Small Arms Proliferation and Drug Trafficking in Southern Africa

3) The Dynamics of North-South Relations

3.1) Contemporary International Relations: North Vs South

The relationship between rich and poor states, the inequalities between them, and the resulting tensions that have arisen between these two camps, has generated much concern historically. This state of affairs has formed the basis of many theories, such as dependency theory and world-system theory. Dependency and world-system theorists contend that the developed world and the economic system of free trade continually acts to keep the developing world in a subservient position in the world economy where its resources, both natural and human, can be exploited to the advantage of the developed world. These theorists argue from an historical perspective that the lack development of the third world is perpetuated by this system. In basic terms, as long as the world capitalist system remains intact, the less developed countries of the world will remain dependent upon the industrialised nations. These theories encompass terminology such as "North" (developed) and "South" (developing).

For the majority of states in the South, their relationship with the North has been marred by the experience of colonialism and economic dependence. The granting of political independence has not eliminated external economic domination: formal colonial status has simply been replaced by a less obvious but none the less constraining "neo-colonialism". ¹¹ The terms "North" and "South" provide a convenient and descriptive means of highlighting the division between wealthy and less poor countries. However, these terms are misleading in two respects. First, geographically, certain countries do not conform to clearly distinguishable hemispheres. For instance, could Australia and New Zealand be described as developing countries? Can Albania be labelled as a developed nation? Second, these terms imply a certain level of cohesion within each group, which in reality does not exist, and in the case of the South is diminishing. ¹² By in large, the distinction relates to historical, political and socio-economic differences between countries.

Power tends to follow money, and consequently, the balance of power in the international arena has become securely clasped in the hands of the Northern countries (United States and Western Europe). This has led to a disproportionate situation where the structures and norms of the international system and the rules of that system, as established after World War II, are almost completely dominated by the Northern states. Examples of these institutions include the United Nations Security Council, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It has been argued quite convincingly that the North has used its monopoly of these "power tools" to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, that is, ensure that many of the countries in the South remain economically poor and under-developed. With the South actively seeking to challenge the external determinants of the situation, it is understandable that an atmosphere of tension, and even conflict has arisen. In a range of third World countries the strains of development have engendered new political and social explosions - Islamic movements, state fragmentation, and ethnic violence, to name but a few. Linked to this North-South tension is the inter-related issue of small arms proliferation and drug trafficking.

3.2) Drug Trafficking

It has been estimated that the production and trade in narcotics is one of the world's largest and most financially lucrative industries. Drug production is unevenly dispersed with the cultivation of heroin confined to the "Golden Crescent" of Asia, namely Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran; the "Golden Triangle" of South East Asia, that of Thailand, Burma and Laos; and Mexico. The cocoa bush, which is used in the manufacture of cocaine is limited to the Andes region of Bolivia and Peru, while processing into refined cocaine takes place primarily in Colombia. ¹³ Marijuana, the other major illicit drug, can be produced under diverse conditions. Leading source countries include Mexico, Columbia, Jamaica and even South Africa.

The drug delivery routes have become increasingly complex in the post Cold War environment where countries with porous borders, slack controls against smuggling and weak state capacity are increasingly used as transhipment points. The market for these substances is located predominantly in the North, with the United States providing the greatest single source of demand. However, drug dependence in the South is on the increase.

Drugs conform to the law of supply and demand: as demand in the North has increased, so production in the South has correspondingly expanded. Due to large collective drug habit in the North, developed countries have been burdened with most of the negative side effects of the demand side of this phenomenon. These effects include increased crime and pressure on health and welfare resources. Given this state of affairs, it is understandable that the North has used its unassailable position of power to manipulate the "rules of the game" to ban and condemn the cultivation, trade and use of drugs on a global scale.

The trafficking in drugs, with respect to the North-South dynamic, has intensified tensions between developed and developing countries, as the production or cultivation of drugs and the trafficking thereof has an enormous potential for improving the socio-economic development of drug-producing regions in the South at a rapid rate. However, on the other hand, the majority of countries in the North, seeking to eradicate the evils associated with drugs as well as sustain the global balance of power, actively promote and enforce the illegality of the drug trade. This is reinforced by the United States' certification policy, which the U.S. Congress mandated in 1986. In terms of this policy nations are evaluated on an annual basis with respect to their cooperation with the United States in the employment of anti-drug measures, such as crop eradication. Some nations are certified as fully cooperating, others are decertified for their lack of cooperation. In most cases the U.S. imposes economic sanctions against nations it decertifies, as was the case, until recently, with Colombia because of allegations that Colombian President Ernesto Samper accepted more than $6 million from the Cali cartel to bankroll his 1994 campaign. ¹⁴ The U.S. will also use its influence to oppose the granting of development loans by international institutions to decertified countries. This certification policy, which focuses exclusively on the supply side of the drug phenomenon, shifts the responsibility of drug control to drug producing nations while ignoring the factors relating to deprivation and poverty which underpin the growing of drug-related crops. In simple terms, certification means that developing nations are constantly at the mercy of the United States.

Despite the vast resources and extreme efforts that the United States has devoted to combating the drug phenomenon, only a marginal impact has been achieved. This begs the question of whether or not the legalisation of drugs on a global scale would be a more productive strategy? However, there is currently a fierce debate over the legalisation issue, with those individuals and groups in favour of legalisation arguing that such a development would significantly reduce the organised crime element and increase tax revenues for the government in question. Anti-legalisation campaigners argue that it lead to increased drug abuse and petty crimes. In terms of North-South dynamics, the legalisation of the drug issue would, in theory, have the same effect as the production of oil had on the Middle East, that is empower and advance a previously underdeveloped region. However, sentiment within governments in the North is still firmly opposed to legalisation.

The Southern African region is a major producer of the "soft" drug marijuana with South Africa, Malawi and Zambia being the leading suppliers. ¹⁵ South Africa has also been home to a strong indigenous trade in Mandrax. Mandrax is manufactured in tablet form in the Durban area or shipped to Maputo, Mozambique for manufacture. ¹⁶ Countries in the region, largely due to their poorly policed borders, ports and airports, have become major transhipment points in the trafficking of two of the most infamous drugs: heroin and cocaine. ¹⁷ Tanzania (Dar es Salaam) and Mozambique (Beira) are the most prominent entrance routes for traffickers from the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Investigations have also revealed that drug syndicates that are based in Nigeria ship large loads of cocaine to South and Southern Africa. ¹⁸

Drug seizures over the past few years seem to indicate that drug trafficking is on the increase. ¹⁹ This has led to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration providing training for law and order officials in Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa, and has even opened an office in Johannesburg. Of greater concern is that residue or a portion of the drugs remain in the region, especially in South Africa which is developing a consumer market, over and above its firmly rooted demand for Mandrax (which is imported from India), for cocaine and "crack".

