"Let Us Gather By the River"

A litiwe linwe a li nunsi hove
(One finger alone doesn't lift a grain of maize - Ronga saying, Mozambique)

In August 1992 the presidents of Southern African states convened in Windhoek to consider regional economic and security arrangements. Against the backdrop of the ending of the Cold War and the imminent demise of apartheid in South Africa, they concluded a treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as an international body with a legal personality. ² The primary goal of the organisation is regional development and economic integration.

On the grounds that political and military stability are essential prerequisites for development, SADC's objectives include the `evolution of common political values and institutions' and the `promotion of peace and security'. ³ The Treaty identifies `politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security' as one of seven areas of regional co-operation. ⁴ Accordingly, in August 1994 the SADC heads of state approved, without further elaboration, the formation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security. ⁵

This paper is concerned with the structures, objectives and operation of the Political Sector. It recommends that the Sector be comprised of a Council of Foreign Ministers and defence, police and intelligence commissions headed by the responsible ministers; it explores some general organisational questions regarding the establishment of these forums; it makes proposals on their terms of reference and conflict management procedures; and it formulates Protocols on political and security co-operation. ⁶ These proposals are situated in the context of strategic, conceptual and institutional developments regarding peace and security in Southern Africa since the conclusion of the Cold War.

There is no doubt that internal oppression, poor governance and economic mismanagement have contributed to Southern Africa's woes. It is equally true that `external factors', in the form of Cold War rivalry and apartheid destabilisation, wreaked havoc on the sub-continent and precluded the attainment of stability and development. That storm is now over and the SADC states have a unique opportunity to repair the damage and rebuild their countries with common purpose.

Strategic Context

Over the past five years the political and strategic environment in Southern Africa has changed dramatically. Most of the major historical conflicts were resolved or are in the process of being settled: Namibia attained its independence; Cuban and South African troops were withdrawn from Angola; Frelimo and Renamo concluded a cease-fire; and, for the first time, democratic elections were conducted in Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho and South Africa. The advent of democracy in South Africa has removed the dominant source of regional instability.

Much of this progress was a direct consequence of the ending of the Cold War, which led to the cessation of Superpower contestation on the sub-continent and a more prominent role for the United Nations in regional and national conflict resolution. ⁷ There has been a concomitant attenuation of ideology as a source of tension within and between Southern African countries ⁸ , and this has been accompanied by significant movement towards political pluralism. ⁹

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the current transitions to democracy are fraught with uncertainty and danger. In Angola the cease-fire agreement and subsequent elections in 1992 were thrown into turmoil when Unita rejected the election results; at the time of writing the country remains locked in civil war. The newly elected government of Lesotho was subject to a coup in 1994, and the negotiated settlements in Mozambique and South Africa are threatened by on-going political and criminal violence.

Furthermore, Southern Africa is wracked by a range of formidable problems for which no immediate remedies are in sight: an absence of effective governance; internal political and ethnic conflict; unstable civil-military relations; a proliferation of small arms in private hands; a large number of demobilised soldiers who are destitute; chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, illiteracy and unemployment; countless refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis and a net outflow of capital; and rampant disease and environmental degradation, compounded by natural disasters like drought. ¹⁰

These problems are exacerbated by the growing political and economic marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders have warned that the continent is `drifting almost to the point of delinkage from the attention of the rest of the world'. They fear that Africa has `moved from being at the periphery to the periphery of the periphery of the global economy - the permanent political underdog, the world's basket case for which there is little hope'. ¹¹

In summary, Southern Africa is characterised by the following strategic features which provide a compelling argument for the creation of a common security regime and offer direction on the agenda and orientation of such a regime.

First, virtually all the major threats to the security of people and states derive from internal rather than external factors. Nevertheless, the domestic crises in some countries are so severe that they undermine stability in neighbouring states and could provoke cross-border hostilities.

Second, the most serious security problems are political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in origin and character. Although these problems may give rise to violence, leading to the deployment of the police and possibly the armed forces, their solutions lie in socio-economic development and the consolidation of fragile democracies.

