that they have deep expertise in the techniques of mediation, namely the facilitation of non-adversarial negotiations, joint problem-solving and consensus building.
The panel would not have coercive powers; it would maintain a low profile; and its efforts would necessarily require the consent of the disputant parties. It may therefore be perceived by these parties as less threatening than the Security Council. Preventive diplomacy, in particular, is less likely to be seen as external interference in domestic affairs.
The establishment of the panel would amount to formalising, within the office of the Secretary General, the kind of Track Two diplomacy undertaken by the religious community in Mozambique. It would give the Secretary General a mediation capacity which could be utilised for advice and action, in respect of both crisis intervention and preventive diplomacy, on a continuous and co-ordinated basis.
In conclusion, certain conflicts do not lend themselves to mediation, or may not be ripe for mediation. Advocacy and enforcement may be essential in these circumstances, and in other situations they may usefully complement mediation. But for as long as these functions are performed by the same body, and for as long as international mediation is closely linked to partisan interests and the exercise of power, it will not be much different from coercive diplomacy.
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