3.3) Small Arms

The demand for small arms is a global phenomenon, with the greatest concentration of demand being located in the South, with many instances is characterised by violent conflict. The bulk of these weapons manufactured in the North and shipped to the South. China with approximately 16 arms producing factories, has the world's largest industrial capacity for manufacturing infantry weapons. ²⁰ The United States, Britain, France and many of the former Eastern Bloc countries are also major suppliers of arms to developing countries. Unlike drugs, small arms have a longer "life span" and can be re-cycled into different conflict situations, and consequently, a South-South dynamic has developed. In addition, certain developing countries, such as South Africa and to a lesser degree Zimbabwe have even procured their own weapons manufacturing capacity. ²¹

There are highly concentrated channels for movement of small arms in various regions of the world, which were of strategic significance to the major military powers during the Cold War. These weapons channels have remained open even after the Cold War has been concluded. In Africa, there is a well-defined channel that runs down the eastern coastline, and as a result hinder the resolution of these conflicts and stabilisation of the Region. It has been estimated that some 1.5 million AK-47s are unaccounted for in Mozambique alone. ²²

Small arms do not create the conflicts in which they are being utilised, however, they tend to provoke conflicts by:

"Affecting the lethality, duration and intensity of violence; encouraging a militant rather than peaceful resolution of unsettled differences; and generating a vicious circle of greater sense of insecurity leading to more widespread demand and use of such weapons". ²³

As the effects of small arms proliferation do not directly impact on the North, the necessary political will does not yet exist to mobilise effective international condemnation. Consequently effective international regulations have not been forthcoming. In Southern Africa regulatory policy in the form of national licensing does exist, but is largely ineffective and can be easily circumvented. An international arms register (as is the case with major conventional weapons) does not exist and only in December 1995, by its resolution 50/70 did the United Nations General Assembly start consultation and formulation of policy recommendations to deal with the problem of small arms proliferation. They were to be assisted by a Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. The Panel's final report was released in the second half of 1997, and only made very broad and vague recommendations to stem the proliferation of small arms. Given this state of affairs, governments and private weapons traders have engaged in the highly profitable small arms trade, with little fear of prosecution. This has also facilitated the maintenance of the North-South balance of power. Some conspiracy theorist take this line of argument even further by facilitates stating that it is in the North's best interests to allow the proliferation of small arms because they exacerbate conflict which undermines socio-economic development.

As a capitalist development fails to provide the mass of the world's population with the political and economic achievements of the more developed states, or to offer a reasonable prospect of such a provision, political and social tensions in the Third World will continue. ²⁴ In order to rectify this disparity, what is required from the South's viewpoint is to change these rules and operating principles of the international system: radical change for some Southern states, less dramatic reform for others.

3.4) Drugs-Small Arms Nexus

Certain scholars have made the case that there is a connection or "nexus" between small arms and drug trafficking. This work, which is in the form of conference papers and/or working papers, is largely based on tentative research and speculation. As a result it has been confined to descriptive analysis, lacking theoretical insight. Even though most of these papers argue that connection between drugs and small arms is a serious threat to national, regional and international security, they tend to embrace sensationalism and conspiracy theory - which has characterised much of the media hype and public obsession with shadowy world of underground criminal networks. In general, only a very weak case is made for the nexus between drugs and small arms. However, it is important to note that a relationship between small arms and drug trafficking does exist, but in a limited sense. They are both diverse and complex phenomena in their individual right, with their own unique characteristics, as well as push and pull factors. At certain times these phenomena do overlap, usually in the context of conflict or war, periods of uncertainty, and a weak state.

Traditionally this nexus is confined to six dimensions:

1. Criminal organisations, from small-time smuggling operations that are based in a community to large, well-organised transnational groups, are in many cases involved in both the illicit weapons and drugs trade. The relationship between these two commodities can be reciprocal, that is weapons are exchanged for drugs or vice versa. These criminal organisations play an intermediary role, and they can be dealers in both commodities in order to diversify their trade. These criminal groups have also been known, in certain situations, to control the manufacture/production of the products.
2. Peasants farmers who feel threatened or insecure during times of war and intense uncertainty will often cultivate drug-related crops (if the conditions are favourable) to exchange them for arms, or money with which they can then purchase weapons.
3. Historically guerrilla or rebel movements who lacked sufficient financial resources have been known to cultivate, or trade in drugs to acquire weapons. The Shining Path of Peru (Sendero Luminoso) is probably the best example of this "guerrilla-narcotraficante" nexus, where the guerrilla movement provides protection for peasant farmers in exchange for the cultivation coca. ²⁵ Afganistani rebels during the war of liberation in the 1980s became heavily emessed in heroin production in order to finance their arms purchases. There has also been speculation that the Sri Lankan separatist movement the Liberation Tamil Tigers for Eelam have financed many of their operations through the production of dagga. ²⁶
4. Certain states have been implicated in the financing their military and arms acquisitions through involvement in drug production and trafficking. For example, there has been much speculation that Pakistan's military arsenal was paid for with funds derived from heroin trafficking organised by Pakistani Military Intelligence. ²⁷ Panama, under Gen. Manuel Noriega, was converted into a franchise of the Medellin Drug Cartel, and in exchange for millions of dollars from the drug barons to maintain his military dictatorship, Noriega permitted Panama's airports to be used for smuggling operations and its banking system for laundering illicit profits. ²⁸
5. Drug lords, as a result of engaging in a very lucrative, but dangerous business, often establish paramilitary forces (which need to be armed) to protect their person and organisation, as well as secure their access to resources and markets. For instance, the Medellin and Cali "drug cartels" operating out of Columbia have established themselves as a very powerful force in society. Armed with billions of dollars in profits from drug sales, these criminal organisations have established private armies, equipped with the most sophisticated weaponry money can buy. ²⁹ On another level street gangs, who in most cases derive much of their income from drug peddling seek to procure weapons to protect themselves and their turf from rival gangs, the security forces and vigilante groups. ³⁰
6. Individual drug addicts may seek to acquire a weapon(s) to engage in criminal activities as they have no other means to finance their drug habit. This phenomenon is fairly common in most urban settings, especially those with a rampant crime problem.

A seventh dimension has recently been suggested which contends that the profits derived from drug trafficking have been used to facilitate the proliferation and dissemination of small arms throughout the globe in order to destabilise certain regions and undermine the legitimacy of certain states. However, for academic and policy purposes this approach is highly conspiratorial, and as adequate evidence is lacking, it should be disregarded.

In the Southern African context this small arms-drugs nexus does exist, however, current research indicates that only the organised crime dimension is really applicable, as the trade in arms and drugs seems to be conducted in a fairly efficient and orderly way. With the conclusion of the majority of liberation struggles, guerrilla warfare has given way to democratic consolidation; thus the guerrilla-nacrotraficante does not exist. ³¹ As Southern Africa is largely a transhipment point and is not a major producer of "hard" drugs, neither have drug lords and their private armies arisen, nor states controlled by drug cartels emerged. In terms of the sixth dimension, crime is an issue for Southern Africa. This is the result of the proliferation of light weapons, socio-economic inequality and a culture of violence, rather than drug dependence. ³² In a limited sense there has been speculation that rural inhabitants have been cultivating dagga in KwaZulu-Natal and the former Transkei (both in South Africa) in order to exchange it for weapons, or money to purchase weapons.

There are positive and negative aspects to employing this nexus. On the positive side, by focusing on the arms-drugs nexus, security threats in the post-cold war era become conceptually manageable. This perspective also provides insight into the diverse nature of organised crime. On the negative side, over-emphasising the arms-drugs connection severely limits our scope in terms of understanding the problem: it has the effect of looking at the world with "blinkers on". It can also be hazardous as it can promote the idea that an all-encompassing policy can be devised, to the effect that one can "kill two birds with one stone". Even though there are certain conceptual frameworks, such as globalism and imperialism that consider the two phenomena in the same light, drugs and small arms, in policy terms are two distinct problems, each with their own demand and supply factors, and as a result they should be dealt with separately. Only where a distinct overlap between small arms and drug trafficking takes place should a dualistic policy be formulated.