Third, certain critical issues - like refugees, environmental destruction, the depletion of natural resources and the proliferation of small arms - are common to many countries and transcend national borders.

Fourth, in the absence of external military threats to individual states or the region as a whole, there is the potential to engage in a process of substantial disarmament in the interests of development and the provision of welfare services.

Fifth, the prospects for addressing disarmament and threats to security in a collaborative fashion are better than at any other time in recent decades. The sub-continent is no longer divided along ideological lines and all the SADC states regard each other as allies.

Conceptual Framework

Since the end of the Cold War, and in anticipation of the ending of apartheid, numerous academic conferences have focussed on the future of security and defence arrangements in Southern Africa. ¹² A broad consensus has emerged around the following themes: new thinking on security; common security; disarmament; and peaceful resolution of conflict. These themes have increasingly been incorporated into the political discourse of SADC and its member states.

New thinking on security

The conventional approach to security was shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War. For close on four decades the international system was characterised by acute tension between rival ideological blocs and the prospect of a major war in Europe; there was also the terrifying possibility of nuclear war. In this context, the debate around security focussed on states and military stability. ¹³ Security policy was chiefly concerned with defending the sovereignty and territory of the state. The predominant response to perceived challenges was the threat or use of force. Fuelled by the self-serving interests of military establishments, the perpetual tendency was to build larger armies and arsenals in anticipation of `worst case scenarios'.

This approach, which remains prevalent in many regions, has a number of severe shortcomings: it generally ignores the underlying reasons for conflict; it does not take adequate account of the security of people and the non-military threats to their security; it contributes to a militarist ethos in civil society; it diverts resources from more productive ends; and it fails to utilise fully the various non-violent forms of conflict resolution.

The approach may also be counter-productive, giving rise to what is termed the `security dilemma': the military steps taken by a state to enhance its security may induce insecurity in other states, particularly those with which it has adversarial relations. The inevitable reaction of those states is to strengthen their own military capability. As the arms race escalates, war preparations become more likely to provoke than prevent hostilities and undoubtedly raise the human and economic costs of warfare. ¹⁴

For several decades United Nations agencies, independent commissions and peace studies scholars have sought to develop an alternative model of security which overcomes these problems. ¹⁵ In the post-Cold War period many of their ideas have been adopted by the mainstream discipline of strategic studies ¹⁶ , as well as by senior defence officials ¹⁷ and political leaders in Africa ¹⁸ , Southern Africa ¹⁹ and elsewhere.

In contrast to the traditional preoccupation with the security of the state and the military aspects of security, the new model emphasises the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security. There are two reasons for this fundamental shift in emphasis. First, the security of states is not necessarily synonymous with the security of people; in much of the world the pre-eminent threat to citizens is their own government. ²⁰ Second, non-military problems like poverty, oppression and ecological degradation present grave threats to the security of people. These problems may also lead to violent conflict and threaten the security of the state.

The main principles of new thinking on security can be summarised as follows:

First, security is conceived as a holistic phenomenon which is not restricted to military matters but broadened to incorporate political, social, economic and environmental issues.

Second, the objects of security are not confined to states but extend at different levels of society to include people, geographic regions and the global community.

Third, threats to security are not limited to military challenges to state sovereignty and territorial integrity; they include abuse of human rights, economic deprivation, social injustice and destruction of the environment.

Fourth, the objectives of security policy therefore go beyond achieving an absence of war to encompass the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and protection of the environment.

Fifth, the use of military force is a legitimate means of defence against external aggression but it is not an acceptable instrument for conducting foreign policy and settling disputes.

Sixth, states can mitigate the security dilemma and promote regional stability by adopting a defensive military doctrine and posture. ²¹

Seventh, domestic security policy should pay greater attention to the problem of violence against women and children. Rape, wife battery, child abuse and diverse types of harassment have a traumatic impact on the physical and psychological security of over half the population but are largely ignored by state agencies.

