A historical analysis of South Africa reveals that the state emerged from the barrel of a gun. From the 1700s a series of frontier wars saw Dutch and British colonialists, subdue the indigenous populations of South Africa by means of powder and shot. In addition, in the Boer Republics, namely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, men with guns monopolised political power.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, British colonialists and settlers of Dutch descent (who became known as Boers) engaged in two bitter civil wars over control of the interior. The end of the Second Anglo-Boer War saw the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 in which the two Boer republics and British colonial territory became united under one government. From that day forward, any challenge to the Union was always repulsed by state-sanctioned violence. The system of apartheid, that followed on the heels of the National Party coming to power in 1948, was ruthlessly maintained by means of the gun until the early 1990s.

Today, small arms are still play a significant role in South Africa as this country experiences a high rate of firearm-related crime and violence. This paper seeks to provide a general overview of the current small arms landscape and climatic conditions in South Africa. The focal period is from 1 January 1994 to December 1998. The reason being is that data prior to this period is unreliable and the data for 1999 has been released yet. This five year period has been critical for South Africa, as the government has sought to protect and consolidate this country's fragile democracy, which is being threatened by the use and abuse of small arms.

This paper is divided in five sections. Section one considers the nature and extent of small arms related violence and crime in South Africa. Section two undertakes an analysis of the arms production, small arms exports and legal firearm ownership. Section three provides an overview of illegal dimensions of small arms and small arms transfers. Section four describes the state's attempts to address the problems of small arms. Section five provides some conclusions.

Violent crime in South Africa is rife. Crimes involving firearms, especially murder are increasing in number on an annual basis. Between 1994 and 1998 a total of 57 106 murders and 11 000 attempted murders involving the use of firearms were reported to the police. In 1994, 41.4% of total murders were committed with firearms, and by 1998 this figure had risen to 49.4%. Of the 46 nations surveyed by the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 1997, South Africa has the second highest homicide rate involving firearms (26,63 per 100,000 persons), a close second to Colombia.

Between 1996 and 1998 a total of 180 088 serious robberies were committed using firearms, which accounted for 79.95% of all serious robberies. Serious robberies include, for example, car and truck hijacking, cash-in-transit robberies and bank-robberies (Chetty, 2000:16-26).

Table 1 provides a select breakdown of firearm related crime in South Africa over the past five years.

Table 1: Rate of Firearm Related Crime (per 100 000 of the population) 1994-1998

The reasons for violent crime in South Africa are diverse and complex. However, most scholars point to the high level of unemployment, massive socio-economic disparities and the after-effects of South Africa's brutal past as the major causal factors of violent crime. South Africa's unemployment rate is a contentious issue, but Statistics South Africa estimate that 37.6% of the labour force is without a job. According to the World Bank (1997), South Africa is one of the world's most unequal economies, behind Brazil and Guatemala, with 63.3% of annual income going to the richest 20% of the population and 3.3% of income earned by the poorest 20%. South Africa's Gini coefficient is 0,58. (The Gini coefficient is the most common measure of income inequality. Perfect equality measures 0 and perfect inequality 1.)

The South African arms industry was established with British financial support on the eve of the Second World War, when training aircraft were assembled by local industry and the Royal Mint in Pretoria manufactured small arms ammunition (Cawthra, 1986:89). Demand for arms and ammunition during the Second War led to a rapid expansion of the industry, with approximately 50 million rounds of ammunition being produced on an annual basis. At the end of the war demand for small arms and ammunition was significantly reduced and as a result the industry shrank with most factories closing down or converting to civilian production (Simpson,1989:220).

In the early 1960s an economic boom in South Africa in conjunction with the launching of the armed struggle by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC), led to a major expansion of the domestic arms industry. The expansion was sustained with the passing of a UN Security Council Resolution calling on all states to voluntarily stop supplying South Africa with arms (Simpson, 1989:221; Batchelor,1998b:98).

By the early 1970s the South African Defence Force (SADF) was being supplied with rifles, mortars, ammunition, bombs, grenades and landmines by the local defence industry. The standard NATO rifle, the Belgium FN 7.62mm was manufactured under licence. This was replaced in the 1970s by the production of the Israeli Galil, designated the R4 (Cawthra, 1986:99). In 1977, following the Soweto uprisings, the United Nations Security Council passed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. This forced the small arms sector to become virtually self-sufficient.