3.5) Transnational Organised Crime

The term "organised crime" has been used with various meanings by scholars and policy makers in different countries. Some authors use it to define a set of relations among illegal organisations, while others use it to indicate a group of illegal activities performed by a set of agents. An early definition, endorsed by the United States federal government, and still commonly used, characterizes organized crime as involving five operational factors. These factors include: hierarchical structure among its membership, profit motive, the use of illegal enterprises to support legal endeavors, the use of predatory tactics such as intimidation and violence, and strict, self-policing discipline within the group. Organised criminal groups are primarily motivated by money and power, and emerge in order to perform services or provide products for which there is a significant demand. Where organised crime differs from ordinary business transactions is that the activities criminal organisations engage in are by definition criminal and illegal. In general these groups are durable, are manifest in some form of hierarchy, and are usually involved in a multiplicity of criminal activities. ³³

Organised crime has a well-established history. Only in the past two decades, as a consequence of fundamental changes in global politics and economics, has the phenomenon of organised crime taken on new international dimensions. These organisations have expanded, become more sophisticated, and resemble transnational corporations. ³⁴ Just as legitimate multinational corporations construct business ventures around the world to take advantage of attractive labour and raw materials markets, so do illicit multinational organisations. Furthermore, international businesses, both legal and illicit, also establish facilities for production, marketing and distribution on a global scale. In short transnational criminal organisations engage in transactions that regularly flow across national boundaries, and include among other things, vehicle theft, fraud, prostitution, armed robbery, blackmail and the production, processing, transportation and distribution of drugs and the laundering of the profits derived from this activity.

Transnational organised crime groups flourish in a variety of different political environments. They are based on every continent, and their activities are increasingly transcontinental and often in conjunction with organised criminals from other regions. They can be located in a collapsing hegemon, as was the case with the former Soviet Union; in the less developed region of a developed democracy; and in a formerly stable democracy. These groups vary in size and employ a myriad of strategies for avoiding detection. ³⁵ The complexity and transnational nature of organised crime is probably most apparent in the area of drug trafficking. Divergent legislative and enforcement policies among nations permit these transnational crime groups to more easily elude authorities with greater ease by exploiting a particular environment. Organized crime can also fulfill essential role in societies where government capacity is weak, that is the delivery of scarce goods and services to a community, and providing protection against predatory crime when the security forces lack the sufficient capacity to do so.

Organized crime enjoys the fascination of the entertainment and news media, with much of this work being sensationalistic. Consequently, most of the available material is written by journalists and novelists, with academic contributions being of a marginal nature.

4) Redefining Security and Security Threats

4.1) Redefinition of Security

During the Cold War the concept of security was seldom questioned in the context of international relations. The debate about security was preoccupied with states, cross-border conflict and military capability defined in terms of the interests and security of the great powers. The result was that security was viewed almost exclusively through the lenses of "defence". ³⁶

In the post-Cold War era traditional boundaries constructed between states, between state and civil society, and between functional areas such as polity, economy, and culture are disintegrating. This has led to the opening up of a set of new, but complex political spaces in international relations, filled with both opportunities and threats. As a result established statecentric and externally directed conceptions of security (which were fairly limiting in the past) are no longer sufficient. Multiple threats that defy military solutions have driven scholars to challenge conventional notions of security, and redefine the concept so that it encompasses not only freedom from physical violence but also the material well being of individuals and the environmental health of the entire planet.

Efforts at reconceptualising or redefining security are not new. Over the past decade, scholars have not only sanctioned, but also refined new and more comprehensive definitions of security suggested by the Palme Commission in "Common Security" (1982), and the Brundtland Commission in "Our Common Future" (1987). Within the United Nations, the Final Document of the Conference on Disarmament and Development (1987) can be regarded as a conceptual, if not a political, turning point. ³⁷ Among scholars, Barry Buzan (1983) (who equated security with development ³⁸ ), and Richard Ullman (1983) were pioneers in blazing new trails of inquiry in security studies. Closer to home, new conceptions of security are also considered in recent southern African defence policy outlines, the most notable being the South African White Paper on Defence, and various related academic articles. In fact these political documents preceded most of the scholarly efforts to expand and clarify the notion of security.

In essence the redefinition of security involves an expansion of the traditional security agenda both in a vertical and horizontal direction. The horizontal expansion refers to the incorporation of political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions into the security framework. The vertical expansion on the other hand involves a multiple level of analysis approach, where the individual and systemic approaches to security are on a par with the state level. Within such a framework the military dynamic is no longer paramount, but is perceived to interact with a host of other complex factors. In terms of this new security paradigm, human security is envisaged as ultimately more important than state security. ³⁹ Consequently typical works in the field have emphasised the expanding scope of security threats by listing such problems as population growth, environmental degradation, energy shortages, drugs and arms trafficking, transnational crime, and the destruction of indigenous cultures as elements of a comprehensive definition of (in)security. To date the debate about security has been active and enlightening, but hardly conclusive. Therefore substantial research and analysis is still required.

4.2) Security in Southern Africa: Arms, Weapons Flows and Drug Trafficking

The Southern African region has recently emerged from a period of protracted violent conflict characterised by a series of national liberation insurgencies and civil war. The region is currently undergoing a term of relatively peaceful democratic consolidation. Despite these developments, uncertainly in terms of potential threats to the region and localised conflicts which have been sustained by massive socio-economic disparities and mass movements of refugees, present a major obstacle to achieving long term peace (with justice) and human development. Local conflicts have been exacerbated and even intensified by the availability of small arms, which have provided the protagonists with the tools which enable to resolve conflicts violently and improve their socio-economic position by engaging in criminal activities. Ironically, most of these small arms are the residue of liberation period, which as a result of lax regional disarmament and weapons control programmes, and consequently have become a major destabilising influence in the region. Added to this problem, porous borders and weak governmental capacity have facilitated the recycling of these weapons to new conflict "hot spots" on the African continent. For example, weapons from Mozambique and Angola have found their way to the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal and the cities of Gauteng in South Africa, exacerbating current conflicts. Small arms have also penetrated the borders of Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The advent of weapons impact on more than just individual well being, they typically have the potential to challenge the very existence of the state. In Southern Africa where resources tend to be scarce and state capacity weak, small arms provide insurgents with the means and power to engage in criminal activities, and in the process severely undermine the rule of law. These criminal elements can also disrupt economic, political and social development. Consequently this leads to an increasing sense of insecurity as a result of the lack of faith in the state's ability to provide personal protection. In response, there is a greater demand for weapons for self-defence and protection of private property by individuals. This leads to the creation of a viscous cycle, a self-perpetuating problem.

In terms of the redefinition of security, the drug phenomenon (excluding drug trafficking) operates on two different levels, namely the individual and state level. On the individual level, the related security threats can be interpreted in two different respects. First, in many rural areas throughout Southern Africa individuals produce and cultivate dagga, which is a lucrative cash crop. ⁴⁰ Government crop irradiation programmes destroy what is often the inhabitant's only means of survival, and thus individuals and families are impoverished and communities destroyed. Second, and probably more serious, is that of drug consumption. The vast majority of illicit drugs on the market are highly addictive and can lead to abuse, therefore heavy drug users are compelled to use whatever means are at their disposal, usually criminal, to procure more drugs.