The main criticism of the new model is that it creates so broad a security agenda as to be unmanageable. Yet, as Ken Booth argues, the political process is precisely about making choices between competing demands. Security concerns have to be prioritised whatever the size of the agenda. Moreover, security is not the sole responsibility of any one government department; different dimensions are handled by the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, home affairs and development. ²²

The strength of new thinking on security is precisely the fact that it sets a broad agenda. Defining problems like poverty, environmental degradation and abuse of human rights as security issues raises their political profile. There may be times when military considerations are paramount but at other times they need to be balanced against non-military threats. ²³ As will be discussed more fully below, finding the right balance is particularly important when allocating state resources since excessive military expenditure will undermine rather than enhance the security of citizens.

Common security

The concept of common security achieved international prominence with the 1982 report of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The Commission argued that countries have become increasingly interdependent in the modern technological age and that common problems transcend national borders as never before. States can no longer protect their citizens through unilateral military means. They share an interest in joint survival and should begin to organise their security policies in co-operation with each other. ²⁴

In the late 1970s the Frontline States responded to Pretoria's policy of regional destabilisation in precisely this manner by establishing the Inter-State Committee on Security and Defence, a little publicised body of defence ministers, defence ministry officials and senior military officers. ²⁵ Regular meetings and co-ordinated action over fifteen years achieved a high level of trust among the participating armed forces and governments. ²⁶

A common security approach will remain necessary in the post-apartheid era despite the fact that there is little prospect of external aggression against individual states or the region as a whole. As noted above, many of the domestic threats to states are shared problems and undermine the stability of neighbouring countries. In addition, since the sub-continent is politically volatile and its national and regional institutions are weak, internal conflicts could easily give rise to cross-border tensions.

It is also significant that the cohesion of the Frontline States was based largely on their common opposition to apartheid. With the advent of democracy in South Africa, the bonds of regional solidarity may begin to melt. Inter-state disputes could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign aid and investment, natural resources and previously suppressed territorial claims.

A common security regime would have many advantages in this context. It could provide a basis for early warning of potential crises; building military confidence and stability through disarmament and transparency on defence matters; engaging in joint problem-solving and developing collaborative programmes on security issues; negotiating multi-lateral security agreements; and managing conflict through peaceful means. The Protocols and terms of reference outlined below contain practical proposals in each of these areas.

Military officers and analysts who remain locked in a Cold War mind set believe that the common security model is premised on idealistic assumptions about the nature of states. Yet the model does not deny that international relations are characterised by competing national interests and the risk of armed hostilities. Instead, it seeks to minimise this risk by creating an environment in which states build their security with rather than against each other; it aims to prevent and resolve disputes without resort to force; and it recognises the interdependence of states and the potential for political and military co-operation.

The European experience since World War Two demonstrates that this perspective is not unduly idealistic. Europe offers two concrete examples of what is possible elsewhere in the world: a strong military alliance in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and a looser framework, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which united hostile states in an effort to defuse tension during the Cold War.

These examples highlight the distinction between a common security regime and a common defence alliance. Whereas the former is based on political and security protocols and co-operation, the latter entails a more ambitious commitment by states to defend each other against external attack. There is some support for a regional defence pact in Southern Africa but the dominant view is that this is a long-term option, the exercise of which depends on the success of common security arrangements.

Similarly, the creation of a standing regional or continental peacekeeping force is generally regarded as being impractical for logistical and financial reasons in the short- to medium-term. ²⁷ States which experience internal or external hostilities are more likely to call on other countries to assist them in peace operations on an ad-hoc basis, albeit under the auspices of SADC, the Organisation of African Unity or the UN Security Council.

Disarmament

Since World War Two the United Nations has devoted much attention to the cause of disarmament in pursuit of its mandate to maintain international peace and security. In 1978 the General Assembly held a Special Session on Disarmament which resolved that the ultimate objective of the international community is `general and complete disarmament under effective international control'. ²⁸ This long-term ideal has served as a guiding principle in subsequent UN deliberations on the subject.

