Crisis Resolution and Conflict Management in Africa

The international community's efforts to stem and reverse the tide of war derive largely from humanitarian concerns about massive human suffering, depicted graphically by CNN and other media. The moral impulse to alleviate suffering does not constitute a sufficient basis for action, however. External interventions also have to be based on a pragmatic assessment of their potential effectiveness. Such assessment obviously depends on the circumstances of each case. Less obviously perhaps, it depends on how the problems of `conflict' and `crisis', and the desired goal of `peace', are conceived at a more general level.

This is not a matter of idle theorising while Africa burns. Every external intervention is based on a set of theoretical assumptions, whether or not the assumptions are explicit and sound. If the problem or the desired outcome are misconceived, then peace endeavours will be ineffectual or counter-productive. Since the international community has not had great success in peacemaking and peacebuilding on the continent, this paper adopts a radical stance by questioning conventional wisdoms and by focussing on the causes rather than the symptoms of intra-state crises.

The paper first presents a framework for understanding conflict, peace and crisis, and then considers the implications of the framework for strategy. The main argument runs as follows. Violence may be the predominant concern from a humanitarian perspective, but from an analytical perspective it should be viewed as a symptom of intra-state crises. The crises arise from four structural conditions in particular: authoritarian rule; the exclusion of minority or majority groups from governance; socio-economic deprivation combined with inequity; and weak states which lack the institutional capacity to manage political and social conflict. As these conditions are the primary causes of mass violence in Africa, sustainable peace is possible only if they are addressed satisfactorily.

RETHINKING CONFLICT, PEACE AND CRISIS

Many people and institutions consider conflict to be an inherently negative dynamic. In much of the academic and policy literature, the term `conflict' refers to situations of mass violence. This perspective is understandable in the light of the destruction wrought by armed hostilities, but it is analytically misleading. The reality is that social and political conflict is inevitable, normal and ubiquitous in all societies which comprise diverse groups. Whether the groups are defined by ethnicity, religion, politics or class, they have different needs, interests, values and access to power and resources. These differences necessarily generate competition and conflict. Conflict is also a natural social consequence of fundamental change and an expression of a desire for fundamental change.

How we comprehend conflict in general has a critical bearing on our response in specific situations. If we regard the phenomenon as intrinsically destructive, then our efforts will be directed towards suppressing or eliminating it. Such efforts are likely to be counter-productive, raising rather than lowering the level of tension. On the other hand, if we view conflict as normal and inescapable, then the challenge lies in managing it in a constructive fashion; that is, in non-violent ways that enjoy the consent of citizens. States which are stable are not free of conflict but are rather able to deal with its various manifestations in this manner.

In the national context, conflict management is the essential, on-going business of governance. It is the formal responsibility, in different ways, of the executive, parliament, the judiciary, the police, other state departments, and provincial and local authorities. Crises arise when states lack the capacity to fulfil that responsibility. In the absence of viable institutional means of protecting rights and interests, managing competition and settling disputes and grievances, individuals and groups will resort to violence. If the state is too weak to maintain law and order, then criminal activity and privatised security may flourish. Somalia and Liberia are often cited as typical examples of this problem in Africa but they are better seen as extreme cases on a continuum of weak states throughout the continent.

Crises also arise when states lack popular legitimacy, either because they are wholly authoritarian or because, even where they are democratic, they exclude ethnic or religious minorities from governance. Marginalised and oppressed communities may seek to resolve the crisis through armed rebellion. Hostilities are likely to be intense and sustained because the stakes are high. In contrast to political systems in the North, in many African countries exclusion from formal governance has a profoundly negative impact on physical security, on protection of basic rights and cultural identity, and on quality of life, economic opportunity and access to resources.

Just as our understanding of conflict informs the nature of peace endeavours, so too does our concept of peace. For the governments and inhabitants of stable Western democracies, the concept is relatively unproblematic. Defined as the absence of widespread physical violence, peace is deemed an unqualified good in terms of orderly politics and the sanctity of life. Since civil wars lead to extensive suffering and loss of life, it seems obvious that the prevention and termination of warfare is a paramount goal.

