'With Open Arms'

This paper describes the content and purpose of CSBMs in Europe and considers their potential application in Southern Africa. In the light of prevailing and expected future regional conditions, it is argued that CSBMs could contribute substantially to the building of greater military confidence and security, that a more ambitious range of measures than applied in Europe could be adopted, and that the Southern African Development Community would be the appropriate forum to design and oversee the implementation of such measures.

Confidence- and security-building measures in Europe

Since the mid-1970s CSBMs have been an integral feature of arms control and disarmament processes in Europe. They comprise agreements between two or more states, the purpose of which has been variously defined as follows:

• to improve trust or, conversely, to eliminate mistrust and uncertainty among military adversaries;
• to reduce misperceptions about specific military threats and concerns by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those fears and concerns are groundless; and
• to reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation, by providing clear and timely information about military activities. ³

One of the best known efforts to achieve these aims is the 1986 Agreement of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, initiated and endorsed by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The signatories included the Soviet Union, the United States and most West and East European states. The accord, and the earlier CSBMs which preceded it, are credited with having contributed to a more open, co-operative and predictable security environment in Europe during the Cold War.

The signatories agreed to the following CSBMs:

• they would restate their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force;
• they would provide annual information on the size, location and purpose of planned military activities;
• they would give prior notification, within specified periods, of military activities above specified force levels;
• they would invite other signatories to observe military exercises above specified force levels; and
• they could undertake on-site inspections, at 36 hours notice, of the military activities of other signatories which might not comply with the agreement. ⁴

The Stockholm Conference thus provided for greater transparency of military activities in an unstable and adversarial context through mandatory measures dealing with notification, observation and exchange of information. The notification required for exercises involving over 40 000 and 75 000 troops was one and two years respectively, and therefore served as a constraint on large-scale manoeuvres. Of historic significance was the additional provision allowing for verification of compliance with the agreement through on-site challenge inspections at short notice. Between 1986 and October 1989, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries conducted 28 such inspections. ⁵

The following event illustrates the application of this intrusive procedure. In August 1987 four US army officers arrived at a Soviet military base in Minsk to inspect an exercise involving 16000 troops and 425 tanks. The officers were welcomed by two Soviet generals and briefed on the structure and purpose of the manoeuvre. They had access to air and ground transportation, cameras, binoculars and maps. They left the country satisfied that the force levels given in the Soviet's prior notification of the exercise had not been exceeded. ⁶

In 1990 the participants in the CSCE concluded a further series of negotiations on CSBMs in Vienna. The Vienna Document strengthened many of the provisions of the Stockholm Agreement and added the following: measures aimed at risk reduction through consultation and co-operation around unusual or unscheduled military activities; procedures for intensifying military contacts among the signatories; a communications network; and annual meetings to assess implementation. The annual exchange of information was extended to include defence budgets and plans for the deployment of major weapon systems. ⁷

Before considering the potential utility of confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa, it is necessary to set the context with a discussion on current and projected regional trends, with emphasis on security dynamics and the nature of conflict.

The regional context

Over the past three years the political environment in Southern Africa has undergone substantial change. Most of the major historical conflicts have been resolved or are in the process of being settled: Namibia has attained independence; Cuban and South African troops have been withdrawn from Angola; Frelimo and Renamo have concluded a cease-fire and are preparing for internationally supervised elections in Mozambique; and South Africa is engaged in multi-party negotiations to end minority rule, the dominant source of regional instability.