African countries have endorsed this position through numerous resolutions of the Organisation of African Unity. They have emphasized that a positive relationship exists between disarmament, development and security, and have declared their commitment to disarmament in general, nuclear disarmament in particular, and the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean. ²⁹

SADC has similarly resolved to `free resources from military to productive development activities'. ³⁰ This has not been idle rhetoric. Since 1989, as a result of the collapse of the Cold War, the reduced state of conflict in the region and growing pressure from international donor agencies, many of the most militarised Southern African states have lowered their force levels by substantial amounts. For example, between 1991 and 1994 full-time force levels dropped from 54 600 to 46 900 in Zimbabwe; from 58 000 to 30 000 in Mozambique; and from 70 000 (SWAPO guerillas and South African-controlled troops) to 8 100 in Namibia. ³¹

There are two basic arguments for disarmament. First, the continuous build-up of arms and the growing sophistication of weaponry make the world a more dangerous place: they heighten political instability, the risk of armed hostilities and the human and economic costs of warfare. Second, armaments divert resources from more productive ends. They are a major cause of the net outflow of capital from many countries in the South and thereby contribute significantly to underdevelopment. ³²

In Africa in particular, large-scale internal repression has required vast sums to be spent on `defence' at the expense of development and the provision of welfare services. The resulting impact on standards of living has further reduced the security of citizens and, in some instances, intensified popular resistance against the state. ³³ Nigeria's Olu Ademiji describes the ensuing vicious circle: Very often, arms acquisitions by Third World countries in the interests of security are made at the apparent cost of primary or basic needs in the area of social and economic well-being. Given the fragile economic base, which cannot sustain the expenditure on arms, and the equally fragile political base, which requires arms acquisition, self-preservation often dictates a choice of defence over development. The non-military threats to security are thus neglected, creating further cause for instability. ³⁴

Disarmament in the post-Cold War period has proven to be an extremely complex process which entails considerable social and economic costs. In Europe, North America and the former Soviet Union, these costs are typically associated with the closure of military bases and resultant loss of jobs, the disposal of weaponry and ammunition, and the conversion of sectors of the arms industry to civilian production.

In Southern Africa the problems are of a different nature. First, there is the difficulty of integrating former combatants into civilian society. Thousands of guerillas who were demobilised at independence in Namibia and Zimbabwe remain unemployed and have resorted to banditry ³⁵ ; this phenomenon is also evident in Mozambique and South Africa. ³⁶ Second, defence cuts often lead to lower wages and deteriorating conditions in the armed forces, invoking a crisis of morale which, as in Lesotho, is conducive to a coup or, as in Mozambique, results in soldiers turning to crime in order to supplement their income.

Finally, the major burden of disarmament in Southern Africa falls on South Africa in the light of its disproportionately high force levels and weapons holdings: in 1993 its military reserves exceeded those of the SADC states combined by over half a million ³⁷ ; its active military personnel exceeded those of individual countries by at least 20 000, or roughly 30% ³⁸ ; and its aggregate conventional weaponry and equipment was nearly five times higher than that of its immediate neighbours. ³⁹ Further, South Africa alone has a sizable arms industry, while the majority of SADC states lack the resources to procure new weapons and maintain existing equipment. Disarmament in South Africa would facilitate regional disarmament, stability and development.

Peaceful resolution of conflict

Over the past few years Southern African governments have repeatedly endorsed the principle of resolving inter-state conflict through non-violent means. They appear to regard this position as being so self-evident as to require little elaboration. Beyond the rhetoric, however, the position is undermined by three factors.

First, the SADC states have not abandoned completely a Cold War perspective on the utility of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. For example, when South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe sought to reinstate the Lesotho government following a coup in 1994, their diplomatic efforts were `reinforced' by the threat of a military blockade against the land-locked mountain kingdom and by the deployment of the South African defence force along its borders. ⁴⁰

By way of further example, the 1993 SADC Programme of Action contains this statement: There is a sense in which military force is an acceptable form of foreign policy. The region would have to agree on conditions under which this will be acceptable. The region would also need to consider conditions under which military intervention in a fellow Member State might be acceptable. Humanitarian considerations, peacekeeping and the restoration of constitutional order would be acceptable grounds for such intervention. ⁴¹

Second, as reflected in the above statement and the threat of force against Lesotho, there is little appreciation of the most fundamental rule of international law: that the use and threat of force in international relations is only justified in the case of self-defence against an armed attack or, in the absence of an attack, with the explicit authorisation of the UN Security Council. SADC's commitment to peaceful conflict resolution would be strengthened considerably if it were grounded in a formal endorsement of the law on armed conflict. ⁴²