The protagonists in an actual or imminent civil war will have an entirely different outlook, however. Oppressed groups may prize freedom and justice more than peace, and may consequently be prepared to provoke and endure a high level of violence to achieve the rights of citizenship. In so far as popular resistance threatens the status quo, peace serves the interests of the regime, the ruling elite and their foreign backers. The cessation of hostilities is thus less a goal in its own right than an outcome of the antagonists' willingness to reach a settlement which addresses the substantive causes of violence.

Put differently, the absence of justice is frequently the principal reason for the absence of peace. Acute injustice invariably leads to popular struggles which are met by repression. Foreign powers that support dictators in the interests of `stability', as in the case of former Zaire, are simply postponing the inevitable conflagration. Both ethically and analytically, the primary goal of external and local endeavours to prevent and resolve African crises is therefore best formulated as the establishment of peace with justice. This is not meant in a simplistic and romantic sense. Despite the existence of international and regional human rights standards, justice is a contested concept in divided societies. What matters greatly is that all sectors of society perceive the political dispensation to be just.

Justice in the socio-economic sphere is as important as in the political arena. Where underdevelopment is combined with extreme inequality, sporadic acts of violence may occur out of frustration and fear. As demonstrated by urban riots in many African countries, the potential for violence increases when poor socio-economic conditions deteriorate rapidly and suddenly; when government is regarded as corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of citizens; and when poverty and unemployment are linked to an inequitable distribution of income and wealth. Archbishop Tutu has issued a similar warning in South Africa: "If the disadvantaged, the poor, the homeless and unemployed become desperate, they may use desperate means to redress the imbalance".

Whereas most scholars and politicians equate an intra-state crisis with large-scale violence, the position taken here is that crises and violence are related but distinct phenomena. A society that is vulnerable to being engulfed by violence is already a society in deep crisis. As illustrated above, violence is typically a manifestation of a crisis, being either an organised and deliberate response thereto or a sporadic and spontaneous outcome thereof. Michael Brecher draws a similar distinction at inter-state level: "In short, a crisis can erupt, persist and terminate with or without violence. War does not eliminate or replace crisis. Rather, crisis is accentuated by war. Viewed in these terms, war is a continuation of crisis by other means".

In summary, four structural conditions in particular constitute an intra-state crisis: authoritarian rule; the exclusion of sectors of society on the basis of ethnicity, religion or other form of identity; socio-economic deprivation and inequity; and weak states in the sense of lacking the institutional capacity to manage political and social conflict. These conditions constitute a crisis not only because they give rise to mass violence but also because, even without this result, they pose a fundamental threat to human security and/or the stability of the state.

The risk of violence rises when these conditions are present simultaneously, intertwined and mutually reinforcing, and exacerbated by other structural problems. In Africa such problems include the lack of coincidence between nation and state as a result of the colonial imposition of borders; the colonial legacy of ethnic discrimination and favouritism; unstable civil-military relations; land, environmental and demographic pressures; arms supplies and other forms of foreign support to authoritarian regimes; the debt burden; and the imbalance in economic power and trade relations between the South and the North.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

The preceding discussion on peace, conflict and crisis has a range of implications for strategy in general and for determining appropriate courses of action in specific situations. This section outlines in a schematic fashion ten such implications with the view to challenging certain conventional wisdoms. The section is organised around the focus, timing, type and form of intervention.

Focus of intervention

1. It is necessary to focus more on the structural causes of violence than on violence per se.

This assertion runs directly counter to many of the standard approaches to `crisis prevention'. For example, the early warning/action model regards the structural causes of violence as `background' conditions or tensions. It seeks to identify `accelerator events' which exacerbate these tensions and might lead to the outbreak of violence `within a matter of weeks or months'. Accelerator events - which could include arms acquisitions, a crop failure, a major currency devaluation, or new repressive or discriminatory policies - provide the basis for `dynamic early warning'.

The model thus ignores a seemingly obvious fact: many societies may experience the events described as `accelerators' but they are not equally vulnerable to being swamped by violence as a result. It is scarcely conceivable that, say, Canada, Belgium or New Zealand would be plunged into civil war because of a crop failure or major currency devaluation. Policies which discriminate against an ethnic minority may generate heated protests but they are unlikely to provoke an armed rebellion as they might in a state which is weak or authoritarian.

