STAFF PAPERS
 

 A Literature Review on the Current Relationship Between War and Economic Agendas in Africa:1

Guy Lamb 2


Centre for Conflict Resolution
Cape Town, South Africa

December 2000

Introduction

A common aspect of many wars has been conflict over access to scarce resources, such as minerals, food, land and trade routes. In certain wars, the primary objective of one or more of the parties was to acquire scarce resources in order to improve their economic well-being. This was the case with the military campaigns of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. With wars of liberation, such as the African National Congress' struggle against the apartheid government of South Africa, economic emancipation of marginalised groups was a critical objective of many insurgent groups. Over the past decade, however, a worrying trend has emerged in the relationship between economics and armed conflict. This trend appears to have two dimensions.

First, valuable resources that are of economic value have been used to finance civil wars, such as to purchase arms, ammunition and military assistance. For example, Executive Outcomes, a former South African mercenary outfit, was granted mining concessions by the Angolan government in exchange for services rendered. In many cases valuable resources, which would have been critical to rebuilding the country in the aftermath of the war, have been used to barter for weapons. Second, a successful outcome of a war is no longer perceived as being the sole means for achieving economic benefits. Rather it has been argued that the perpetuation of war in certain African countries has become an alternative way of generating profits.

It has been alleged that where economic privileges and assets have been acquired in an armed conflict, either from control of the state or secured through illegal means, parties to the conflict tend to acquire vested interests in prolonging the conflict. The reason is that peace, democracy and accountability for human rights abuses could seriously undermine wartime economic interests. In addition, as with the Angolan, Liberian and DRC civil wars, outsiders motivated by economic agendas can intervene in, and perpetuate, armed conflicts. These outsiders include states, rebel groups, multinational corporations, mercenary outfits and entrepreneurs. They become involved in conflicts in order to enrich themselves though the exploitation of natural resources or via commercial ventures such as weapons trafficking.

War profiteering is not a new phenomenon. However, it has been argued that the extent to which commercial agendas are driving or perpetuating current violent conflict in Africa, and the profits that are being derived from these activities, are unprecedented. Critically, these economic agendas provide significant obstacles to the resolution of many conflicts and will prevent sustainable processes of peacemaking and peace-building from being achieved.

The objective of this paper is to conduct a literature review of the relationship between war and economic agendas in Africa so as to derive a more informed understanding of the state of research on this phenomenon. The literature in question does not comprise a distinct stand-alone assemblage, but is rather a component of an extensive multidisciplinary literature set on armed conflict and peace-building. In order to achieve this objective the relevant literature is categorised into coherent themes or typologies so that major trends in the literature as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses can be ascertained.

This paper is comprised of the following sections: Section One interrogates the relationship between war and economic agendas. Section Two presents a detailed literature typology. Section Three analyses the relative strengths and weaknesses of the literature set. Section Four makes recommendations on how research in this area can be enhanced, and makes suggestions for a future research agenda.

1) DEFINING WAR AND ECONOMIC AGENDAS

In order to undertake a literature review of the relationship between war and economic agendas, the phenomena of "war" and "economic agendas" need to be defined.

War Defined

War is a phenomenon that evades a simple definition. It is multidimensional, a complex entanglement of culture, politics, economics, sociology, religion, psychology, ideology, biology and technology. It is paradoxical in that it can both facilitate the creation of states and empires, and also bring about their demise. War can be both ends and means, separately as well as simultaneously. However, in its crudest form, war is "an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will..." 3

In order to avoid getting bogged down in a terminological quagmire, many researchers employ a technical definition that equates war with the number of battle related deaths. In terms of this definition, an armed conflict (war) is said to exist where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths during a particular year. However, in many protracted African conflicts less than 1000 battle related deaths take place per year. Hence in this paper, war will be more broadly defined to include intermediate (more than 1000 battle-related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, but fewer than 1000 in a particular year) and to a lesser degree minor (battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict is below 1000) conflicts 4, such as the recent Lesotho and Caprivi uprisings. In each instance, there should at least be the presence of rebel groups that have taken up arms against the government.

Economic Agendas

An agenda is a plan or program, that is a phenomenon that has a distinct aim or motive. Hence, an economic agenda entails a plan or intention to derive financial benefits from a particular situation.

In a war, economic agendas can be divided into two broad categories, namely economic agendas that are related to the causes of war, and economic agendas that contribute to the perpetuation of war. There is no clear boundary between these two categories as there can be a degree of overlap, particularly with respect to greed.

In terms of the first category, wars often emerge out of attempts by political communities to improve their material well-being. Historically, many military campaigns have been launched in order to acquire valuable natural resources and/or strategic trading points. Examples include Spain's conquest of the Americas and various wars during the critical era of state formation in Europe, namely between the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. In addition, economic grievances, such as socio-economic deprivation, and inequitable distribution of resources by the state amongst its citizens, can contribute to the outbreak of war. This was the case with the French and Russian revolutions, as well as many of the wars of national liberation in Africa.

In terms of the second category, wars can be perpetuated due to the presence of key individuals or groups who derive economic benefits from the war that would be negatively affected should the war be peacefully resolved. Consequently many of these individuals and groups devise and implement plans to prolong armed conflicts. These profit-making activities tend to be driven by greed and generally involve the exploitation of mineral rich areas, usually diamonds and oil, and commercial ventures such as weapons trafficking.