Third, while Southern African leaders regularly stress the value of mediation and negotiation, they have not yet established fixed procedures and mechanisms for implementing such strategies. Nor are they sufficiently familiar with the relevant skills and techniques. Their mediation efforts, such as around the Lesotho coup, consequently tend to be ad-hoc, reactive and reminiscent of gun-boat diplomacy. A more sustained, systematic and preventive approach to inter- and intra-state dispute settlement is outlined below.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

In 1980 the independent states of Southern Africa established the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) with a view to reducing their economic dependence on South Africa. ⁴³ In 1992, as the apartheid era drew to a close, SADCC was dissolved and replaced by SADC. The new institution differs from its predecessor in three major respects: it includes the regional `superpower', South Africa; its primary goal goes beyond economic co-ordination to higher levels of regional integration ⁴⁴; and its mandate extends to the political, military and security realms.

The founding documents of SADC present the following motivation for this broad mandate: War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security. ⁴⁵

The SADC Programme of Action for 1993 proposed the following strategies for advancing regional security: the adoption of a `new approach to security' which emphasises the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security; the creation of a forum for mediation and arbitration; reductions in force levels and military expenditure; the introduction of confidence- and security-building measures and non-offensive defence doctrines; and the ratification of key principles of international law governing inter-state relations. ⁴⁶

In July 1994 SADC convened a Ministerial Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security. In two respects the event was a watershed in the evolving debate on these themes. First, the workshop was attended by a wide range of interested parties: the participants included cabinet ministers and government officials; military, intelligence and police officers; parliamentarians; and delegates from human rights groups and other non-governmental organisations.

Second, the workshop marked a major step on the road to a common political and security regime. It recommended the formation of a Human Rights Commission headed by judges and eminent persons; a Conflict Resolution Forum comprised of foreign ministers; a Security and Defence Forum composed of ministers responsible for defence, policing and intelligence; a SADC Sector on security and defence; and an autonomous institute for strategic studies. ⁴⁷

In August 1994 the SADC Summit, comprised of heads of state or government, approved the creation of a Sector on Politics, Diplomacy, International Relations, Defence and Security. In a relatively short period of time, the focus of SADC's deliberations on regional peace and security has thus moved from principles to strategies to mechanisms. The challenge now is to determine more precisely the objectives, programmes and procedures of the new Sector.

GUIDELINES FOR THE CREATION OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY FORUMS

Before turning to the specific features and terms of reference of the Political Sector and its sub-structures, this section considers some general organisational questions regarding their establishment. It makes proposals on appropriate means of dealing with institutional constraints; the problem of sovereignty; the involvement of women; the status and co-ordination of the Sector; and a number of debates concerning alternative structural arrangements.

Constraints

Southern Africa is characterised by a relatively high level of political co-operation which is likely to prevail over the next decade. Our common cultural and social affinities, common historical experiences and common problems and aspirations remain a firm and enduring foundation for common actions to promote regional economic welfare, collective self-reliance and integration in the spirit of equity and partnership. ⁴⁸

Nonetheless, there are many constraints on the effectivity of regional mechanisms on the sub-continent: financial resources are extremely limited and it is undesirable to be overly reliant on foreign funding; national institutions are weak and this weakness is automatically transferred to regional structures; small states fear that they may be overwhelmed or undermined by strong states in multi-lateral forums; a tension exists between the pursuit of national and regional interests; and states are reluctant to surrender sovereignty in the sensitive areas of security, defence and foreign policy.

In the light of these constraints, the following considerations should guide the formation and operation of the Political Sector: its programmes should be cost-effective and, to the greatest extent possible, financed by member states; it should have realistic objectives and a modest agenda which could be strengthened over time; it should endeavour to advance national interests rather than concentrate exclusively on regional goals; and its decision-making should be based on consensus.