Research conducted by the United States Department of Justice, points out that there are strong correlations between violence and psycho-active substances, but the underlying relationship differs by type of drug involved. With respect to Southern African research, the Institute for Security Studies' "Crime and Policing Policy Project" has recently released a policy paper which also addresses the relationship between drugs and violence. ⁴¹ This research contends that irrational behaviour and violence is either the direct result of ingesting drugs (or the result of being deprived of these substances), and/or actions (crimes) that are undertaken to raise money to purchase drugs. Criminals who use illegal drugs commit robberies and assaults more frequently than nonuser criminals, and they commit them increasingly during periods of heavy drug use. Concentrated drug use in particular areas or communities can have severe socio-economic effects: rise of gangsterism, unemployment, and increased crime, which can ultimately lead to the destruction of the community in question. This tends to have ripple effects through the rest of society. Research also indicates that a large proportion of children born with HIV had mothers who were drug users.

On the state level, the government in question is forced to allocate what are already scarce resources to combat the problems related to drugs and drug trafficking. Hospitals and treatment centres need to be provided to assist drug abuse victims. The increased level of crime associated with drugs and drug trafficking also puts increasing pressure on the state's operational capacity as more security personnel need to be deployed to arrest criminals, and prisons need to be refurbished or built to accommodate them.

Critically drugs and small arms are self-perpetuating problems. The availability of drugs and small arms destabilise areas, and where conflict exists, exacerbate it. This situation creates a sense of helplessness, which tends to drive people towards taking drugs, and also motivates certain citizens who feel insecure to acquire small arms in order to protect themselves. Such conditions often facilitate the involvement of criminal groups. All these factors generally interact to undermine governmental authority

4.3) Transnational Organised Crime: A Threat to National and Regional Security

The phenomenon of organised crime can be traced back the emergence of the first human communities, where groups of individuals lacking the means of production would engage in acts of banditry. However, it was only in the twentieth century that organised crime began to take on transnational dimensions. Moreover, given the highly visible problem of superpower conflict and regional hostilities that characterised the Cold War period, the problem of transnational crime was neglected by security agencies and international organisations. As a result the world now faces highly developed criminal organisations that have the potential to undermine the rule of law, international and regional security and the world economy. ⁴²

Criminal organisations are economic rather than political entities; they do not pose the same kinds of overt or obvious military challenges to the state as terrorist organisations do, however, they can have equally devastating consequences. The concentration of wealth and coercive potential in the hands of criminal organisations has developed to a point where these groups undermine civil society and human rights through intimidation and assassination of political figures, crime fighters and journalists. Large-scale money laundering, the corrupting of key officials in economic and customs positions and of utilising banks, stock exchanges, venture capital opportunities and commodities markets, all undermine the financial security of world markets. National sovereignty, particularly in the case of drug production/cultivation in the developing world, is constantly violated by anti-drug inspired foreign intervention. In fact national sovereignty is the de facto ally of criminal organisations. Latin America's Drug Barons have accumulated such enormous wealth, in fact, that they once offered to pay off Colombia's entire foreign debt in exchange for repudiation or extradition as a national policy. In certain instances these criminal organisations have the capacity to convert themselves into a "state-within-a-state". Currently organised criminal groups are particularly pervasive and effective in societies undergoing transition where they are able to exploit the accompanying internal turmoil and weak state capacity for their own gains.

In a study of African organized crime, James Opolet emphases that conflicts as well as lack of capacity of law enforcement, along with political corruption and economic dislocation has led to the emergence of organized crime syndicates in Africa. ⁴³ A highly diverse array of crime syndicates, handling a variety of goods and services dominates the African scene. West African diamond and cattle smugglers, Ugandan and Kenyan coffee smugglers, and Somali poaching bands represent just some of the varieties of criminal activities found on the African continent. ⁴⁴ New syndicates, created in recent years, have often been organized around money laundering, weapons smuggling and the drug trade. In many respects drug trafficking has been the driving force behind modern African organized crime, leading to a re-organisation of traditional smuggling and poaching operations. ⁴⁵

Apart from individual actions, most illegal weapons that are injected into the region's "hot spots" are the work of smuggling syndicates. In the case South Africa, criminal groups make use of various methods of gun-running: illegal immigrants mainly from Mozambique are used as "mules"; refrigerated transport trucks are utilised with guns being hidden in frozen cattle and sheep carcasses; and a group of Xhosa women, posing as clothing merchants have been implicated in smuggling small arms from Angola, via Namibia, to South Africa. ⁴⁶ With respect to Angola, groups within South Africa, in conjunction with foreign groups, have used light transport aircraft to smuggle weapons to the rebel movement, National Union for the Total Independence of Namibia (UNITA). ⁴⁷

The drug cartels are increasingly using African states as transshipment points for cocaine, especially with their strategy of de-emphasizing the less profitable U.S. market, and rerouting cocaine to Europe and Japan. ⁴⁸ Both Zambia and Zimbabwe have become increasingly important drug trafficking centres for the smuggling of Mandrax (a drug similar to Quaalude), dagga, cocaine, LSD and heroin. It has become common practice in these countries to trade Mandrax for motor vehicle spare parts and stolen automobiles from South Africa. ⁴⁹ Criminal groups are also attracted to the region by South Africa's relatively sophisticated physical and financial infrastructure, including a banking sector with few controls on money laundering. ⁵⁰ In addition, high unemployment and a high cost of living in South Africa have made it an increasingly attractive site for foreign criminal groups. This has also been facilitated by the internal political instability during the run-up to the 1994 elections and the reorganization and reform of law enforcement services. ⁵¹ Intelligence analysts in South Africa have already identified Chinese, Japanese, Israeli and Russian criminal syndicates operating in the country. There is also speculation that the infamous Colombian Cali Cartel is interested in South African investment opportunities. ⁵² In July 1996, a South African Police spokesman estimated that at that point there were 136 drug syndicates, 112 vehicle-related syndicates, 85 commercial/fraud rackets, and 171 diamond and gold-related syndicates in South Africa. ⁵³ Certain analysts that these criminal groups have already infiltrated government departments and security forces in the region, particularly in South Africa. ⁵⁴ High-ranking Zambian political figures have also been implicated in drug trafficking. ⁵⁵

Within South Africa itself, a relatively unsophisticated drug distribution infrastructure exists, built around a network of street gangs. But those gangs have grown more sophisticated and have become more entrenched with the heavy volume of cash associated with the retail and wholesale cocaine trade.

5) Pursuing Future Research and Policy Making

In order to develop effective strategies and policies in the realm of small arms proliferation and drug trafficking, it is essential to have insight into the causes, relations and consequences of these phenomena. Research plays a fundamental role in this endeavour by assessing the nature and extent of the issue and evaluating interventions and initiatives. What is revealing about the above conceptual analysis is that our understanding of the basic details of drug trafficking and small arms proliferation, not only in Southern Africa, but throughout the world, is fairly limited. This can be attributed to the inadequacy of current research initiatives and data, and the lack of political will to pursue these issues. This section has three objectives. First, it seeks to identify and assess the various sources of data on small arms and drug trafficking, as well as the associated quantitative and qualitative limitations. Second, undertake an analysis of the reason for the lack of political will in addressing these issues. Finally, propose a possible methodology that could inform future research.