David Keen (1998), one of the only authors to provide a detailed definition of an economic agenda, interprets this phenomenon more broadly by claiming that the following seven categories constitute economic agendas 5:

Trade

Controlling or monopolising trade has been an important component of civil wars in Africa, where 'forced markets', rather than market forces, may determine the demand and supply of resources. War may cause price increases of certain commodities, and may make it easier to threaten or constrain trading rivals. Officials may profit by allowing government restrictions or sanctions on wartime trading to be breached; conflict may make it easier for warlords to avoid paying government taxes.

Labour Exploitation

In a time of war, where the rule of law is severely weakened, threatening individuals and communities with violence may force them to work cheaply or for free.

Land and Natural Resources

Conflict may depopulate large areas, allowing armed groups to claim land, water and mineral resources. Mineral rich areas are often intentionally targeted by armed forces for this very reason.

Benefits for the military

In a war situation, the economic wellbeing of the armed forces is often drastically improved, as war often necessitates a larger budget and/or justifies a role in government. In addition, it may include higher salaries for senior military officers and/or seats on the boards of private companies.

Looting and Pillaging

In many situations of violent conflict, sections of the government's armed forces often loot and pillage villages and towns in order to supplement military wages, which often are not paid by the government. Rebel groups often engage in similar activities in order to obtain supplies and money to purchase weapons.

Protection Money

In situations of violent conflict, warlords, security personnel and criminal syndicates may offer 'protection' from violence to civilians, communities or companies in return for payment.

Theft of Aid Supplies

During a war where there is large-scale suffering by civilians, foreign relief aid is often forthcoming. As food, medical and other essential supplies are often in short supply in these situations, stolen aid supplies can be sold for a substantial profit.

However, as Keen defines economic agendas broadly, he neglects to distinguish between actual economic agendas, namely planned or intended actions, and opportunistic spin-offs of armed conflicts. For example, looting/pillaging, protection money and theft of aid supplies are rent-seeking activities, but in most conflict situations they do not constitute a significant agenda or motive that would obstruct the peaceful resolution of armed conflicts.

This section has provided definitions of the concepts of war and economic agendas, and the relationship between these two phenomena, which forms the basis for the construction of the literature typology in the following section.

2) LITERATURE TYPOLOGY

The bulk of the literature in question are reports, the result of investigations by international bodies such as the United Nations and human rights organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Global Witness. The remaining literature comprises journal articles, a small collection of books, conference papers and media reports. To a lesser extent, papers from conferences have been published as edited volumes. The literature is either policy-oriented or academic in nature.

This literature set can be divided into seven categories, based on the various themes that appear in the literature. As research on the relationship between war and economic agendas is still in its early stages, additional categories may emerge over time. A graphical representation of this typology is presented below:

POLICY

ACADEMIC

Consumerism campaigns

Theoretical studies

Sanctions and sanctions violations

 

Human rights

 

Humanitarian

aid

Privatisation

of security

Analyses of rebel

movements

 

Theoretical Analysis

Most of the theoretical literature in this area is drawn from research projects housed within institutions such as the World Bank and the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), as well as international conferences. The main conferences to date have been "Economic Agendas in Civil Wars" held in Canada House, London, April 1999 6; and "The Economics of Political Violence", held at the Center for International Studies, Princeton University, March 2000 7.

This literature can be crudely divided into qualitative and quantitative approaches, with the greater volume of literature being qualitative. The common thread is that economic agendas are seen as a significant factor in current civil wars in Africa, and a major impediment to their resolution.

In terms of the qualitative literature three authors stand out, namely David Keen, William Reno and Mark Duffield.

Keen argues that to have some understanding of violence in civil wars, one has to have some grasp of the economic dimension of armed conflict. From a general overview of war, Keen asserts that

"war has increasingly become the continuation of economics by other means. War is not simply a breakdown in a particular system, but the way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection."

He argues that in the context of civil wars, members of armed groups can benefit from looting and regimes can use violence to deflect opposition, reward supporters or maintain their access to resources. Under these circumstances ending civil wars becomes difficult, and defeating the enemy may not be desirable,

"as the point of war may be precisely the legitimacy which it confers on actions that in peacetime would be punishable as crimes. Analysts have tended to assume that war is the 'end' and abuse of civilians the 'means', it is important to consider the opposite possibility: that the end is to engage in abuse or crimes that bring immediate rewards, while the means is war and its perpetuation." 8

Keen distinguishes between two forms of economic violence, namely "top-down" and "bottom-up". Top-down violence is mobilised by political leaders and entrepreneurs, and can be influenced by factors such as a weak state, an economic crisis, a strong threat to a regime and competition for valuable resources. Bottom-up violence is violence employed by citizens and/or low-ranking soldiers. It is fuelled by social and economic exclusion, the absence of a strong revolutionary organisation or ideology, and the belief that violence will go unpunished. 9

William Reno, through an analysis of the political economy of violence in "shadow states" 10 argues that autocratic leaders stay in power by intentionally undermining state institutions and creating and enshrining patronage. Reno also asserts that in the context of civil war economic interests of belligerent groups may seriously impede the termination of conflict. The reason for this is that war may be used to control land, commercial activities, labour, take advantage of emergency relief supplies, and ensure the financial well-being and status of elites. Hence, belligerent parties may have vested interests in the continuation of conflicts. 11 However, as Reno predominantly has anecdotal evidence to draw from, his analysis reveals that more qualitative research in this area is required.