Much of this progress is a direct consequence of the demise of the Cold War, which led to the cessation of Superpower contestation on the sub-continent, a brief flurry of joint US-Soviet efforts to resolve long-standing disputes in south-western Africa, and a more prominent role for the United Nations in regional and national conflict resolution. There has been a concomitant attenuation of ideology as a source of tension within and among African countries ⁸ , accompanied by significant movement towards political pluralism throughout the continent. ⁹

Notwithstanding these positive developments, the current tranitions to democracy are fragile and uncertain processes. In Angola the cease-fire agreement and subsequent elections in 1992 were thrown into turmoil when Unita rejected the election results, and at the time of writing the country remains locked in civil war. Progress towards negotiated settlements in South Africa and Mozambique is also threatened by high levels of violence. Furthermore, Southern Africa as a whole is beset by a range of critical problems for which no immediate solutions are in sight:

• The region suffers from chronic underdevelopment and attendant poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, malnutrition and inadequate provision of social services. Efforts to redress the situation are inhibited by balance of payments deficits, an acute debt crisis and an unfavourable international economic climate.
• The structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which tie foreign loans and aid to prescribed economic and political reforms, impinge on the independence of states, disadvantage the poorest sections of the population and have given rise to food riots and other forms of protest in several countries.
• Regional and national stability are undermined by internal political and ethnic conflict, authoritarian rule and disregard for human rights in some states, fledgling democracies in others, and large numbers of refugees and displaced people.
• The sub-continent is wracked by an Aids pandemic as well as rampant disease and environmental degradation, arising from human mismanagement, limited resources and natural phenomena. In 1992 the most severe drought in 80 years threatened 30 million people with starvation.

These problems are exacerbated by Africa's growing marginalisation in international politics and the world economy. The continent has never presented an attractive opportunity for foreign investment, and the ending of the Cold War has greatly diminished what little strategic value it once had. The situation is compounded by the diversion of international aid from the Third World to the East and the Middle East, and by the emergence of giant trading blocs in North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim, with which Africa cannot compete.

It would be unwise to make categorical predictions about the future of Southern Africa until the internal conflict in the regional power, South Africa, is finally settled. Nevertheless, on the basis of the summary overview presented above it is possible to identify four distinct characteristics of the security environment and, in the light of these, to suggest broad strategies for enhancing security.

First, many of the major threats to the countries of the region are political, social, economic and environmental rather than military in character, and derive more from internal than external factors. They directly impinge on the security of people and it is primarily for this reason that state security is threatened. It follows that national security policies should become less state-centric and militarist, and more attuned to meeting the rights and needs of citizens. What is required at conceptual and strategic levels is a new approach to security, concerned not only with defence but also with the pursuit of democracy, sustainable economic development, social justice and protection of the environment. ¹⁰

Second, no country in Southern Africa is threatened by external military aggression. This should allow states to engage in a process of substantial disarmament, through reductions in force levels, weaponry and defence expenditure, in order to stem the outflow of capital from the region and release funds for socio-economic development and investment in production. Disarmament may thereby contribute indirectly to greater political stability.

The events of the past three years have already given rise to actual or planned unilateral disarmament, mainly in the form of force reductions, in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola. This could be taken further if pursued in a multi-lateral manner which promotes common security. The process will need to be asymmetrical, how ever, since South Africa accounts for the lion's share of regional arms in ventories. The experience of Zimbabwe after independence, where former combatants could not find jobs and resorted to banditry, highlights the necessity for demobilisation to be accompanied by education, skills and employment programmes for veterans.

Third, the problems outlined above are shared by every country in the region and cross national borders. At the same time, the opportunities for regional co-operation are greater than at any other stage in recent decades. A co-ordinated response to a range of critical issues is therefore both imperative and possible. There is widespread consensus that economic co-operation is especially needed, and that a post-apartheid South Africa could considerably strengthen regional fora which seek to achieve this.

The logical forum for regional co-operation is the Southern African Development Community (SADC), established by the member states of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in Windhoek in 1992. ¹¹ SADC's mission can broadly be described as the pursuit of regional integration, particularly but not exclusively in the economic sphere. Defined areas of co-operation include food, land and agriculture; infrastructure and services; industry, trade, investment and finance; human resources development, science and technology; natural resources and environment; and peace and security. ¹²

Fourth, there is a real danger of long-term low-intensity conflict in many countries as a result of economic crises, weak states, a proliferation of small arms in private hands, and internal repression or fragile democracies. Such conflict will have serious political and economic implications for neighboring states and could erupt into cross-border hostilities. Common security arrangements are thus essential, notwithstanding the fact that no single country nor the region as a whole is confronted by external military aggression.