Between 1989 and 1993 South Africa underwent an economic recession, which led to severe budget cuts for the Department of Defence (by 40%). A process of disarmament followed, which included dramatic cuts in defence expenditure and reductions in force levels. In addition, demand for small arms by the military, the defence industry's biggest client was significantly reduced following the SADF's withdrawal from Angola and Namibia. These factors contributed to a downsizing and restructuring of the defence industry (Batchelor & Willett, 1998:67).

From 1994 onwards, in the wake of further cuts in the defence budget due other spending priorities such as health and education, the defence industry has continued to shrink and restructure. Many of the surviving companies have turned to the export market in order to survive (Batchelor & Willett, 1998:166).

Table 2 provides a breakdown of current South African small arms companies and the products they manufacture.

There are in excess of 4.5 million registered firearms in South Africa. The majority of legally registered firearms are held by private individuals (78.2%), with 662 140 individuals owning two or more firearms each, and over 13 000 individuals having more than 10 firearms registered under their names (SAPS Central Firearms Registry). The remaining registered firearms belong to institutions, firearm dealers, manufacturers and government departments, excluding the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police. Table 3 provides a breakdown of registered firearms in terms of type of firearm and type of licence.

Table 3: Firearm Registrations: Type of Firearm and Type of Licence

The largest concentration of licensed weapons can be found in the province of Gauteng, with 36.5% of total licensed firearms, followed by KwaZulu-Natal (13.5%) and the Western Cape (12.4%). This firearm distribution is a consequence of crime rates, perceptions of insecurity and a unique history. For example, Gauteng, the wealthiest province in South Africa has the highest violent crime rate in country.

The 9mm parabellum pistol is the most commonly licensed firearm in South Africa (517 576 licensed between 1994 and 1998), with the most popular brands being Norinco (Chinese), Lorcin (United States) and CZ (Czech) (SAPS Central Firearm Registry). Both Lorcins and Norincos sell for between R800 and R900 (Steinberg, 1999). In general, guns are owned for sports shooting and hunting; self-defence; to secure of businesses; and as a hobby (gun collectors).

From the early 1980s the South Africa defence industry began to actively export arms in an attempt to offset rising overhead costs, excess productive capacity and poor economics of scale (Batchelor, 1998a:58). The markets to which South Africa could export weapons were very limited due to its pariah status in internal affairs and the UN embargo on South African arms exports. Consequently, South Africa exercised little or no scruples in the selection of international clients. The apartheid government sold to just about any country that would buy arms from them. For instance arms were sold to Pinochet government of Chile, to Cambodia during the bloody reign of the Khmer Rouge, to UNITA in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique and to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (Batchelor, 1998a:59). In 1989 Bulgaria, Haiti, Sudan, Liberia, Nigeria, China and Somalia were favoured clients of the South African arms industry (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1997:12). The details of these arms transfers remain classified even today, but what is fairly certain is that small arms were part of the deal.

In September 1994, five months after the first democratic elections, Armscor, the South African government's arms procurement agency supplied 10,000 AK-47 assault rifles to Yemen, a prohibited destination (Batchelor, 1998a:60). The weapons were ostensibly destined for Lebanon, but this dubious deal was exposed when Yemeni authorities rejected the shipment. This embarrassing episode prompted President Mandela to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate this arms deal. The commission of inquiry recommended that South Africa's arms export policy, procedures and decision-making processes be drastically reformed (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1997:11-13).

Many of these recommendations were implemented in 1996 when the South African government released a Defence White Paper (1996) which stipulates that all applications for arms sales must be approved by a fairly rigorous control system, which includes a cabinet committee - the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) (Batchelor, 1998a: 61). The document clearly states that South Africa will not export arms to countries which "systematically violate human rights and fundamental freedoms"; and it will avoid arms transfers which are likely to contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts and regional instability, and negatively influence the balance of power (Nathan, 1998:53).

Initially the implementation of this new "morally responsible" arms export policy was less than decisive. Between 1996 and 1998 government deviated several times from its much lauded policy. This was brought about by disoriented foreign policy, the desire to earn foreign currency through arms sales and extensive lobbying by the South African arms industry. South Africa courted Algeria, Indonesia, Syria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, and sold small arms to Rwanda and the Republic of Congo. At the time all these countries were either being ruled by authoritarian and undemocratic regimes, had poor human rights records or were involved in an intra- or inter-state conflict (Batchelor, 1998a:61). In addition South Africa has sold arms to most of the major players in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Many of the more controversial deals fell through due to protests by the media and civil society, and in certain cases due pressure brought on South Africa by Western powers. Table 4 outlines the countries that South Africa has exported small arms to between 1996 and 1998 and the value of the small arms.