Mark Duffield analyses the relationship between globalisation and protracted civil wars in developing countries, and provides a sound analysis of war economies. Duffield argues that globalisation has not contributed to civil war in a significant way, but has led to increased disparity and instability in the developing world, as well as the expansion and penetration of all forms of transborder activity, particularly, highly criminalised war economies. 12 As war economies are dependent on external markets, Duffield argues market regulation could potentially be a useful conflict resolution tool. Duffield calls for more research to be undertaken in this regard.

Recently, quantitative models have begun to emerge, mainly driven by research projects within the World Bank and PRIO.

The World Bank's project on the economics of civil wars, crime and violence, which is headed by Paul Collier, seeks to determine the following: the economic and political factors that increase the risk of civil war, terrorism, and violent crime; policies that are conducive to reducing these risks; and the socio-economic policy difference between post-conflict societies which have high levels of violence, and those societies without such problems. In terms of civil war, this project has two specific foci. First, to investigate and analyse the economic causes and consequences of civil wars. Second, to study the inter-relationships between economic, political, and social variables as they affect the probability that civil war will occur as well as the duration and intensity of these wars. It is anticipated that these analyses will provide insights that will facilitate the generation of economic policies that will reduce the probability of war and reduce human suffering in post-conflict countries. 13

PRIO's research project on the political economy of civil wars is linked to the World Bank's project (and funded by the Post-Conflict Fund of the World Bank). It is headed by Nils Petter Gleditsch, and its research staff include Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre and Indra de Soysa. 14

The work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler appear to be amongst the most sophisticated. These scholars use a panel data set of conflict over the period 1960-99 to examine the risk of civil war using logit regressions. The authors employ a set of rational choice models of rebellion that revolve around two contrasting motivations for rebellion, namely "greed" and "grievance". The simple greed-rebellion model holds that rebellion will occur if it is financially profitable, provided rebel forces are able to evade, endure or repel assaults by government armed forces. The simple grievance model states that war will occur as a consequence of one or more grievances, such as inter-group hatred, political exclusion, and vengeance. Through an intensive statistical analysis, of the global pattern of large-scale conflict from 1965, Collier and Hoffler found that the grievance models had low explanatory power, while greed models perform well. 15 In fact, in another article Collier claims through statistical analyses that economic agendas appear to be central to the origins of many civil wars. 16

The models that Collier and Hoeffler construct and the conclusions they draw are thought-provoking and certainly challenge conventional wisdom. They are correct in arguing that the economic dimensions of civil war have been neglected. The political economy of rebel groups is a glaring gap in the literature. However, there are certain weaknesses with Collier and Hoefflers' grievance model. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious hatreds are over-emphasised, while issues of governance, socio-economic deprivation and security concerns are not adequately accounted for. These omissions, if adequately addressed, could have significant implications for their analysis.

In terms of governance, the state's lack of institutional capacity to manage ordinary political and social conflict is often a fundamental cause of armed conflict in Africa. That is when states do not have the resources and expertise to resolve disputes and grievances, distribute resources equitably, manage competition and protect the rights of citizens, individuals and groups may resort to violence. Socio-economic conditions, with the exception of income distribution, are not included in the grievance model. According to Nathan, in African countries the risk of violence increases when poor socio-economic conditions suddenly deteriorate even more; when government is corrupt and unresponsive to the needs of its people; and when poverty and unemployment are linked to an inequitable distribution of wealth. 17

The models also overlook external factors to civil wars. A number of rebellions have been initiated and/or sponsored by foreign governments. This was common during the Cold War years. For example, Renamo, the Mozambican rebel group that emerged in the 1970s was created and maintained by the Rhodesian government and later by the apartheid regime of South Africa. There is also evidence to suggest that current rebellions in the Democratic Republic of Congo were created and/or sponsored by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments due to security concerns.

Indra de Soysa, who draws on Paul Collier extensively, examines the links between the scarcity of natural resources and civil conflict by utilising World Bank estimates of natural capital stock per capita for sixty-four countries. Essentially, de Soysa seeks to challenge the position that natural resource scarcity drives conflict. The results of de Soysa's analysis suggest that the abundance of renewable resources among poor countries is more likely to lead to violence and to lower economic, human, and institutional development. De Soysa further claims that the abundance of non-renewable resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development. According to de Soysa, the results support the argument that armed conflict is often driven by greed-motivated factors rather than grievance factors. 18 However, de Soysa's model does not take account of governance, socio-economic inequality, and inter-group rivalries in a significant manner.

Analyses of Rebel Movements

Over the past decade a moderate case study literature on guerrilla movements in Africa has emerged. These publications have built on the work of authors such as Davidson, Chaliand, Chabal, Grundy and others. 19 This literature set provides sound analyses of the history, motivation, objectives and internal dynamics of particular rebel movements. The most significant weakness of this literature is that analyses of the political economy of rebel movements are lacking. Only brief descriptions are provided on how rebel groups sustain themselves financially. Yet, as will be shown below, there is some disagreement on the relationship between the political economy of rebel movements and the perpetuation of armed conflicts