5.1) Research Sources: Statistics and Data

Small Arms ⁵⁶

When conducting research into the proliferation of small arms, there is a fundamental adversity one is forced to come to terms with: the shortage of accurate and reliable data. Currently, there are only a very limited number of sources available, which tend to be of varying quality and precision. This is due to a number of reasons. First, many countries lack consistent arms transfer policies or reporting standards, and where such structures do exist small weapons are rarely considered. Second, as most small arms transfers are of a sensitive nature (i.e. they are often sold to countries with poor human rights track records), data in this regard is tentative at best. Third, there is a lack of coherence and consensus with respect to research methodology and data collection. Fourth, there are many problems with comparing data across sources, and there often tends to be a lack of corroboration between sources as well. Fifth data sources cover different time periods and track different categories of weapons. Sixth, sources differ in terms of level of aggregation of the data they present, moreover there is a lack of consensus over whether they use data or list qualities of weapons transferred. Finally, certain sources indicate only those weapons in service, and with which forces; others try to determine the source of the weapons. As a result of these limitations it is difficult to reconcile data derived from various sources.

Despite substantial anecdotal evidence on the trade in small arms there are few mechanisms of verifying these transactions. Reports regularly appear in the media that contain information about transfers, however, it is often impossible to determine the origins and the routes by which these weapons reached their ultimate destination. These constraints on data collection are intensified in the Southern African region where capacity to undertake research, particularly financial, is lacking

These problems apply to the legal trade in light weapons, with the assumption that governments, businesses, or individuals are not intentionally concealing data. These problems are compounded for those researchers seeking information on illegal or quasi-legal arms transactions, and as a result the extent of the illegal weapons trade is unknown, and probably unknowable.

The available data sources of small arms proliferation are as follows:

1. International Statistics and Data. There are a number of governmental agencies, quasi-governmental bodies and NGOs that publish statistical reports on arms transfers throughout the globe. These sources incorporate one or more of the following items: arms registers, statistical analysis of suppliers and recipients and a categorisation of weapons traded. Examples include: The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ⁵⁷ , the Congressional Research Service (CRS), International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) ⁵⁸ , UN Register of Conventional Arms, and Jane's Information group. ⁵⁹
2. National Governmental Data. A number of national governments (and their related departments) release data on weapons transfers, with the most detailed listings being provided by the United States (Defence Security Assistance Agency of the Department of Defence). In terms of the Southern African region, Armscor, the South African Government owned arms procurement agency, publishes a monthly Acquisition Bulletin that provides details of most of the legitimate weapons related contracts that have been offered and awarded in that month.
3. Non-Governmental Sources: Commercial Production and Sales. There are a number of trade information services that publish information related to small arms transfers. For example, Forecast International/DMS, which is located in the United States, has undertaken various weapons studies, and published three regional assessments of foreign military markets roughly on an annual basis: NATO and Europe, Latin America and Australasia, and the Middle East and Africa. Military trade magazines and newsletters are also an important source of information on a number of defence related issues, including small arms. Titles include Jane's Defence Weekly (and related publications) and the International Defence Review. Throughout the world there are a number military trade associations and expositions that focus on small arms and light weapons, but are mainly confined to the United States. In the Southern African region there is only one such association, the South Africa Defence Industry Association (SADIA), but its focus is on the defence industry and not small arms per se.
4. Non-Governmental Sources: Individual Transactions. There are a number of public interest groups and NGOs that publish data on small arms flows. In the United States Human Rights Watch, the Institute for Research on Small Arms in International Security (IRSAIS), the Federation of American Scientists, and the British American Security Information Council are the most reputable sources of small arms information. In the Southern African context the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) released a publication titled Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa (1997) which was complied by Glenn Oosthuysen. This publication includes data and statistics on licensed firearms, small arms stolen/lost/recovered, and illegal weapons seized. The Institute for Security Studies' (Midrand, Johannesburg) Crime Index (in collaboration with Nedcor) and Towards a Collaborative Peace Project has also conducted extensive research into small arms issues.
5. Covert and Illegal Operations. The data with respect to illegal operations is scarce. It is usually only intelligence and police agencies that possess this data. In the Southern African region, each country's security agency does collect data, but is generally tends to be of poor quality.

Drug Trafficking

Concrete and reliable data on drug trafficking is virtually non-existent. This is largely the result of the nature of the phenomenon. First, all aspects of the drug trade are illegal. This means that few records of transactions are maintained between parties, and those that do exist are kept under tight wraps for fear that such documentation could lead to criminal proceedings and prosecution. Second, the drug trade is extremely diverse. Drugs are produced in almost all regions of the world. They can be produced on varying scale, from backyard cultivation to massive agricultural endeavours. Third, drug trafficking tends to be covert in nature. In order to avoid detection by law enforcement agencies, drugs are often produced in secret well- guarded locations, and when they are transported drugs tend to be ingeniously concealed to avoid detection. As a result of this drug production and trafficking are very difficult to trace.

The data that does exist is ad hoc in nature and includes information on drug seizures, drug addition and crime, drug rehabilitation, and drug-related deaths. There seems to be very few attempts to draw these various sources of information together into a coherent process. In terms of drug trafficking, drug seizure data is available, but is of limited use. The reason for this is apart from the fact that this data only reflects a portion of the supply side of the phenomenon, the agencies involved readily admit that what they capture is probably less than ten percent of the actual trade in drugs. In addition, there is a lack of consensus with respect to drug reporting procedures. Police and law enforcement agencies in the Southern African region also lack the capacity and resources to gather the relevant data, and there is often complacency, and at times compliance with the drug traffickers.

Below are the current sources of data on drug trafficking and its related phenomena:

1. International Data and Statistics. There are several international bodies and inter-governmental organisations such as Interpol ⁶⁰ , the World Health Organisation, UN Drug Control Programme and the World Customs Organisation, as well as international NGOs and independent institutes that are engaged in drug-related research. One of the most reputable bodies is the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), which collects and analyses data on drug related issues and disseminates information is this regard. ⁶¹
2. National Government Data. In countries that are affected by drug trafficking there is usually a state agency that is responsible for data collection and research. In the United States there is the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In South Africa it is the Narcotic Bureau. Many governments employ a national strategy in response to their respective drug problems, with certain government departments or inter-departmental agencies being responsible for their implementation. For example, in 1991 the Government Strategy to Prevent Drug Misuse was established in Ireland, which was to be administered by the National Co-ordinating Committee on Drug Abuse. In South Africa, the National Crime Prevention Strategy was initiated by the Cabinet in March 1995, with the Ministry for Safety and Security has been tasked with ensuring its success.
3. Non-Governmental Sources. In the United States and Western Europe there are numerous organisations, from community groups to nationally-based NGOs, that conduct research and collect data in and around drug issues. There are even drug reform lobby groups. In Southern Africa there are only a handful of such bodies, and they tend work in isolation from each other. Only in the past few years, with increased crime rates and greater attention to drug issues in the press throughout the region, has their been an increased interest in pursuing drug related research. In South Africa, the Medical Research Council is engaged in epidemiological research while the ISS and SAIIA are currently investigating drug trafficking, and the consequences thereof.