Table 4: South African Small Arms Exports: 1996-1998 (in Rand values at current prices) (Source: Directorate of National Conventional Arms Control. 1999. Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1996-1998, http://www.mil.za/SANDF/DRO/NCACC /ncacc.htm)

Government policy may have changed, but a number of South African citizens continue to keep the faith of the apartheid's regime arms export policy. Since late 1994 South African war profiteers have been implicated in the sale of small arms to the UNITA rebel movement in Angola, the Hutu government in Rwanda in the period just before the genocide and rebel groups in Burundi (Human Rights Watch 1994; 1995; 1999).

Reliable data of the numbers and types of illegal weapons in circulation in South Africa is not available. Analysts have pointed to four sources of illegal weapons.

First, during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's hearings, it was revealed that the apartheid government distributed thousands of firearms to Inkatha Freedom Party para-military groups in KwaZulu Natal in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was done in order to destabilise the region and prevent the ANC from consolidating political support. Vast quantities of small arms were also distributed by the TBVC (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda) governments to "loyal" citizens. To date these arms have not been fully accounted for, and there is conjecture that many of these weapons have been used in criminal activities.

Second, legal gun-owners are a major source of illegal firearms. The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice conducted a survey in 1997 on measures to regulate firearms, which showed that SA gun owners are among the most targeted by criminals for their firearms and/or the most negligent in the world. Current evidence indicates an alarming increase in the theft and loss of licensed firearms. In 1994 15 309 firearms were reported lost and stolen, and by 1998 a total of 112 692 had been stolen over the five year period. During the same period 63 703 weapons were recovered by the police or found by their owners. However, these figures do not provide an accurate picture of the problem of illegal firearms, as many people do not report thefts and losses for fear of being prosecuted. Table 5 provides more detail on this issue.

Table 5: Firearms Lost, Stolen and Found 1994-1998

A third source of illegal firearms are the SAPS and the SANDFs' armouries. Over the past five years, a number of police and military arsenals have been robbed. In many cases firearms were recovered, but the whereabouts of a significant number of firearms still remain unknown. For example, in May 1998, the Tempe Military base in Bloemfontein was robbed of more than a hundred firearms and 20 000 rounds of ammunition by an extremist Afrikaner group called Die Volk (The People), who were allegedly planning a coup d'etat against the government. In June 1998, 59 firearms were stolen from the Faure police base (near Cape Town) by a policeman and allegedly sold to gangsters and vigilante groups.

Fourth, there has been speculation by analysts and the media that a large proportion of the illegal small arms in South Africa originated in Angola and Mozambique, the residue of the period of liberation struggle and civil war in the region. However, this source seems to have dried up over the past few years as seizures of AK-47 assault rifles and ammunition by the SAPS have dropped, while seizures of handguns and handgun ammunition have increased (see Tables 6 and 7).

Table 6: Firearms Seized by the SAPS 1994-1998

Table 7: Ammunition Seized 1994-1998

The South Africa government appears to be determined to tackle the problems associated with small arms head-on, but it is currently facing some major obstacles such as porous borders, ineffective firearms control regulation and weak state capacity for fighting crime. In addition, the requisite resources to effectively engage these problems are lacking. However, despite these impediments, the South African government has made some in-roads. This section provides a description of positive steps government has taken with respect to dealing with the proliferation of small arms.

In 1999 the SANDF and the SAPS devised plans to destroy the bulk of their surplus weapons. In February of 1999 the Department of Defence called for tenders for the safe destruction of the following small arms which were either redundant, obsolete, unserviceable or had been confiscated: 198 506 R1 rifles; 1 326 paratroop R1 rifles; 3,708 M1 rifles; 2,914 heavy-barrel rifles; 3 637 Bren light machine guns; 2 256 Vickers machine guns; 12 237 R2 rifles; 1 259 Uzi submachine guns; 412 Brownings; 36,412 other small calibre weapons. The SAPS have already destroyed 40 tons of surplus small arms, nine tons of surplus ammunition, over ten tons of confiscated arms and 11 tons of confiscated ammunition (Engineering News, 19/3/99, Star, 1/3/1999).

In a response to alleged illegal gun running between Mozambique and South Africa, a four part joint operation between the South African and Mozambican police forces known as Operation Rachel was launched in 1996. The objective of Operation Rachel was to locate and destroy arms caches in Mozambique. Between 1996 and 1999, 11 891 firearms, 106 pistols, 6 351 anti-personal mines and 3 192 337 rounds of ammunition were collected and destroyed (Chachiua, 1999).