Some writers argue that decision-making by consensus is dysfunctional in conflict situations because it allows belligerent states to veto proposals for punitive action being taken against them; majority or `consensus-minus-X' rules are preferable in such situations. ⁴⁹ Whatever the merits of this argument, a consensual approach was adopted by the Frontline States and SADCC, and is clearly favoured by SADC. ⁵⁰ It is seen as essential to maintaining unity and preserving the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs. Furthermore, non-coercive conflict resolution will only succeed if it has the support of the disputant parties.

The SADC Treaty does provide for a deadlock-breaking mechanism: Article 16 states that a Tribunal shall be constituted to adjudicate upon any disputes referred to it, and that the decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding. Article 33(1) declares that the Summit may impose sanctions on a member state which fails to fulfil Treaty obligations or undermines the principles and objectives of the organisation. However, SADC has yet to establish the Tribunal and clarify the procedures for imposing sanctions.

The question of sovereignty

As noted above, certain of the SADC states fear that their membership of multi-lateral political and security forums will entail major infringements of sovereignty. This is an entirely legitimate concern which has also bedeviled efforts to consolidate the European Union. It would be prudent for SADC to seek to accommodate such sensitivities. Nevertheless, the following countervailing factors are relevant.

First, Southern African countries have already agreed to entertain a loss of sovereignty by joining SADC. President Nujoma of Namibia, amongst others, argues that this is intrinsic to the nature and successful functioning of the institution. He highlights `the need to put regional considerations above national interests and the need to relinquish some national sovereignty for the interests of the region'. ⁵¹

The 1992 SADC Declaration dealt with the matter in this way:
Regional integration does imply that some decisions which were previously taken by individual states are taken regionally, and those decisions taken nationally give due regard to regional positions and circumstances. Regional decision-making also implies elements of change in the locus and context of exercising sovereignty, rather than a loss of sovereignty. ⁵²

Second, the political and security forums as currently envisaged are unlikely to lead to significant encroachments on sovereignty since their emphasis will be on co-ordination and co-operation. It is only at higher levels of integration, such as through the formation of a defence alliance or regional parliament, that sovereignty may be seriously effected. The Protocols outlined below will certainly impose positive and negative obligations on states but these obligations are based on international norms and can therefore be regarded as reasonable and necessary limitations on foreign policy.

Third, the greatest threat to sovereignty lies outside the region. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are interfering in domestic decision-making throughout Southern Africa (and elsewhere in the Third World) by making foreign loans and aid contingent on the adoption of Structural Adjustment Programmes which entail prescribed political, economic and military reforms. ⁵³ The strengthening of SADC may enable member states to better resist this pressure and reduce their dependence on external financing.

Involvement of women

Conferences on peace and security in post-apartheid Southern Africa have been dominated by male academics and military officers, with the result that women's concerns and perspectives are seldom expressed and acknowledged. ⁵⁴ SADC's political and security forums will perpetuate this trend if they are comprised exclusively of cabinet ministers and security officials.

The limited involvement of women reflects their broader exclusion from political power and the fields of international relations and defence in particular. Yet women (and the children they support) are obviously and deeply affected by violence and instability. Their security is also undermined by systematic gender discrimination and harassment in the economic, social and domestic arenas.

For these reasons, and as a matter of political right, SADC should take steps to ensure that women have a meaningful opportunity to present their views in the new forums. Women's organisations should be consulted on the most appropriate way to achieve this. One possibility would be to reserve a permanent place in the forums for representatives of these organisations.

Status and co-ordination of the forums

The supreme authority in SADC is the Summit which is comprised of heads of state or government. The second highest level of decision-making is the Council of Ministers. Since SADC's primary emphasis is on economic development and integration, the Treaty provides that `the Council shall consist of one Minister from each Member State, preferably a Minister responsible for economic planning or finance'. ⁵⁵

The SADC Sectors, through which member states co-ordinate activities in such areas as trade, energy and agriculture, report to the Council. The Council, in turn, advises the Summit on matters of overall policy and oversees the functioning and development of SADC, the implementation of its policies and the execution of its programmes. ⁵⁶ The question arises as to where the political and security bodies should fit in to this hierarchy.