The concept of `common security' achieved international prominence with the 1982 report of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. The Commission argued that in the modern technological age, countries have become increasingly interdependent and common problems transcend national borders as never before. States can no longer protect their citizens through unilateral military means. They share an interest in joint survival and should begin to organise their security policies in co-operation with each other. ¹³

Before outlining specific proposals for CSBMs in Southern Africa, it is necessary to make two further contextual comments. First, CSBMs should be seen as a component of a broader programme to build common security and not as an isolated phenomenon capable of achieving military confidence on its own. Second, the route to peace and security on the sub-continent lies primarily through national solutions and regional co-operation at political and economic levels rather than in the military sphere.

CSBMs in Southern Africa

Our knowledge of CSBMs and their effectiveness is derived mainly from their development in relation to conventional arms control in Europe during the Cold War. Caution should therefore be exercised in considering the `exportability' of the concept to other parts of the world; many of its features may be `context-specific' rather than an intrinsic part of confidence-building .¹⁴

The design of CSBMs for other regions should necessarily be based on relevant political, military, historical and geographic factors.

In this regard, an important difference between Europe and Southern Africa should be noted. The Stockholm Agreement was premised on, and sought to mitigate, antagonistic relations between rival ideological blocs. The SADC states, in contrast, have enjoyed a relatively high level of political cohesion over the past decade. The ending of minority rule in South Africa will remove the major source of inter-state hostilities and polarisation in this period.

This is not to suggest that CSBMs would be inappropriate in Southern Africa, but rather that conditions are conducive to the adoption of stronger measures than applied in a divided Europe. The political climate after apartheid may in fact more closely approximate that of Western Europe after World War 2, hence SADC's objective of building an integrated economic community. If sufficient political and economic unity is achieved over the next 5 to 10 years, it may be feasible to form some kind of regional military alliance. Ambitious CSBMs might serve as building blocks towards that goal.

That even modest CSBMs are required at this stage should be obvious from the forgoing discussion: the sub-continent is volatile and its national and regional institutions are weak, with the result that internal conflicts could easily give rise to cross-border tensions. Furthermore, boundary disputes may become militarised, as occurred in 1992 when Namibia and Botswana, which otherwise enjoy friendly relations, mobilised troops in a territorial spat over an obscure riverine island.

By way of further motivation, there is currently widespread regional suspicion over the construction of a large airforce base in Botswana in 1991/2; the unease is heightened by a lack of information about the purpose of the base and alleged US military involvement. Neighboring countries have also indicated that they will continue to feel threatened by South Africa for as long as it retains disproportionately large armed forces, regardless of the government in power in that country. ¹⁵

It would consequently be worthwhile for Southern African states to consider selecting from, and adapting to meet local circumstances, the provisions of the Stockholm and Vienna agreements: annual exchange of information on defence budgets and plans to deploy troops and weapons systems; notification and observation of specified military activities; verification procedures; a communications network; and means of dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents. The purpose of such measures would be to alleviate mistrust and prevent misunderstandings from developing into crises.

Some of these CSBMs have in fact already been operative in a limited and informal fashion in Southern Africa through the Inter-State Committee on Security and Defence, a little publicised body of military officers and defence ministry officials constituted by the Front Line States in the late 1970s in response to South African aggression. ¹⁶ Committee members claim that regular meetings, information sharing and co-ordinated action in certain areas have built a high level of trust among senior and rank-and-file soldiers in the region, with the obvious exception of the South African Defence Force and other armed forces of non-participating states. ¹⁷

The following additional, more expansive types of CSBMs could also be considered in the light of the historical and prevailing spirit of co-operation.

Joint activities

Joint activities could be pursued in a number of areas: military training at senior and rank-and-file levels; intelligence gathering and analysis; patrols of national boundaries by border guards; maintenance and procurement of weapons systems; and a programme to stem the proliferation of small arms in private hands. These activities would build confidence, promote a co-ordinated response to common military problems, and provide for the sharing of information and resources.