One of the most recent publications is African Guerrillas (1998) edited by Christopher Clapham. This book undertakes case study analyses of rebel movements in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo-Zaire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the case of Sudan, Douglas Johnson claims that the Sudan People's Liberation Army diverted international relief supplies for military operations. With respect to Somalia Daniel Compagnon points out the various militia groups engaged in wide-scale looting, due to the collapse of the Somali state and formal economy. The looted material tends to be sold to merchants inside Somalia who re-sell it either within Somalia or in neighbouring countries. A number of the wealthy merchants, in order to maintain the steady flow of merchandise, provide financial support to various militia groups. Some wealthy businessmen even became faction leaders themselves. Consequently, Compagnon argues that a criminal economy has emerged in Somalia, characterised by theft, kidnapping, bribery and kidnapping. In short, Compagnon argues that the war is perpetuated for the sake of the economic benefits that it provides to the economically empowered. 20

In his chapter on 'warlord insurgencies' in Liberia Stephen Ellis argues that valuable natural resources such as diamonds, gold, iron ore and timber played a crucial role in the recent war in that country. Ellis even claims that Liberia's natural wealth was a significant motivation for the Nigerian-based ECOMOG intervention in the conflict, and hence played a major role in prolonging the civil war. 21

In the case of Sierra Leone, Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana argue that the war has been prolonged as the government is seeking further opportunities to enrich itself through illicit diamond mining, logging and looting. Rebels continue to fight due to the vast profits they derive from the illicit diamond business. 22 Paul Richards, in a sophisticated and detailed analysis of the Revolutionary United Front rebel group in Sierra Leone, disagrees with Abdullah and Muana. Richards argues that,

"[w]ar in Sierra Leone is not entirely about economic rationale1/4We need to consider to what extent, also, the war makes sociological sense1/4Rebel leadership is an excluded intellectual elite1/4Their violence is an intellectual project in which the practical consequences have not been fully thought through." 23

Human Rights Issues

The literature that focuses on human rights issues exposes alleged human rights abuses as a consequence of civil wars. The relationship between war and economic agendas is discussed within this context. Many of the publications provide policy recommendations. Examples include country or issue specific reports by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the US Department of State. 24

For instance, according to Human Rights Watch,

"[t]he wealth of diamonds mined in UNITA-held areas has provided the rebels with the resources to rearm and prepare for renewed conflict during the Lusaka process1/4much of which is invested in military supplies, petroleum products, food and medicines." 25

The US Department of State reported in the case of Sierra Leone that

"1/4AFRC/RUF [Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Revolutionary United Front] insurgents kidnapped religious workers and foreigners as bargaining chips and in an attempt to extort money1/4Rebel forces also forced civilians to labour as porters and workers in diamond fields under insurgent control months after the signing of the peace accord." 26

In the case of the DRC, the same agency reported that

"[m]embers of the security forces also raped, robbed, and extorted money from civilians1/4" 27

In the case of Sudan, Amnesty International report that

"[t]ens of thousands of people have been terrorised into leaving their homes in Western Upper Nile since early 1999. Government forces have used ground attacks, helicopter gunship and indiscriminate high-altitude bombardment to clear the local population from oil-rich areas." 28

A section of the literature considers the actions and responsibilities of foreign companies and corporations that operate in conflict zones. To date, analyses of the oil industries in Angola and Sudan have been conducted, as well as studies of the diamond sectors in Angola and Sierra Leone. This literature is almost exclusively produced by NGOs, with the exception of the public relations material released by the companies or corporations in question. According to human rights NGOs, companies operating in conflict situations have a responsibility to oppose human rights abuses by belligerent groups in the areas in which they operate, to implement proactive steps to promote respect for human rights, and to ensure that they do not become complicit in human rights violations. 29 In addition, these NGOs are calling for increased transparency in the relevant industries to ensure that corporations "practice what they preach."

In the case of Sudan it has been argued that foreign currency earned from oil exports has provided the government with the means to continue fighting a war against the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. It has been alleged that the increase in oil exports was due to the revival of Sudan's oil industry through the Greater Nile Oil Project, which is dominated by foreign oil companies. The biggest players in this initiative are the China National Petroleum Company, Petronas Carigali (Malaysia) and Talisman Energy (Canada). The Sudanese government has implemented divide and rule strategies, initiated the forced removal of communities, and allegedly committed gross human rights violations, all in an attempt to consolidate its control over oil resources. This has had the effect of exacerbating the armed conflict. 30

Amnesty International and a Canadian government assessment mission have recommended that oil companies encourage the appropriate authorities to guarantee unrestricted access to humanitarian agencies and independent human rights monitors. 31 In a report on the Angolan oil industry, Global Witness has argued that the Angolan government has used oil revenues to finance the protracted civil war in Angola. This has been precipitated by the lack of transparency in the Angolan oil industry. Hence Global Witness argue for increased transparency and enhanced corporate responsibility in this industry. 32

According to Partnership Africa Canada and Global Witness, the lack of transparency in the diamond industry has a significant impact on the conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone, as the rebel groups use diamonds to sustain themselves. Hence these two organisations argue for greater transparency, oversight and control in the international diamond market. In addition, these organisations call for the creation of processes and mechanisms that can identify the geographical origin of diamonds. 33

Humanitarian Aid

There is a small body of literature that considers the role and implications of humanitarian relief in conflict situations. There is consensus that humanitarian aid is not neutral. There is a potential for it to be manipulated. Consequently, it can become a source of conflict amongst belligerent groups as it constitutes a means of sustenance. Hence it is argued that the distribution of aid can sustain conflicts and reinforce inequalities of power by boosting the power and wealth of the dominant belligerent groups through their control of food and emergency supplies. 34 In short, humanitarian aid is not a direct economic agenda in civil wars, but rather a supplementary agenda that emerges following the outbreak of war.