It would be inappropriate to place the Political Sector on the same tier as the other Sectors which are subordinate to the Council. Given its inherent status and likely responsibilities, a forum of foreign ministers should occupy a position which is either superior or equal to the Council. Whichever turns out to be the case, the forum should report directly to the Summit.

In democratic countries during times of peace, defence policy is usually shaped in the context of foreign policy; in this respect the Ministry of Defence defers to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It would make sense to replicate this relationship at a regional level and establish military, police and intelligence commissions as sub-components of the Political Sector. The commissions would have their own mandates and programmes but would resort under the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The co-ordination of SADC's existing Sectors is permanently allocated to a particular member state. This approach offers the advantages of continuity and specialisation and could be followed with respect to the Political Sector and its commissions. An alternative approach would be to rotate the chairpersonship of these bodies on an annual or biennial basis so as to avoid an actual or perceived concentration of power in politically sensitive areas. ⁵⁷

Formal versus informal arrangements

Some Southern African countries insist that informal arrangements are preferable to formal procedures in the conduct of inter-state relations because `structured informality' allows for a greater degree of diplomatic flexibility. This argument is based largely on the positive experience of the Frontline States, through which presidents and cabinet ministers were able to communicate quickly and easily with each other without being encumbered by excessive bureaucracy.

Yet while informal political arrangements may have distinct benefits, they also have a number of serious shortcomings: they may be seen as disadvantaging small states; they do not regulate inter-state behaviour and the settlement of disputes in an agreed and predictable fashion; they are not binding on states; and, as a result, they tend to break down in times of crisis when they are needed most. In any event, formality and informality need not be regarded as mutually exclusive. It should be possible to incorporate an adequate measure of flexibility into formal conflict resolution procedures.

Multi-lateral, bilateral and unilateral action

Within certain government and academic circles, discussion on the evolution of SADC and its political and defence forums has focussed on the respective merits of bilateral and multi-lateral security arrangements. The two approaches are sometimes mistakenly seen as alternative options when, in reality, they are likely to be pursued simultaneously.

States will naturally conclude agreements with their neighbours around issues of common interest or concern. At the same time, multi-lateral efforts are required to deal with security problems that effect several countries. Problems such as drought, Aids, refugees and gun-running do not recognise national boundaries and cannot be tackled meaningfully on a bilateral basis. Similarly, domestic crises such as the Lesotho coup and the Angolan civil war impact on the stability of many contiguous states. It is precisely for these reasons that SADC is committed to promoting co-ordination and co-operation in the areas of security, defence and foreign policy.

In the post-Cold War period there is growing international interest in disarmament and confidence-building measures being undertaken by states on a unilateral basis; such measures provide powerful evidence of good faith and avoid the laborious route of complex multi-lateral negotiations. ⁵⁸ This position is entirely applicable to South Africa given its history of regional aggression and, more importantly, it overwhelming military and economic strength relative to neighbouring states. Pretoria would bolster regional confidence and stability immeasurably if it unilaterally engaged in disarmament and reorientated its armed forces in a defensive direction. ⁵⁹

Institutional options

This section concludes by considering an on-going debate around the appropriate structure for regional security co-ordination. A number of national leaders and academics have argued implicitly (and unsuccessfully) that SADC's focus should be limited to economic matters. ⁶⁰ Political and security issues should be the responsibility of either a revamped version of the Frontline States ⁶¹ , or a new association which is modelled on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. ⁶²

This position is based partly on the argument that SADC is inefficient. Yet there is no reason to believe that the machinery of a new body will be any different. Unlike many regional institutions in Europe, SADC has a small Secretariat and is `owned' in a real way by member states; it is entirely within their reach to manage and adapt the organisation as they see fit. It should also be possible for the Political Sector and its commissions to appoint their own administrative staff.

A further argument against SADC is that it is `controlled' by Botswana which hosts the Secretariat and has chaired the Summit since 1992. Small states feel threatened by this apparent domination, while countries like Zimbabwe are anxious to maintain the leadership role they played within the Frontline States. These tensions could be overcome by rotating the chairpersons of the Council of Foreign Ministers and its commissions on a regular basis, and by locating their secretariats outside Botswana.