Mechanisms for conflict resolution

Conflict resolution mechanisms could be introduced to engender trust and facilitate the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes. Such mechanisms could include: a non-aggression treaty, drawing on the charters of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity and prohibiting the threat and use of force; the ratification of this treaty in national legislation; an early warning system to give advance notice of impending problems; and, most importantly, established procedures and for a for preventative diplomacy, mediation and arbitration.

Positive and negative lessons could be drawn from recent European experiments along these lines. In 1990 the CSCE established a Conflict Prevention Centre, and the following year devised a Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation with Regard to Emergency Situations. ¹⁸ The Yugoslavian crisis highlights the limitations of such procedures; their effectiveness ultimately depends on the willingness of disputing parties to make use of them. Nevertheless, their existence may encourage parties to resort to mediation and may also, over time, help generate a culture of peaceful conflict resolution.

Domestic CSBMs

Although CSBMs have traditionally been confined to inter-state relations, it might be productive to explore their possible application to internal sources of military tension. In many Southern African countries there is considerable mistrust between the armed forces and government, as well as between the army and civil society. Domestic CSBMs would be no substitute for the establishment of sound civil-military relations, but they could compliment this task in much the same way as CSBMs in Europe supported rather than replaced arms control efforts.

Domestic CSBMs would also be relevant to the integration of government and guerilla forces, a complex and sensitive process which is expected to occur in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa in the near future. The mixed experience of integration in Zimbabwe and Namibia suggests that this process would benefit greatly from confidence-building measures between the respective armies, both before and after the merger takes place. The Namibian government's policy of national reconciliation at independence was directed partly to this end, and succeeded in mitigating tension between former adversaries in the newly constituted military and police. ¹⁹

Foreign military involvement

Given the divisive effects of direct and indirect Superpower intervention in the region between 1975 and 1989, the question of future foreign military activity on the sub-continent warrants special attention. At the very least, agreement should be reached among Southern African states on the necessity for prior notice and full disclosure of such activity.

Foreign military involvement currently takes two main forms: the British Army is training soldiers, and in some instances advising Defence Ministry officials, from every SADC state except Angola ²⁰ ; and the United States 3rd Special Forces Group, a Green Beret unit, has conducted a variety of exercises in Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana as part of an African-wide `nation-building' programme. ²¹ While the former is uncontroversial, as noted above the latter is causing some consternation. Within the ANC, there is a fear that the US presence is intended to inhibit radical initiatives being undertaken by a democratic government in South Africa. ²²

Non-offensive defence

The most ambitious approach to constraining CSBMs would be the adoption by Southern African states of the doctrine of non-offensive defence, also known as confidence-building defence. ²³ The doctrine aims to heighten military stability and confidence by ensuring adequate defence against attack while minimising offensive capabilities. It seeks to eliminate, in particular, retaliation and escalation strategies and the capacity for large-scale offensive action and surprise attack. ²⁴ Key aspects of this approach were endorsed by President Gorbachev in a major revision of Soviet strategy in 1986-7, and incorporated into subsequent arms control negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.

The underlying rationale is that conventional defence doctrines, which attempt to deter external attack by threatening pre-emptive or retaliatory action, are inherently destabilising and provocative. However benign a state's intentions, a significant offensive capability will invoke uncertainty and fear in other states whose potential aggression it wishes to prevent. The inevitable result is an escalating arms build-up. Furthermore, the capacity for surprise attack and pre-emptive strike on one side puts pressure on the other side to emphasise the same strategies, thereby raising the risk of armed hostilities.

Non-offensive defence transcends traditional arms control initiatives which pursue step-by-step numerical reductions of force levels and weaponry. It is concerned rather with restructuring every aspect of the armed services - posture, deployment, weaponry, training, equipment, manpower procurement etc - so as to bring the overall character and strategy of the military into line with declared defensive intentions. At tactical and operational levels, various divisions and types of hardware may remain capable of offensive action.