5.2) Inadequate Political Will

The relatively poor state of research and data that exists on small arms proliferation and drug trafficking is not only the result of insufficient capacity of state and non-state actors, the dimensions of the international system also play a significant role. From the North's perspective, in terms of realpolitiek, small arms proliferation is largely a problem confined to the South, which rarely impacts on states in the North. In fact many governments in the industrialised world, via their defence industries, derive substantial profits from the sale of weapons to developing regions. Consequently, until recently, there has been a lack of political will in the North (with the exception of Canada and the Scandinavian countries) to provide funding and employ resources to research this issue. It can be further argued that effective action has not been forthcoming as the proliferation of small arms maintains the global socio-economic status quo.

The inadequacy of drug-related data has more to do with the covert and criminal nature of drug trafficking and its interpretation than with a lack of political will to deal with the problem. In fact in the United States vast resources have been allocated to combat drug problems, however, they are generally misdirected. The reason is that as the trafficking element of the drug phenomenon is viewed as a threat to national security, a military-styled "war on drugs" has been instituted. This approach portrays drug trafficking groups as "the enemy", where every available means should be employed to eliminate them, including techniques such as crop eradication. This has led to an increase in human insecurity in regions where drugs are produced. It is an approach has obscured the vision of the North in dealing with the drug issue, especially the United States, as it has encouraged state agencies to only tackle the symptoms of the problem and ignore the largely socio-economic and psychological structural causes of the problem. It is state of affairs that has impeded the development of international research into more constructive and creative approaches, such as legalisation and decriminalisation. The fact that current international drug policy acts to maintain the status quo in terms the North-South dynamic should not be ignored. ⁶² Europe is beginning to form uniform drug laws as a result of European unification, and is decriminalising drugs in similar vein to programs used in England and the Netherlands. Most European countries have already approved the Frankfort Accord, which adopts decriminalisation as the primary approach to drugs.

5.3) Proposed Research Methodology

Given the problematic nature of current data on small arms and drug trafficking, and the difficulties involved in gathering it, researchers face a daunting task in their attempts to assess, analyse, and understand the nature of these phenomena. In order to make any headway, preliminary operations will need to undertaken just to facilitate data capturing.

Overcoming Data Limitations

There are certain research techniques and approaches that can be applicable to both small arms and drug trafficking, especially with respect to overcoming the obstacles to data collection, such as procedures to co-ordinate those data current sources and data collection with respect to covert operations. However, as small arms and drug trafficking are separate issues with distinct push and pull factors, they should therefore be treated as distinct research entities.

Future research endeavours will require both active and passive research approaches. Below are six mechanisms or criteria that should be implemented in order to overcome the present data limitations.

First, existing data resources and research initiatives in the Southern African region need to be assessed in order to determine their accuracy and reliability. In addition efforts should be made to facilitate greater co-ordination between these resources. For instance the EMCDDA has created a European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction which has key surveillance, information and collection exchange points throughout the European Union called "focal points". Such a project could be undertaken under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) with the creation of a special unit. ⁶³ Second, it needs to be determined what materials are available internationally, form sources such as Interpol, which can serve as a "guiding light" for further inquiries. Third, consensus on a common method of data collection and its organisation, as well as a common set of research questions should be formulated. This would enable individuals and organisations to conduct investigations in the same direction. Fourth, under-utilised research and data sources in the region should be systematically investigated and a comprehensive bibliography and database developed. Fifth, there should be closer collaboration with investigative journalists to obtain data and information already available, as well as to supplement existing sources of information. ⁶⁴ Sixth, once the previous five criteria have been met, coherent databases on small arms transfers and drug trafficking need to be created.

6) Conclusion: Informing Further Research

The central thrust of this paper has been that the proliferation of small arms and drug trafficking pose a threat to not only international and regional security, but national and individual security as well. This has been facilitated by major wealth and power disparities in the international system (North/South dynamic), which has led to the enforcement of policy programmes that have prohibited the legitimate trade in drugs, but left the trafficking arms relatively unregulated. This has led to an increased deterioration of the security situation in developing regions like Southern Africa as transnational criminal organisations have emerged. The activities of these groups tend to undermine sovereignty by penetrating nation's borders with relative ease, and introducing drugs and small arms which act to further undermine the relative stability of the region. With continued inequalities, both within and between societies, which could combine with poverty to encourage individuals and groups to engage in illicit activities to provide a source of income. Unless effective action is taken to defuse this complex situation conditions in the developing world are likely to worsen. However, without a detailed understanding of the phenomena involved, very little process can be made improving the lot of developing regions. In order to achieve this more coherent and systematic research, data collection and analysis is required.

In the Southern African region, academic analysis and policy research (see Appendix A) can be pursued, however, it is constrained by the lack of research, as well as accurate and reliable data essential for policy detail and generating propositions and hypotheses. Substantial effort is required to reverse this trend as it means generating political will and effectively swimming against the tide of the well-entrenched North-South dynamic.

APPENDIX A

Policy Options for the Problems of Small Arms Proliferation and Drugs

Drugs and weapons proliferation, although intimately linked, demand policy solutions that are distinct. Organised crime, with its established networks, exacerbates both problems and should be addressed when formulating policy solutions. By using states that are in transition from Central and South America, to Eastern Europe and Russia, to Africa and East Asia, organised crime traffics drugs and guns for a lucrative profit. However, there are general categories of public policy that should be the focus of a co-operative effort. These categories are co-ordinated control mechanisms on an international, regional, and national/local level, and a combination of confidence building measures (CBMs) and points of leverage, which lay the groundwork for effective control mechanisms to function.

International Control Mechanisms

Control mechanisms are policies that reduce the supply and curb the demand of both drugs and weapons. On an international level, the United Nations plays the most important role for implementing and developing proper control mechanisms. One of the most important mechanisms are transparency agreements that help to take stock of a country's weapons, which in turn helps track the proliferation of small arms. Also intervention attempts to combat organised crime and the established conduits of both drugs and guns are necessary. The UN International Drug Control Programme would be the ideal body to tackle the policy implementation. A successful policy must seek international harmonisation in legislation combating crimes in the areas of banking, security law, customs and extradition. At the 1994 UN Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime further policies were suggested as practical efforts. These included urging nations to adopt legislation on the criminalisation of participation in a criminal organisation, the criminalisation of conspiracy, the prohibition of laundering of criminal profits, and the implementation of forfeiture laws. The UN also formed in 1988 the Financial Action Task Force to fight money laundering. Industrialised nations are the only parties to this task force, but countries with established banking systems, e.g. South Africa, should be encouraged to join. This harmonisation will reduce the opportunities for criminal activity and minimise the infiltration of transnational organised crime groups into legitimate businesses.

The UN Registry of Convention Arms is a correct step towards transparency in international arms transfers and further inclusion should be pursued. Co-operation on an international front must take the form of arms embargoes as an enforcement tool from the international community. The concept of a code of conduct for nations and the international community to follow in regards to arms transfers, purchases and sales should also be encouraged. In this way, the equation stands as:

A Code of Conduct + Embargo + UN Register = Restraint in Supply

of small arms and light weapons. Finally, the UN can take a lead in identifying the private arms networks, where informal arrangements traffic a large proportion of legal and illegal weapons. Another important role the UN provides is knowledge dissemination and assistance programs, especially to the developing world. Effective anti-drug programs can be shared, and successful gun buy back programs can be copied. Finally, resources channelled to developing nations through the UN's development apparatus are critical for the implementation of these types of programs. These are only a few examples of the means of UN support for international control mechanisms.