Accelerators lead to large-scale violence in some states but not others precisely because, in the case of the former, they heighten structural tensions. Whereas an accelerator may or may not result in the outbreak of violence, the structural problems give rise to a societal propensity to violence. Unless there is good reason to believe otherwise in a given country, it can be assumed that the more severe the tensions, the greater the number of potential accelerators and the greater the risk of violence posed by these events. It therefore makes little sense to emphasise the proximate causes of violence while relegating the structural causes to the status of `background conditions'. In doing this, the early warning/action model is geared more to crisis reaction than to crisis prevention or resolution.

2. It is necessary to distinguish between the symptoms and causes of crisis.

Through peace operations, emergency relief and on-going humanitarian aid, the international community devotes substantial resources and energy to various symptoms of intra-state crises, especially when a crisis reaches the catastrophic proportions of civil war, genocide or mass starvation. While such efforts may serve to mitigate human suffering, the crisis itself, and therefore its symptoms, will persist for as long as the underlying causes prevail. Moreover, where a particular problem is misdiagnosed in terms of the distinction between causes and symptoms, strategic interventions may be misdirected.

By way of illustration, many local and foreign organisations attach a high priority to demilitarisation and disarmament in Africa on the grounds that weapons flows and other forms of militarisation promote a culture of violence, divert resources from development and hence perpetuate and deepen conflict and insecurity. The organisations focus, in particular, on the proliferation of small arms in private hands; illicit trafficking in light weapons; conventional arms acquisitions; excessive military spending; unstable civil-military relations; and the role of mercenary outfits. The basic thesis, propagated by a range of United Nations agencies, is that there is a positive relationship between disarmament, development and security.

Whatever the validity of this thesis, demilitarisation campaigns are least likely to succeed where the problem is greatest, namely in situations of crisis as defined. Intra-state crises give rise to a security vacuum which state and non-state actors attempt to fill through violence for the purpose of maintaining power, contesting power, self-protection or economic subsistence. Demilitarisation is therefore contingent on filling that vacuum by legitimate political means and institutions. At the most fundamental level it requires democratic and effective governance. Only in these circumstances can development and human security be achieved and sustained. The positive relationship posited here is between good governance, security and disarmament.

It is no coincidence, for example, that the process of light weapons disarmament in Mali followed the ending of military rule and the Taureg rebellion in that country. Similarly, the demilitarisation of the South African state flowed in the first instance from the demise of the Cold War and the thawing of adversarial regional relations, and then accelerated dramatically with the advent of democracy. Conversely, civil society in South Africa remains highly militarised, chiefly in the form of violent crime and privatised security, because gross poverty and inequity have not yet been mitigated and because the chronic incapacity of the police service has not yet been overcome.

Timing of intervention

3. Intra-state crises cannot be resolved quickly and easily.

The structural causes of intra-state crises are complex and deep-rooted, and therefore have no simple or `quick fix' solution. The early warning/action model fails to appreciate this in seeking to prevent the outbreak of violence within a matter of months or weeks. Anarchy, civil war and genocide are not remotely similar to a violent incident, such as a house burglary, which might be thwarted by prompt action before or at the moment of occurrence. They are social phenomena whose multiplicity, range and complexity of causes, dynamics and contested issues preclude prevention at short notice.

A serious disagreement between two parties around a single domestic issue, such as a wage dispute between management and workers, is often hard to resolve. The challenge is immeasurably greater where, as in most national crises, there is a plethora of parties with different needs, values and perspectives on a variety of issues; the situation is more complicated still where the conduct of neighbouring states and foreign powers exacerbates the conflict. The larger the number of parties, the more difficult it is to reach a settlement. The problem of breadth is accompanied by one of depth, since agreements concluded by political elites will not hold if they lack grassroots support.