If Southern African states decided in principle to undertake such restructuring, much work would be needed to formulate the technical details. Most of the models proposed for other regions draw on the area-defence tradition and stress the increasing anti-armour capacity of modern infantry weapons and indirect-fire artillery systems. Key issues, depending on geographic and resource parameters, involve the balance and integration of light and heavy forces and static and mobile components. ²⁵ In essence, states would strengthen defensive strategies in cost-effective ways rather than rely on the threat of pre-emptive strike or retaliatory action to deter aggression.

South Africa

Non-offensive defence and CSBMs would be applicable to all the states in Southern Africa but would place a special responsibility on South Africa. It is the only country in the region to have resorted to repeated and large-scale offensive action outside its borders, it has the only armaments manufacturing industry on the sub-continent, and it has disproportionately large armed forces and major weapons holdings.

The full extent of South Africa's military dominance is illustrated by the tables presented at the end of this paper. Its reserve forces exceed those of the SADC states combined by over 500000, and its active personnel will exceed those of individual countries by at least 20000, or 28%, once the anticipated integration of government and rebel armies in Angola and Mozambique has been affected. Its aggregate conventional equipment is nearly five times that of its immediate neighbors ²⁶ , and it accounts for approximately 70% of total military spending in Southern Africa. ²⁷

These figures tell only half the story in the sense that they provide no comparative assessment of the effectiveness of armed forces and no qualitative evaluation of weaponry held. However, the history of regional conflict and the limited financial and technological resources at the disposal of SADC states suggest that South Africa's military advantage would become even more evident if these factors were taken into account.

The achievement of greater regional security after apartheid, and progress towards disarmament in particular, will therefore require substantial limitations on the destructive capacity of the South African Defence Force. Almost all its features will have to be reorientated to bolster domestic and regional confidence, including its doctrine, posture, size, structure, deployment and manpower procurement policies, the level and nature of its armaments, the composition of its leadership, the degree to which it is subject to political control, and the scope of its Special Forces.

Institutional arrangements

The previous section did not intend to argue that all the CSBMs proposed should, or indeed could, be implemented immediately and simultaneously. The aim was rather to highlight their potential and identify the wide range of measures which could be considered in Southern Africa. CSBMs should be seen as a process, both in the sense that their content requires negotiations among participating states and in the sense that an initial set of measures can be strengthened and added to over time.

Negotiations around CSBMs, and their implementation and monitoring, require an institutional framework. In this regard a second important difference between Europe and Southern Africa should be raised. The Stockholm and Vienna agreements were concluded by strong states, albeit under authoritarian rule in the East. As noted above, Southern African states are weak and have limited resources and infrastructural capacity. This weakness is automatically transferred to regional institutions and will impose a practical constraint on ambitious proposals for CSBMs.

The creation of a new security institution modelled along European lines, as suggested by some writers and politicians ²⁸ , is not viable. The only realistic option for designing and housing a regional security regime, and CSBMs as one element of that regime, is through SADC. Despite its many limitations and problems, SADC has considerable expertise and cohesiveness. The achievements of its predecessor, SADCC, were largely attributable to it adopting an `authentic and indigenous approach to regional co-operation' which avoided `concepts and strategies foreign to [the region's] needs and interests'. ²⁹

The SADC Treaty commits member states to co-operating in a number of areas, including `politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security'. <sup>30</sup> The Treaty's objectives similarly include the `promotion and defence of peace and security'. ³¹ These issues are regarded as `critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration'. ³² The underlying rationale is that economic development and sustainable growth are impossible in Southern Africa in the absence of peace and security. ³³

To give the Treaty substance and practical effect, provision is made for member states to negotiate a series of protocols which `spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for, co-operation and integration' in designated areas. On approval, the protocols will become an integral part of the Treaty. ³⁴

It is recommended that the first set of protocols on security and defence endorse the broad strategies outlined above - a new approach to security, disarmament and common security. Additional protocols could then focus on specific issues. SADC should constitute a team of technical experts and a high powered Security Committee, comprised of Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Development, to formulate these protocols and monitor security developments. ³⁵

Conclusion

The building of greater peace and stability in Southern Africa will depend primarily on national solutions and regional co-operation at political and economic levels. As part of a programme of common security, CSBMs could contribute significantly to this process by promoting military confidence and security. Although developed in a different context and in response to a particular set of problems, suitable measures could be designed to meet local circumstances and needs. The Southern African Development Community would be the appropriate forum to undertake this task and oversee its implementation.