Regional Control Mechanisms

Regional control mechanisms are the next step. Fundamentally, the development of policies combating the proliferation of both drugs and guns on a regional level can be seen as a starting point for co-operation on a range of issues to follow in its wake. The regional control mechanisms established to tackle the problems of drugs and weapons proliferation can act as a launching point for region-wide norms that will help with the regional security concerns specifically southern Africa. Regional control mechanisms, however, must begin with co-operation. A first step is a regional declaration from the collective states to start a process of co-operation on drug control and gun control. An exchange of legislation on gun laws, with the aim of harmonisation (even if it's a lowest common denominator type of legislation). After this exchange of legislation, the implementation of good policies are essential, for example cross-border policing, capacity building, extradition agreements, and a clear distinction in the form of a joint policy statement between what is legal and illegal. Border control agreements must be implemented where custom agents on both sides of a border are equally trained and supported.

In terms of weapons proliferation, arms production and import harmonisation policies are necessary to prevent an over-arming of a region, which leads to a surplus weapons problem. Regional co-operation of police and defence units provides useful enforcement avenues, as well as aids in the dissemination of successful strategies for the combating of weapons proliferation and illegal drug trafficking. Another benefit of regional co-operation is resource sharing, as co-operative efforts prove to be the most efficient way to do the most effective job, especially in budget conscious countries like South Africa. This regional co-operation also aids in the fight against drug trafficking, which is inherently a transnational problem. Other policy strategies are the following:

• The establishment of communication services such as a hotline between related agencies and an information exchange including the establishment of a regional database recording the weapons and drug seizures, the transfers of light weapons
• The creation of regional registries of every individual weapon recording the serial number of every weapon in the possession of the governments and individuals. In this way, illegal arms can be traced back to their source more effectively with the aim of controlling the leaks of small arms.
• The establishment of mechanisms for surplus arms disablement is crucial for the disarmament of the region and for the control on the supply of illegal weapons. The UN's involvement at the resolution of conflict is essential in this process of disarmament.

These policies will help in the effective formulation of non-proliferation and anti-trafficking results.

National and Local Control Mechanisms

National and local control mechanisms are the crucial work of anti-drug and non-proliferation policy. On a national level, control mechanisms for drugs and weapons proliferation are divided into two groups: policy control mechanisms and national/local campaigns and programs. The first step for policy control mechanisms is a review of existing legislation relating to drugs and weapons. Are the punishments for convicted drug users effective in stamping out drug use? Are drug treatment programs in place? Is the regulation of firearms effective in controlling the proliferation of small arms? Is the existing legislation on gun ownership and licensing enough to ensure the control of arms in the country? These are just some of the questions to be asked during the legislation review step. The next step of the policy control mechanism process is the discernment of the need for relevant new legislation, followed by improved implementation of the existing legislation and the new policies. Public education and law enforcement education of the gun and drug policies must be the next step. Southern Africa is ripe with examples of the police not knowing which laws to enforce and the public not knowing their rights and obligations by law. This type of bottom up policy education is where small sectors are mobilised within civil society. These small sectors in turn, whether an NGO, church group or community groups, create the critical mass to effect the necessary systemic changes in society that will curb the demand and that will support the policies that reduce the supply of drugs and weapons.

Campaigns and programs are the second set of tools of national control mechanisms. A critical first step in a drug control and nonproliferation program is more effective policing (including community policing techniques and better training for police) and a strong regulation and control of indigenous arms production. The means for an awareness raising public campaign is mass media. If mass media is effectively used, then ordinary people will be mobilized around the issues of weapons proliferation and drug abuse. For example, the stigmatization of drug use by young people is essential for real cessation of demand and for a long-term solution for drug abuse. In turn, the lowered demand of drugs will ease the supply and lower the criminal element in society, thus lowering the demand for guns. The most potent means for the development of this stigmatization is mass media. Community groups, youth groups, health care advocates, and politicians all can coordinate and cooperate in a national media campaign that effectively "sells" the stigmatization of drugs via the medium most accessible to young people. By developing a national campaign in this bottom up manner, the essential step of policy implementation, i.e. bringing onboard the stakeholders will be satisfied.

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Points of Leverage

Confidence building measures (CBMs) and the development of points of leverage precede the policy development steps outlined above. CBMs involve the building of trust and understanding between stakeholders on a regional and national basis. CBMs are not control mechanisms, but they act as a beginning where control measures are the end product. Some examples of CBMs are:

• Hot pursuit agreements across borders to facilitate the apprehension of drug traffickers and weapons smugglers
• Transparency agreements like the UN Registry for Conventional Arms The use of same radio frequencies on a regional basis to facilitate communication between complimentary agencies
• International and regional illegal weapons proliferation agreements and joint policy statements.

Points of leverage refer to the co-ordination of the relevant stakeholders, on an inter- or intra-department basis. For example, recently South African National Defence Forces and Mozambique defence forces held co-operative weapons search and destroy missions in Mozambique, with highly praised results. These operations lead to greater co-operation and communication between the complimentary organisations. This type of facilitation need not happen on such a high level. Community groups can be equally effective in communicating their strategies of addressing local drug problems. These techniques are non-linear approaches to disarmament. However, they are also highly effective and provide fertile ground for the successful implementation of more developed control mechanisms on an international, regional, and national level.

Conclusion

The combination of these control mechanisms on a international, regional, and national/local level with the efforts of CBMs and points of leverage will lead to the control of both small arms and drugs in southern Africa. However, a necessary ingredient to the ultimate control of small arms proliferation and drugs is economic development. Beyond the organised crime factor, beyond the porous borders, beyond the weak enforcement mechanisms, the demand created by the economic restructuring policies of the regional governments must be countered with anti-poverty programs before the demand for drugs and guns eases. Economic development must be achieved and resources directed to all sectors of society to achieve any long-term solution for the problems of drugs and weapons proliferation.

Notes ^1. Rana, S. "Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts", Conference Paper 7-11 November 1994, (Genenva: UNIDIR), P. 2.

^2. Dikshif, P. "Proliferation of Small Arms and Minor Weapons", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 17(2) May 1994, p. 189.

^3. Draft Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, (New York, March 1997).

^4. Rana, p. 7.

^5. These weapons usually consist of nothing more than a hollow pipe with a spring inserted inside and operated by a nail. Home-made weapons are particularly prevalent in the rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa).

^6. UN Security Resolution 918 (1994).

^7. "Narcotics", Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopaedia CD-ROM.

^8. Interestingly, heroin was first developed as a cough suppressant in 1898 and non-addicting substitute for morphine. Its addictive potential was soon realised, and as result was banned in the United States.

^9. Cocaine is a white, crystalline powder with a bitter taste.

^10. "Drugs", Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopaedia CD-ROM.

^11. Ibid., p. 155.

^12. Hocking, B. & M. Smith, World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 2nd Ed., (Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 153.