However, the future of Operation Rachel remains undecided as the most of the weapons caches in southern Mozambique appear to have been neutralised, and according to the SAPS intelligence reports, the flows of illegal weapons into South Africa from Mozambique have slowed down considerably due to larger markets in central Africa. Therefore, the SAPS are finding it difficult to justify their continued financial support this expensive operation (The Mercury, 5/7/1999).

Up until 1997 South Africa had 36 airports that were mandated to handle "international" business, however, the majority of these lacked air traffic control as well as regular police, customs, and immigration checks. In 1997 the South African authorities revoked the "international" status of 28 of these airports in order to facilitate better border control and cut down on expenditure. Mobile X-ray units were deployed at land borders and airports that previously did not have such facilities (Human Rights Watch, 1999:116-117). In addition, an X-ray scanner with the ability to scan large cargo containers was put at the disposal of the Border Police at Durban harbour. A Management Information Centre has also been established at Border Police Head Quarters, which maintains a database of border control information (Border Police, 1999:7).

In 1997, the National Interdepartmental Structure for Border Control (NIDS) was established to facilitate better co-operation between the various state structures that are responsible for border control. According the Border Police (1999:5), NIDS is responsible for managing 15 projects aimed at improving border control.

In mid-1998, the South African airforce deployed an early-warning radar system, which monitors air traffic to the north of South Africa. This system covers a distance of 1 900 nautical miles and operates from border towns. The South African authorities can now monitor flights over Botswana, Namibia, southern Zambia and southern Angola. The radar system is supported by Tactical Mobile (radar) Units which covers an even wider area. These developments have already resulted in number of arrests by the Border Police for illegal possession of firearms more doubling, from 49 in 1997 to 106 in 1998 (Border Police, 1999).

However, this radar system is unable to detect small aircraft, such as DC-3s. Despite these advances in border surveillance, the smuggling of arms to UNITA, which has sanctions against it, still continues unabated (Human Rights Watch, 1999:116-117).

The Arms and Ammunition Act is a relatively archaic piece of legislation which has been amended on numerous occasions to the extent that, in certain sections it lacks coherence and is ambiguous, which "has opened the way for circumvention and corruption" (Gun Control Alliance, 2000:3). The new Firearms Control Bill seeks to address the inadequacies of the current Act as well as promote and enforce more responsible gun ownership. Some of its objectives include:

• The establishment of "a comprehensive and effective system of firearms control and management";

• The enhancement of "the capacity of the State to remove illegally possessed firearms from society, control the supply, possession, transfer and use of firearms and to detect and punish the negligent or criminal use of firearms".

The new Bill states that firearm licenses be renewable on a five-year basis, as a means to ensure that the Central Firearms Register remains relatively current and that licence holders are still fit to carry firearms. The Bill stipulates that gun owners have to pass a competency test before a firearm license is approved. In addition, the Bill places a limit on how many guns may be owned for self-defence, but exemptions are provided for genuine hunters, collectors and sports shooters. The proposal envisages the creation of "gun-free" zones at schools, hospitals, places of worship and bars.

At the time of writing this paper, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security were putting the final touches to the Bill before presenting it to Parliament.

This paper has provided an overview of the dynamics of small arms in South Africa for the period 1994-1998. It considered the nature of firearm-related crime, and violence; the production, export and legal ownership of firearms; the illegal dimension; and the positive steps government has taken to address the various problems of small arms in this country.

This paper has shown that the use, abuse and availability of small arms are serious and complex problems. Firearms, through there use in crime have led to increased feelings of insecurity among South African citizens and has eroded many people's confidence in the State's ability to protect them. This has led to an increased demand for guns by ordinary citizens and has contributed the emergence of armed vigilante groups, such as the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). This has simply exacerbated the situation. In short, firearms threaten to undermine the democratic and developmental successes that have been achieved over the past five years. However, the South African government is not sitting idly by while the situation gets progressively worse. It is taking action, such as through over-hauling gun control legislation, tightening up border control and destroying surplus weapons.

In the short to medium term, the South African government faces a number of challenges. First the new Firearms Control Bill needs to passed by Parliament and then has to be implemented. In addition, border control requires beefing up, especially as South Africa has become a springboard from which weapons smugglers transport small arms to conflict hotspots on the continent. However, if the South African government ultimately wants to reduce the levels of firearm-related crime it has reduce unemployment, address socio-economic inequality and promote development within the southern African region in a sustainable manner.

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