Political conditions in the region lend themselves to more far-reaching CSBMs than applied in Europe: joint military activities; mechanisms for conflict resolution; domestic CSBMs; and non-offensive defence doctrines. Given South Africa's military might and history of regional destabilisation, special attention will have to be paid to the reconstitution of its armed forces and armaments industry after apartheid.

APPENDIX A

Table 1: Size of armed forces in Southern Africa, June 1992

The following table lists the size of armed forces and reserves in Southern Africa. The abbreviation NE (`no entry') indicates either that the country concerned has no reserves or that the relevant figure has not been ascertained.

	ACTIVE	RESERVES
	(000)	(000) Estimated
SOUTH AFRICAa	72.4	635.0
SADC STATES
ANGOLA	127.5b	NE
BOTSWANA	6.1	NE
LESOTHO	2.0	NE
MALAWI	10.7	1.0
MOZAMBIQUE	50.2c	NE
NAMIBIA	7.5	NE
SWAZILAND	NE	NE
TANZANIA	46.8	10.0
ZAMBIA	24.0	NE
ZIMBABWE	48.5	NE

^{a Excludes homeland armies with an estimated total of 7000 personnel.
b The Angolan government and Unita have agreed to merge their forces into a 50000 strong National Army.
c Frelimo and Renamo have agreed to form an integrated force of 30000.}

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992. The Military Balance, 1992-1993. Oxford:Brassey's, pp. 190-214

APPENDIX B

Table 2: Military equipment in Southern Africa, June 1991

The following table lists the number of weapons held by Southern Africa states in the following categories: main battle tank (MBT); heavy armoured combat vehicle of reconnaissance type (RECCE); armoured infantry fighting vehicle (AIFV); armoured personnel carrier (APC); towed artillery (ARTY); multiple rocket launcher (MRL); mortar (MORT); and combat aircraft (C\A). The abbreviation NE indicates that the country concerned has few or no weapons in a particular category, or that the relevant figure has not been ascertained. No figures are available for anti-tank guns and air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.

	MBT	RECCE	AIFV	APC	ARTY	MRL	MORT	C\A
SOUTH AFRICA a	250	1600	1500	1500	350	130	4120	259
SADC STATES
ANGOLA	500	100	100	300	500	75	140	160
BOTSWANA	NE	22	NE	30	10	NE	10	13
LESOTHO	NE	10	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE
MALAWI	NE	34	NE	NE	12	NE	NE	NE
MOZAMBIQUE	80	30	40	200	268	30	NE	43
NAMIBIA	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE
SWAZILAND	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE	NE
TANZANIA	60	20	NE	75	395	50	350	24
ZAMBIA	30	88	NE	13	103	50	NE	81
ZIMBABWE	43	118	NE	100	30	40	4	81

^a Excludes homeland forces.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991. The Military Balance, 1991-1992. Oxford:Brassey's, pp. 125-148

FOOTNOTES

1. Although `CBMs' may refer specifically to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and `CSBMs' to the 1986 Stockholm Agreement on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the terms are often used interchangeably in the academic literature. CSBMs is preferred as the generic term in this article since it makes explicit the goal of building military security.

2. See The Kampala Document: Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa, 1991. Kampala:Africa Leadership Forum/Organisation of African Unity/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, pg. 12.

3. Holmes, M., 1990. `Compliance with confidence-building measures: from Helsinki to Stockholm', Background Paper, No. 30, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, pp. 1-2; and Gillian, B., Crawford, A. and Buczek, K., 1987. `Compendium of confidence-building proposals', Extra-Mural Paper, No. 45, Canadian National Defence Department, pp. 1-2. For a fuller discussion on definitions of CSBMs, see Macintosh, J., 1985. `Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: a Canadian Perspective', Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 1, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, Canada.