The literature reflects a dilemma that many aid agencies face, namely how to relieve human suffering while at the same time not exacerbating the conflict. There are a number of publications that provide policy and practical advice on how to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian interventions. 35

Consumerism Campaigns

Over the past few years, campaigns centring around public education on consumer products that originated in conflict situations have emerged. One of the first campaigns was launched in 1998 by Global Witness, a British based NGO. The campaign exposed the fact that the majority of garden furniture manufactured in Vietnam originated from the illegal, uncontrolled and unsustainable plunder of Cambodia's forests. Global Witness argued that this timber had been used by various warring factions and political parties in Cambodia to fund their political and military activities in the country's civil war. 36

In the African context, one of the most high profile campaigns targeted the activities of the De Beers diamond consortium and its Central Selling Organisation in Angola. 37 This campaign was driven by an alliance of international NGOs, calling themselves 'Fatal Transactions'. 38 The relative success of the campaign contributed to an announcement by De Beers in October 1999 that its buying offices would cease to buy diamonds mined in Angola. The only exception is that De Beers will still purchase diamonds from SDM, a joint venture mining operation controlled by the Angolan government and the Australian mining company Ashton Mining. 39

A similar campaign was launched in North America around the involvement of Talisman Energy in Sudan, where NGO groups have been calling for mutual fund companies, civil service pension plans, and other investors to divest in Talisman Energy stock on moral grounds. 40

Sanctions and Sanctions Violations

The literature that deals with sanctions in Africa focuses almost exclusively on the Angolan situation, as UNITA has had various sanctions imposed against it since 1993. The sanctions have been consistently and systematically violated. They prohibit the sale or delivery of arms and military equipment to UNITA; prohibit the provision of petroleum products to UNITA; prohibit the purchase of diamonds mined in areas controlled by UNITA; require the seizing of bank accounts and other financial assets of UNITA; and mandate the closing of UNITA representation offices abroad as well as restrictions on the travel of senior UNITA officials and adult members of their immediate families. The literature in question either provides an analysis of the sanctions violations and/or suggests processes or mechanisms to strengthen the sanctions regime.

Samuel D. Porteous provides an analysis of the dimensions of financial sanctions, and argues that these instruments could be more effective if the financial assets of the leadership of criminal rebel groups are targeted, monitoring is improved, multilateral agreements are created, and more resources are made available to enhance the implementation of sanctions regimes. 41

The recent release of the report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of United Nations Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA made many important recommendations to strengthen the sanctions regime against UNITA. The Panel was asked to inform the Security Council on how the sanctions against UNITA were being violated, who was violating them, and what could be done to make the sanctions more effective. In their report, the Panel found that diamonds had a uniquely important role in UNITA's political and military economy. First, UNITA's ongoing ability to sell rough diamonds for cash and to exchange rough diamonds for weapons provide the means for it to sustain it military and political activities. Second, diamonds have been, and continue to be, an important component of UNITA's strategy for acquiring allies and maintaining external support. Third, rough diamond caches rather than cash or bank deposits constitute the primary and the preferred means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA. 42

The Panel made a number of recommendations concerning the strengthening of sanctions against the export of diamonds by UNITA and from UNITA-held territory. These recommendations included: the forfeiture of rough diamonds should the processor be unable to establish their legal origin; the implementation of controls that would facilitate increased transparency in the diamond sector; and making dealing in undeclared rough diamonds a criminal offence in countries hosting significant diamond marketing centres. 43 These recommendations reinforced those made in Human Rights Watch's report titled, 'Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process' (1999).

A significant gap in the sanctions literature is the lack of assessments of the costs and benefits of declaring and enforcing sanctions against countries and/or rebel groups involved in armed conflict. The reason for this is twofold. First, sanctions on the import of fuel and other essential items may further impoverish non-combatants as was the case in Burundi. Second, sanctions may lead to the creation of highly profitable black markets, in which certain individuals and groups may develop economic agendas that would be negatively affected by the peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Privatisation of Security (Mercenaries)

There is a vast array of publications on the privatisation of security, that is the employment and deployment of 'mercenary' forces in armed conflicts. These business entities have a significant economic interest in war and in its perpetuation as there are significant financial rewards to be had, either in cash or mineral concessions.

Mercenaries (private armies) can be defined as:

"soldiers hired by a foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed conflict - whether directly by engaging in hostilities, or indirectly through training, logistics, intelligence or advisory services - and who do so outside the authority of the government and defence force of their own country." 44

In the literature, there are two schools of thought, namely those who support the use of private armies, and those that oppose them. The 'support' literature emphasises the technical and efficiency aspects of this phenomenon. It is claimed that private security firms have a distinct corporate character; they have used legitimate instruments to secure deals; and they have mainly supported recognised governments, avoiding unpalatable regimes. This literature set claims that coercion is often essential to breaking deadlocks and bringing opposing parties to the negotiation table. Private security firms are the solution for poor governments that lack the resources to field effective fighting forces, especially as the political and economic costs of peacekeeping continue to escalate. In short, this section of the literature implies that private security firms for the most part aim to resolve conflicts. 45

Those in the opposing camp point to issues of accountability and control. It is argued that private security forms are not subject to checks and balances that restrain regular, national armed forces from abusing their power. 46 A number of authors argue that in certain contexts, private security outfits may contribute to the perpetuation of the war. For example, Sean Cleary argues that,