Further, the issues at stake have to do with perceived or real threats to security and survival, evoking deep feelings of fear, animosity and suspicion. Once preparations for killing are underway, the intensity of emotion and resolve is such that the belligerents are unlikely to be amenable to compromise, receptive to diplomatic interventions or deterred by the use or threat of force. Their resistance to external peace initiatives will be heightened if foreign powers previously ignored or contributed to their plight. In all probability, the initiatives will be overwhelmed by the rapidity and ferocity of local developments.

In summary, intra-state violence is not an independent event but the outcome of a set of dysfunctional relationships, processes and structures. Its prevention is not possible unless these matters are addressed to the satisfaction of local communities and disputant parties. This cannot be done easily or quickly. Mass violence may break out relatively suddenly but it is years if not decades in the making; equally, it is years if not decades in the `unmaking'. Early warning and action are much too late if they are triggered by the proximate causes of violence. By then, conditions may have deteriorated, and enmity may have mounted, to the point that the momentum towards armed hostilities is irreversible.

4. A crisis does not end with the cessation of warfare.

Notwithstanding the discourse on `post-conflict peacebuilding', the attention of the international community remains fixed on emerging and full-blown civil wars. In the aftermath of a war, external actors tend to move on too quickly to the next crisis, a tendency referred to as `the CNN affect'. In the case of South Africa, for example, financial aid from major donors is likely to be withdrawn shortly on the grounds that the transition to democracy will be over by the time of the next election in 1999; that is, a period of five years following three centuries of oppression and neglect!

Yet just as a state of crisis precedes the outbreak of violence, so the crisis does not end with the conclusion of a peace agreement. Nor indeed is the crisis resolved when elections are held and a democratic government has been elected. The crisis will prevail for as long as the conditions which threaten human security and engender violence persist. This is one of the main reasons why newly elected governments in Africa so often turn to violence or are overthrown by violence.

Type of intervention

5. Peacebuilding strategies are the only viable means of preventing and resolving a crisis.

According to Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace, preventive diplomacy is the principal means of averting a crisis. It entails "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur"; whereas preventive diplomacy is meant to avoid a crisis, "post-conflict peacebuilding is [intended] to prevent a recurrence". The key problem with this approach is that the complexity of intra-state crises puts them way outside the category of a `dispute'. Preventive diplomacy may achieve a fragile peace but the strategies for preventing and resolving crises, and thereby attaining a durable peace, lie elsewhere.

The requisite strategies are those which tackle the root causes of violence. They include entrenching respect for human rights and political pluralism; accommodating ethnic and cultural diversity; strengthening the capacity of state institutions; and promoting economic growth and equity. Since these measures are the most effective means of avoiding intra-state violence, they are imperatives long before the outbreak of civil war and not only after its cessation, as suggested by the term `post-conflict peacebuilding'. The term is also inexact because peacebuilding has everything to do with the on-going management of conflict through good governance.

6. Good governance requires efficiency and effectiveness on the part of state institutions.

Good governance is not limited to the cardinal concerns of the international community: free and fair elections, respect for pluralism and human rights, accountability, transparency, and the other features of democracy. It also entails efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling the functions of the state. These qualities are missing in most African countries, which lack the skills base, expertise, infrastructure and resources to meet the welfare and other security needs of citizens. In the absence of the necessary institutional capacity, the values and principles of democracy cannot be `operationalised', the security vacuum will not be filled, and resort to force will remain commonplace.

By way of example, adherence to the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police respect human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than use of force; democratic civil-military relations rest not only on the organisational culture of the armed forces but also on the proficiency of departments of defence and parliamentary defence committees; and illegal trafficking in small arms will not be stemmed through policy and legislative measures if governments are unable to control their arsenals and borders. The building of capacity in these and other areas is necessarily a long-term endeavour.

7. Political stability depends on structural accommodation of diversity.

Western states attach great importance to multi-party democracy as an essential component of peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa. The underlying assumption is that this system serves the interests of all political parties and their constituencies. The ability of political parties to protect and advance these interests may be somewhat diminished, but it is not undermined entirely, if they lose an election. Elections consequently provide for a stable transfer of power according to the changing preferences of voters.