4. Holmes, op cit, pp. 3-4.

5. Ibid, pg. 6.

6. Ibid, pg. 1.

7. Lemke, H., 1992. `Military aspects of future security building in Southern Africa: exploring the applicability of the European experience', Research Report SWP-IP 2732, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, pp. 15-17.

8. Adedeji, A., 1991. `An agenda for security and stability as the foundation for co-operation and development in Africa', paper presented at the Kampala Forum on a Conference on Security, Stability, Co-operation and Development in Africa, Kampala, May, pg. 4.

9. See Decalo, S., 1991. `Back to square one: the re-democratisation of Africa', African Insight, Vol. 21, No. 3.

10. This notion of security is embraced in The Kampala Document, op cit. See further Booth, K. (ed), 1991. New Thinking about Strategy and International Security. London:Harper Collins.

11. The SADCC/SADC member states include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

12. Article 21 (3), Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, 1992, Windhoek.

13. Palme Commission, 1984. Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. London:Pan. See also Palme Commission, 1989. `Final statement of the Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues', Disarmament, 1990, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 165-186.

14. Macintosh, J., 1990. `Confidence- and security-building measures: a skeptical look', unpublished paper, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto, pp. 4-5.

15. Comments to this effect have been made by, for example, the President of Mozambique. See Chissano, J., 1991. `Kampala Forum on a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa', paper presented at the Kampala Forum, op cit, pp. 6-7.

16. The Front Line States include Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

17. Author's interview with Major General Pheto, Chief-of-Staff Botswana Defence Force, Maputo, September 1991.

18. See Lemke, op cit, pp. 18-19.

19. See Nathan, L., 1990. `Marching to a different drum: a description and assessment of the formation of the Namibian Police and Defence Force', Southern African Perspectives, No. 4, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape.

20. See Baynham, S. and Mills, G., 1992. `British military training assistance in Southern Africa: lessons for South Africa?, African Insight, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 218-224.

21. For details on this programme, see `US increasing its special forces activity in Africa', Baltimore Sun, 15 March 1992.

22. Author's interview, January 1992.

23. The term `confidence-building defence' is used by the Study Group on Alternative Security Policy (SAS), based in Bonn. See for example Unterseher, L., 1992. `Confidence-building defence as a universal principle', paper presented at the Conference of the Asian Peace Research Association, Christchurch, January/February.

24. On non-offensive defence, see Boserup, A. and Nield, R. (eds), 1990. The Foundations of Defensive Defence. London:MacMillan; Disarmament, 1990, Vol. 13, No. 1; and Nield, R., 1989. `Non-offensive defence: the way to achieve common security in Europe', Background Paper, No. 25, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

25. See for example Conetta, C., Knight, C. and Unterseher, L., 1991. `Towards defensive restructuring in the Middle East', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 115-134.

26. Lemke, op cit, pg. 23.

27. Batchellor, P., 1992. `Demilitarisation in Africa: the case of South Africa', paper prepared for the Political Studies Staff Seminar, University of Cape Town, August, pg. 5.

28. Proposals for the establishment of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Southern Africa, modelled on the CSCE, have been made by, amongst others, President De Klerk [Southscan, Vol. 6, No. 44, November 1991, pg. 365. and Hans-Dieter Lemke, op cit, pg. 26]. Erich Leistner has proposed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation (OECD) as a model for Southern Africa [Africa Insight, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 4-13] .

29. Weimer, B., 1991. `The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC): past and future', Africa Insight, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 80.

30. Article 21 (3) (g), Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit.

31. Article 5 (1) (c), Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit.

32. `Towards the Southern African Development Community: A Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States', 1992, Windhoek, pg. 9.

33. Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, 1992. Theme Document. Maputo:SADCC, pg. 18.

34. Article 22, Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, op cit.

35. See further Nathan, L., 1992. `A framework and strategy for building peace and security in Southern Africa', paper commissioned by the SADCC Secretariat, Gaborone, October.

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