"EO [Executive Outcomes]'s continued availability and efficiency - together with substantial arms deliveries from several countries - gave the Angolan government reason to believe that the FAA [Angolan Armed Forces] could continue to disregard the cease-fire throughout the Lusaka talks." 47

Certain authors and advocacy organisations take their opposition to the use of private security firms even further by arguing that they constitute an "economic imperialist" force. They point to the partnerships between private security firms and mining houses as examples of this trend. 48

The privatisation of security literature set is generally not underpinned by thorough investigative research. This literature is descriptive in nature, with there being only a handful of academic publications. The fundamental weakness of this literature is the lack of theory. Very few authors interrogate the link between the privatisation of security and the weakening of state capacity. The political economy of private security firms is also rarely considered. In addition, very few researchers have tried to engage the subject from a balanced point of view, with the result being that the debate on deployment of private security firms in conflict situations is polarised. 49

3) STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE LITERATURE

This section discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of the literature on war and economic agendas. In this regard, as in the typology, a distinction is made between academic and policy literature.

As mentioned in the Introduction, a new trend has emerged in the relationship between war and economics. This trend has two dimensions, namely that valuable resources have been used to finance civil wars, and that the perpetuation of war in certain African countries is perceived to be an alternative way of generating profits. The first dimension has been accepted by most academics, researchers and journalists without any detailed analysis of the political economies of rebel movements.

Most of the literature is concerned with describing and/or analysing the second dimension. The popular assumption is that economic greed is a significant, if not the predominant, driving force in many of the current conflicts in Africa. In this regard, there are a number of publications that provide unequivocal statements that a direct link exists between the desire to acquire economic wealth by elites and civil war. However, in general, this assumption remains untested.

The media has had a major influence on this state of affairs. Since 1998 numerous media articles have emerged that have described in some detail the role economic agendas play in African wars. The most common subject matter has been on how greed and the illicit trade in diamonds continue to fuel violent conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC. Many international newspapers have carried such stories, with lengthy articles having appeared in the New York Times and the Mail and Guardian, to name but a few. Many of these media reports were inspired by the release of publications by Global Witness, the United Nations Panel of Experts, Human Rights Watch and Partnership Africa Canada.

In terms of the academic literature a distinction can be made between theoretical and empirical work. Publications of a theoretical nature generally deal with the conceptualisation of the relationship between war and economic agendas, and how war economies interact with the global economy. Examples include publications by David Keen and Mark Duffield. However, clarity is lacking in terms of what actually constitutes an economic agenda and what does not. In addition, the entire nature of the relationship between war and economic agendas still needs to be explored. Hence this concept and its various dimensions needs to be rigorously interrogated.

To date, no comprehensive empirical study of the dynamics of war economies and the mechanisms of greed in the context of armed conflict in the post-Cold War era has been conducted. Not even the case study research of rebel movements provides insight into this area. Generally, only brief descriptions of the political economy of rebel movements are provided, with anecdotal references being frequently employed. This is understandable, as studying the economies of civil war in Africa, especially rebel organisations is a risky occupation. In addition, many of these economic activities tend to be highly sensitive and hence measures are taken to conceal them.

In the theoretical literature only econometric analyses are relatively well developed. These analyses involve the application of mathematical and statistical techniques to study problems, analyse data, and develop and test theories and models. It has been possible for econometric analyses and models to be generated, as no extensive field research is required, with the exception of securing a reliable data set. However, econometric analyses are constrained by the fact that data originating from conflict hotspots is often unavailable, and where available it tends to be unreliable.

The econometric models, however, have some serious deficiencies. In the case of the greed and grievance models devised by Collier and Hoeffler three shortcomings can be identified. First, Collier and Hoeffler claim to compare two contrasting motivations for rebellion, namely greed and grievance. However, while the grievance model considers motivations for armed conflict, such as inter-ethnic hatreds, the greed model appears to focus on opportunities for rebellion (e.g. size of the rebel movement, relative military advantage and cost of recruitment), rather than motivations. Second, the grievance model does not reflect the myriad of sophisticated theories of the causes of armed conflict. Third, as the models are concerned with major trends, and hence indigenous/unique features are not included in the models. For instance, in the case of Southern Africa, one would be hard-pressed to argue that past conflicts in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe were inspired by greed.

The policy-oriented literature is also still in its early stages of development, however, the sanctions, human rights and private security literatures provide some well constructed policy proposals. These proposals include detailed technical recommendations for the improvement of sanctions regimes, increased respect for human rights, the reformation of the diamond and oil industries, and the regulation of the private security companies. Some of the recommendations tend to be too ambitions, and a certain number are unrealistic and unimplementable. In the sanctions literature, as well as the publications that call for diamond certification and transparency in the Angolan and Sudanese oil industries, research into the relevant costs and benefits should be undertaken. The reason for this is that particular policies may have unintended consequences. For instance, in certain contexts, sanctions may contribute to the perpetuation of armed conflict rather than to its peaceful resolution.

The policy literature is constrained by the undeveloped nature of the academic research. That is, if one is not able to diagnose the problem effectively, then the relevant solutions cannot be determined.

Despite the fact that many African scholars, such as First, Hutchful, Mazrui and Mamdani, have studied and theorised about armed conflict in Africa, the literature on war and economic agendas in Africa is dominated by academics from Europe and the United States. There are two possible reasons for the absence of an African voice. First, the sub-field of war and economic agendas is new and is being studied by only a handful of scholars. Should it grow in popularity, then it is simply a matter of time before African academics make contributions in this regard. Second, African scholars, by virtue of their physical location, are more in touch with the complex nature of civil wars on the continent, and hence do not readily subscribe to the greed thesis.