These conditions do not apply in many African countries. Paradoxically, the arrangements which guarantee formal equality have the effect of reinforcing socio-economic inequality. Where political parties are organised largely along ethnic lines and the electoral system is based on the principle of winner-takes-all, minorities may be excluded completely and permanently from the structures of governance. The impact is severe because, as noted earlier, access to political power determines economic opportunity, resource distribution and physical security. The net result may be as deleterious to minorities as outright oppression.

Minorities, whether they are marginalised or hold power, may consequently believe that violence is their only means of survival. In some instances they may oppose democratic norms for ideological reasons; but it is often the case that they have no faith in the norms for the pragmatic reason that they have little to gain and everything to lose in a democracy. Democracy may thus be an obstacle to peacemaking. In order to prevent and resolve crises that emanate from inter-group conflict, democratic majoritarianism has to be tempered by structural accommodation of diversity.

Structural accommodation emphasises inclusiveness and respect for diversity in the system of governance, state institutions and the law. It aims to provide minorities with access to power and protect them against abuse of power. These aims can be met through mechanisms which do not negate the aspirations of the majority or undermine the precepts of democracy. In the case of South Africa, for example, the mechanisms include an electoral system based on proportional representation; a government of national unity; the integration of government and guerilla armies; constitutional entrenchment of rights, including those related to language, culture and religion; and the power of the independent courts to overrule the executive and parliament where their decisions are inconsistent with the Constitution.

Form of intervention

8. Peacemaking and peacebuilding are the responsibility of local rather than foreign actors.

The international community should abandon the delusion that it is responsible for preventing and resolving intra-state crises. For better or worse, these functions must be undertaken by local actors. Peacemaking and peacebuilding are not sustainable unless their form and content are shaped by these actors. While individuals and groups locked in conflict are obviously concerned about physical and economic security, they also crave respect, acknowledgement and affirmation. They want to be involved in decisions which affect their lives, and they resent being treated as the object of some other body's plans.

Accordingly, the international community's contribution should be reoriented from the delivery of products to the facilitation of processes. In the context of peacemaking, this would entail supporting local negotiations and problem-solving rather than prescribing solutions based on Western experience. In the case of peacebuilding, efforts should be directed towards strengthening the capacity of government and civil society through the transfer of skills and knowledge. Literally and metaphorically, teaching people to build bridges is more useful than building bridges for them; more useful still if it draws on their expertise and is not reliant on foreign technology; but useless if they want roads and not bridges. The greatest need for capacity-building is in the area of national and local governance.

9. International actors should do no harm.

The design of every intervention in a situation of crisis should include a rigorous assessment of its potential to fuel conflict, intensify inequality or otherwise exacerbate the structural causes of violence. By far the most significant contribution of the international community to peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa would be to attend to the ways in which foreign powers and institutions deliberately or inadvertently provoke and heighten tension. The issues here include injudicious arms sales; political and economic support for authoritarian regimes; the debt crisis; structural adjustment programmes; and global trade relations. With respect to development aid, humanitarian relief and other missions, the desire to do good should be secondary to the imperative of not causing harm.

10. International actors should practice what they preach.

International institutions and foreign powers that promote democratic norms in Africa are obliged to adhere to these norms. They undermine the norms, and incur resentment and resistance from African leaders and communities, when they operate without any semblance of accountability, transparency and respect for people. Through their conduct they appear to regard Africans as objects rather than actors. Too often they dash to the scene of a crisis, competing with each other to give us food and bright ideas, equipped with a superficial understanding of local dynamics, knowing and learning nothing about our lives, only to vanish just as suddenly to the next crisis.

CONCLUSION

This paper has emphasised the importance of attending to the structural conditions which give rise to large-scale violence. Notwithstanding the formidable obstacles and dilemmas that will be encountered, this imperative derives from the logical premise, supported amply by historical evidence, that intra-state crises cannot be avoided or ended without addressing their root causes. The substantial resources of the international community are mobilised mainly around the symptoms of crises, especially when these reach catastrophic proportions. While emergency action is necessary, the symptoms will recur, and the crises will endure, for as long as the underlying causes prevail.

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Staff Paper written by

Laurie Nathan (B.Bus.Sci/LLB, Cape Town and M.Phil, Bradford) is Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town.