While it is difficult to see what advantage an additional organisation would have over SADC, the negative consequences are eminently predictable: there would be a duplication of functions between SADC and the new body, conflict over their respective roles and jurisdiction, and a waste of resources. These problems have long been evident in the relationship between SADC and the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) given their overlapping membership and focus on trade issues. ⁶³

As noted above, SADC has yet to determine the objectives, strategies, programmes and procedures of the Political Sector and its sub-structures. The following sections deal with these matters by proposing terms of reference and Protocols for the new forums. The proposals are presented in the format of the SADC Treaty.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE POLITICAL SECTOR

Principles

1. The Political Sector shall be guided by the following principles:
   1. respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Member States;
   2. sovereign equality of Member States;
   3. respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law;
   4. respect for international law on armed conflict and adherence to the prohibition on the use or threat of force in international relations;
   5. settlement of inter- and intra-state disputes through peaceful means; and
   6. co-operative, harmonious and mutually beneficial relations among Member States. ⁶⁴
2. Upon ratification by the Summit, these principles shall constitute a Protocol on Political Co-operation and Peaceful Relations among Southern African States.

   Goals

3. The Political Sector shall have the following goals:
   1. to promote political and security co-operation among Member States and the evolution of common political values and institutions;
   2. to promote the military and non-military security of Member States and their citizens;
   3. to foster respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
   4. to formulate rights and construct mechanisms for the protection of women, minority groups and refugees;
   5. to promote disarmament in the interests of military stability and socio-economic development; and
   6. to prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means.

   Functions

4. The primary functions of the Political Sector shall be in pursuit of the goals outlined above.
5. The Political Sector shall have the following secondary functions:
   1. to ratify United Nations and Organisation of African Unity declarations and treaties on arms control and disarmament, human rights and peaceful relations between states;
   2. to approve and co-ordinate the participation of Member States in international and regional peace operations;
   3. to enter into political treaties and security agreements with states outside the region;
   4. to address extra-regional conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa; and
   5. to conclude agreements concerning foreign military involvement on the sub-continent.

   Institutions

6. The Political Sector shall be co-ordinated by a Council of Foreign Ministers, comprised of the Foreign Ministers of Member States, which reports to the Summit.
7. The Council shall establish and oversee the activities of a Defence Commission, a Police Commission and an Intelligence Commission, comprised respectively of the responsible Ministers of Member States.
8. The Council shall establish a Standing Committee of Officials to administer an `early warning system' and serve as a technical advisory committee. ⁶⁵ The members of the committee shall receive specialised training in conflict resolution and international law.
9. The Council and its commissions shall establish permanent or ad-hoc advisory groups as deemed necessary.
10. The Council and its commissions shall liaise closely with other SADC Sectors on the non-military dimensions of security in Southern Africa.
11. A member of the SADC Secretariat shall be appointed to facilitate communication between the Council, its commissions, the Summit and other SADC structures.

    Meetings

12. The Council shall meet on an annual basis to plan and assess its activities and to review the state of conflict in the region.
13. The Council shall also convene for extraordinary meetings, at the behest of a Member State and with the approval of the Chairperson, to consider appropriate action in relation to inter- or intra-state conflict.
14. The Chairperson of the Council shall convene joint meetings of the defence, police and intelligence commissions, or the chairpersons of these commissions, as deemed necessary.
15. The Chairperson of the Council shall request reports from the defence, police and intelligence commissions as deemed necessary.

    Decision-making

16. Decision-making within the Council shall be based on consensus, with disputes being referred to the Summit or Tribunal.

    Chairpersons

17. The Council shall elect from among its members a Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson for a two year period.

    Public involvement

18. The Council shall facilitate the involvement of the people and non-governmental organisations of the region through the following measures. ⁶⁶
    1. The Council shall ensure that parliamentarians, non-governmental organisations and women's groups have an opportunity to present their views on political and security matters.
    2. The Council shall support the initiatives of organisations concerned with political and security matters and shall facilitate regional contact between these organisations.
    3. The Council shall keep the people of Southern Africa informed of its deliberations and decisions through regular and detailed press communiques.

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