The entire literature set does have some positive traits. Its greatest strength is that it emphasises the economic dimension of violent conflict, in particular the role and impact that the availability of valuable primary resources has on war. It is stressed that these primary resources need to be taken into account in order to have any hope of securing a sustainable peace agreement. This literature set is multidisciplinary in nature and is characterised by a number of creative approaches to the relationship between war and economic agendas. In particular, economic modelling has introduced some analytical rigour.

4) CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA

This literature survey through the employment of a literature typology has shown that there are a wide variety of publications that consider the relationship between war and economic agendas. Publications range from superficial and uninformed analyses of armed conflict, such as a number of media reports, to complex economic modelling of civil wars, such the work of Collier and Hoeffler. However, this literature review has revealed that in depth, well-researched studies of the economic agendas in armed conflicts are a rarity.

Below are a number of modest recommendations that will contribute to the enhancement of the research on the relationship between war and economic agendas in Africa, as well as suggestions for future research.

General Recommendations
  • As this is a new area of research, the assumption that economic agendas are a major impediment to the resolution of armed conflict should be critically analysed. The reason is that there might be other factors that contribute to the perpetuation of certain armed conflicts, such as a lack of state capacity and ineffective governance. Assumptions inform the entire research process, and more importantly policy recommendations. Hence, if a problem is misdiagnosed, it can have dire policy implications.

  • Researchers and academics should refrain from generalising, unless they are able to substantiate or verify the generalisations. The reason for this is that local and historical factors have a direct bearing on the course of the conflict. That is, what is applicable in a civil war in Southern Africa may not be applicable to an armed conflict in North Africa.

Academic Recommendations
  • A more sophisticated conceptual understanding of the economic agendas in wars should to be developed.

  • More detailed analyses of specific African conflicts are required to ascertain the extent to which economic agendas fuel civil wars.

  • In depth case studies of the political economy of rebel movements should be undertaken. An illuminating enterprise would be a comparative analysis of the political economies of rebel groups in Angola, DRC and Sierra Leone.

  • The greed and grievance models developed by Collier and Hoeffler should to be further tested in order to verify the applicability of their results.

  • There is a need for comparative research on the question of why peace has been brokered in certain armed conflicts while peace has been elusive in other armed conflicts.

  • Additional research should be undertaken into the relationship between globalisation and war economies.

  • Extensive research of the diamond and oil industry, as well as the dynamics of weapons smuggling is required.

Policy Research Recommendations
  • The incentives and disincentives of war and peace in armed conflicts should be carefully assessed. Are there any creative ways of making peace more profitable than war to the extent that socio-economic development is not negatively affected?

  • Research should be undertaken on the costs and benefits of sanctions in the context of African wars.

  • Research should be undertaken on the costs and benefits of attempts to make the Angolan oil industry more transparent, for example the International Monetary Fund's staff monitoring programme.

NOTES
  1. This literature review is based on a report by the author that was commissioned by the International Development Research Centre (Canada).
  2. Guy Lamb is a senior researcher with the Centre for Conflict Resolution, which is associated with the University of Cape Town (South Africa). Lamb manages the Centre's Project on Peace and Security.
  3. Theodore Ropp, 1962. War in the Modern World, (New York: Collier), p. 13.
  4. Margareta Sollenberg (ed.), 1996. States in Armed Conflict, Report No.46, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 1994-1999, SIPRI Yearbooks 1994-1999, (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  5. David Keen, 1998. "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars", Adelphi Paper 320, (London International Institute for Strategic Studies), pp. 15-17. An updated version of this publication is titled "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence" and appears in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), 2000. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner), pp. 19-42.
  6. This conference was hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of International Development of the United Kingdom, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Centre for International Studies at Oxford University, and the International Peace Academy.
  7. This conference was hosted by the Centre of International Studies and the World Bank Research Group.
  8. David Keen, 1998, p. 12
  9. David Keen, 1998.
  10. Reno defines shadow states "as the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the façade of de jure state sovereignty."
  11. William Reno, 2000. "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars, in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 43-68.
  12. Mark Duffiled, 2000. "Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 69-90.
  13. World Bank Group. The Economics of Civil Wars, Crime and Violence, (http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/)
  14. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo. The Political Economy of Civil Wars, (http://www.prio.no/research).
  15. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. 2000. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War", presented at conference on the economics of political violence, Princeton University, 18-19 March 2000.
  16. Paul Collier, 2000. "Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 91-112.
  17. Laurie Nathan, 2000. "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa", Peace and Change, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 190-192.
  18. Indra de Soysa, 2000. "Natural Resources and Civil War: Shrinking Pie of Honey Pot?", presented at conference on the economics of political violence, Princeton University, 18-19 March 2000; Indra de Soysa, 2000. "The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?" in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 113-136..
  19. See P. Chabal, 1984. "People's War, State Formation and Revolution in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Angola", in N. Kasfir (ed.), State and Class in Africa, (London: Frank Cass), pp. 104-125; G. Chaliand, 1969. Armed Struggle in Africa, (New York: Monthly Review Press); B. Davidson, 1981. The People's Cause: A History of Guerrillas in Africa, (Harlow: Longman); K. Grundy, 1971. Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview, (New York: Grossman).
  20. Daniel Compagnon, 1998. "Somali Armed Movements", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), African Guerrillas, (Oxford: James Currey), pp. 73-90.
  21. Stephen Ellis, 1998. "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), pp. 155-171.
  22. Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, 1998. 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat", in Christopher Clapham (ed.), pp. 172-194.
  23. Paul Richards, 1996. Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, (Oxford: James Currey), p.33.
  24. See Human Rights Watch, 1994. Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections, (New York: Human Rights Watch); Human Rights Watch, 1999. Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process, (New York: Human Rights Watch); Human Rights Watch World Reports 1998 and 1999 (http://www.hrw.org); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; U.S. Department of State, 2000. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report) - see reports on Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan.
  25. Human Rights Watch, 1999. p.135.
  26. U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sierra Leone, February 25, 2000, (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/sierrale.html)
  27. U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Democratic Republic of Congo, February 25, 2000, (http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/congodr.html)
  28. Amnesty International. 2000. Sudan: The Human Price of Oil. (http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/AFR/15400100.htm)
  29. Human Rights Watch. 1999. The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities (New York: Human Rights Watch).
  30. Shannon Field, 2000. "The Civil War in Sudan: The Role of the Oil Industry", Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Occasional Paper No.23, (Braamfontein: IGD).
  31. Amnesty International. 2000. Sudan: The Human Price of Oil. (http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/2000/AFR/15400100.htm); John Harker, 2000. Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian Assessment Mission (Ottawa: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), p.71.
  32. Global Witness, 1999. A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, (London: Global Witness Ltd.).
  33. Ian Smilie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Partnership Africa Canada), (http://www.web.net/pac/pacnet-1/msg0009.html); Global Witness, 1998. A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict (London: Global Witness Ltd.); Global Witness, 200. Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, (London: Global Witness Ltd.).
  34. See Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, (eds.), 1994. War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, (London: Zed Books); Francios Jean, (ed.), Life, Death and Aid: The Médecins sans Frontières Report on World Crisis Intervention, (London: Routledge); Alex D Waal, 1997. Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa, (Oxford: James Currey).
  35. See John Prendergast, 1996. Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner); Mary Anderson, 1993. "Development and the Prevention of Humanitarian Emergencies", in Thomas G. Weiss and Larry Minear (eds.), Humanitarianism Across Borders, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner); Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, 1995. Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community (Boulder: Lynne Reinner); Mary Anderson, 1999. Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - Or War, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner).
  36. Global Witness, 1998. Made in Vietnam - Cut in Cambodia: How the Garden Furniture Trade is Destroying Rainforests, (London: Global Witness Ltd).
  37. De Beers' Central Selling Organisation was established to control the international diamond trade and maintain steady prices. It is estimated that De Beers sell around 80% of the world market and has been actively involved in the Angolan diamond industry, particularly in UNITA held territories, in order to maintain its monopoly and market stability.
  38. The following NGOs constituted this alliance: Global Witness (United Kingdom), Medico International (Germany), Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa and Novib.
  39. "De Beers Won't Buy Diamonds from Angola", Professional Jeweller Magazine, October 8, 1999, (http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/news/1999/100899story.html).
  40. See Talisman Energy Divestment Campaign, (http://anti-slavery.org/oil/); Colin Nickerson, 1999. "Canadian Oil Company Finds Opposition in the Pipe Line", Boston Globe, 21 November; Steven Chase, 1999. "Talisman plays with fire in Sudan", Toronto Globe & Mail, October 9.
  41. Samuel D. Porteous, 2000. "Targeted Financial Sanctions", in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone (eds.), pp. 173-188.
  42. United Nations Security Council, 2000. Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA, p. 26.
  43. United Nations Security Council, pp. 34-35.
  44. Laurie Nathan, 1997. "Lethal Weapons: Why Africa Needs Alternatives to Hired Guns", Track Two, Vol. 6, No.2, August, p.10.
  45. See David Shearer, 1998. "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, No. 112, Fall, pp. 68-81; Herbert, M. Howe, 1998. "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 307-331; David Shearer, 1998. "Private Armies and Military Intervention", Adelphi Paper No.316, (New York: Oxford University Press); Jakkie Cilliers and Ian Douglas, 1999. "The Military as Business - Military Professional Resources, Incorporated", in Jakkie Cillers and Peggy Mason, Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies, pp. 111-122; Executive Outcomes. No date. Presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Defence: Parliament, Cape Town.
  46. Laurie Nathan. "Trust Me I'm a Mercenary: The Lethal Danger of Mercenaries in Africa", Seminar on the Privatisation of Peacekeeping, Institute for Security Studies, 20 February 1997; Ian Douglas, 1999. "Fighting for Diamonds - Private Military Companies in Sierra Leone", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), pp. 175-200; Bernedette Muthien, 2000. "The Privatisation of Security in Southern Africa", presented at a conference on Demilitarisation and Peace-building in Southern Africa, Pretoria, 3-5 March.
  47. Sean Cleary, 1999. "Angola - A Case Study of Private Military Involvement", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), pp. 141-174; also see A. J. Venter, 1996. "Mercenaries Fuel Next Round in Angolan Civil War", Current Conflicts: Jane's International Defence Review; Christopher Clapham, 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
  48. See Khareen Pech, 1999. "Executive Outcomes - A Corporate Conquest", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), pp. 81-110.
  49. For further analyses on the issue of mercenaries in Africa see Abdel-Fatau Musah et al (eds.), 2000. Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, (London: Pluto Press).
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