^13. Dziedzic, M. J. "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security", Survival Vol. 31(6), November/December 1989, P. 534.

^14. Certified as fully cooperating: Aruba, Bahamas Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela and Vietnam. Decertified for inadequate cooperation, but not subject to sanctions: Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan and Paraguay. Decertified for inadequate cooperation, and subject to sanctions: Afghanistan, Burma, Iran and Nigeria.

^15. Grove, W. The Drug Trade as a National and International Security Threat.

^16. Duke, Drug trade moves in on S. Africa.

^17. "Global Drug Smuggling Routes", Washington Post Internet Edition (http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/drugs/oct/map.html). Cocaine is shipped from Brazil and Argentina via South Africa and then directly to Europe, or indirectly via South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Nigeria, and then Europe. South Africa is generally used as a transhipment point for the heroin trade from the "Crescents" on route to the U.S.A.

^18. Grove, W. "South Africa: The Drug Trade as a National and International Security Threat", CJ International, May-June 1995.

^19. According to US Department of Justice statistics the world-wide seizures of cocaine increased from 111 metric tons in 1989 to 280 metric tons in 1992, and world-wide heroin seizures increased from 15 tons in 1989 to 21 tons in 1992.

^20. Rana, p.6.

^21. Reutech, Pretoria Metal Pressings, Musgrave, LIW and Cape Armoury are just a few of the South African small arms manufacturers.

^22. Rana, p. 9. The joint South African/Mozambique `Operation Rachel' is reported to have resulted in police teams finding arms caches in the border areas containing 20 SA-7 Strela surface-to-air missiles, 5,584 assault rifles, several recoilless guns, 59 RPG-2 and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, 12 mortars with 2,340 bombs, 336 hand grenades, 15 cases of explosives, and about three million rounds of ammunition. Jane's Defence Weekly 1997, 1 October.

^23. Draft Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (New York, March 1997), p. 10.

^24. Halliday, F. "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions", in Booth, K. & S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Polity Press, 1995), p. 58.

^25. Dziedzic, pp. 541-542.

^26. Kartha, T. "Non-Conventional Threats to Security: Threat from the Proliferation of Light Weapons and Narcotics", unpublished paper presented at SAIIA/IDSA India-South Africa: Strategic Partnership Dialogue Conference, 25-26 March 1997.

^27. Kartha, p. 9.

^28. Dziedzic, p. 539.

^29. Dziedzic, p. 538.

^30. An example of this was evident in Cape Town, South Africa in 1996, when gangsters in large numbers took to the streets wielding firearms, and openly displaying drugs, to agitate for the "respect of their rights". This march was a display of force, which was a reaction to the vigilante actions by an anti-crime organisation PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Crime).

^31. The country that does not apply is Angola, which is once again on the brink of open warfare. In this regard the rebel movement UNITA engages in the diamond trade to finance its operations.

^32. In all countries in Southern Africa, there have been reports of weapons related crimes, which were committed in order to sustain drug habits, but these have been mostly surpassed by crimes motivated by alternative means.

^33. Fiorentini, G. & S. Peltman, The Economics of Organised Crime (Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 3-8.

^34. Williams, P. "Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security", Survival Vol. 36(1), Spring 1994.

^35. Shelley, L. "Transnational Organised Crime: An Imminent threat to the Nation-State? Journal of International Affairs, 2 Winter 1995, PP. 471-472

^36. K. Booth, A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations, CSAS, Southern African Perspectives No. 30, University of the Western Cape, February 1994.

^37. Vayrynen, R. "Concepts of Security Revisited", Mershon International Studies Review, 39 (1995), p. 259.

^38. See Buzan, B. People, States and Fear (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Mathews, J.C. "Redefining Security", Foreign Affairs, 68 (2), 1989.

^39. Booth, p. 3.

^40. See Mail & Guardian Vol. 13(29), 25 July 1997, "Focus on Drugs".

^41. Ryan, T. "Drugs, Violence and Governability in the Future South Africa", ISS Papers, NO. 22, May 1997.

^42. Shelley, P. 464.

^43. Opolet, J.S.E. 1979. Organized Crime in Africa. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. 3, 2: 177-183.

^44. Ibid.

^45. Potter, G. & Thompson, B. 1997. "Emerging Influences and Trends in African Organized Crime", International Association for the Study of Organised Crime, IASOC Vol. 11, Nos. 1 & 2.

46. See Oosthuysen, G. 1997. Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa, (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs), pp. 60-82.

^47. Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1994. Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections, (New York: Human Rights Watch), pp. 49-59.

^48. Grove, W, 1995. The Drug Trade as a National and International Security Threat. CJ International. May-June.

^49. Forged Zimbabwean passports are increasingly being used by drug syndicates, as there is the perception that Zimbabweans generally do not have criminal tendencies (compared to Nigerians, for example). See Baynam, S. 1996. "Drugs Set to Become Africa's New Invaders", Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 September, p.426.

^50. Duke, L. "Drug Trade Moves in on South Africa", Washington Post Internet Edition (1/09/96), (http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/drugs/oct/safrica.html).

^51. Grove, W. The Drug Trade as a National and International Security Threat.

^52. Duke, L. 1996. Drug trade moves in on S. Africa. Washington Post. September 1: A33.

^53. Mills, G. 1996. War and Peace in Southern Africa: Crime, Drugs, Armies and Trade, World Peace Foundation Report No. 13.

^54. See Baynam, 1996.

^55. Mwiinga, J. "Zambia's Drug War Heats Up", Electronic Mail & Guardian (19/05/95). In 1989 some 29 Zambian politicians and businessmen on drugs-related charges. Most were eventually acquitted.

^56. This section draws heavily from a document complied by Natalie Goldring and Michael Klare for the British American Security Information Council (Project on Light Weapons), titled "Research Sources an the International Trade in Light Weapons" (Draft Copy, Version 2.0), 24 March 1995.

^57. SIPRI publishes a yearbook annually. It probably one of the most accurate sources with respect to conventional arms transfers.

^58. The IISS's publication is called The Military Balance.

^59. Publications include Jane's Infantry Weapons and Jane's Ammunition Handbook.

^60. Interpol's specific action against drugs began in the 1970s with the creation of a Drugs Subdivision to centralise data from member states on drug trafficking and related violations, which include transnational organised crime.

^61. The EMCDDA releases an annual report that assesses drug demand and demand reduction, anti-drug strategies, information sources and information structures in the European Union.

^62. If particular relevance to current policy is the racist origins of U.S. anti-drug laws. The first American anti-drug law was an 1875 San Francisco ordinance which outlawed the smoking of opium in opium dens. It was passed because of the concern that Chinese men were luring white women to their "ruin" in opium dens. "Ruin" was defined as associating with Chinese men. It was followed by other similar laws, including Federal laws in which trafficking in opium was forbidden to anyone of Chinese origin, and restrictions on the importation of smoking opium. Cocaine was outlawed because of fears that superhuman "Negro Cocaine Fiends" or "Cocainized Niggers" (actual terms used by newspapers in the early 1900's) take large amounts of cocaine which would make them go on a violent sexual rampage and rape white women. Marijuana was outlawed in 1937 as a repressive measure against Mexican migrant workers during the Depression. The specific reason given for the outlawing of the substance was its supposed violent "effect on the degenerate races." (Testimony of Bureau of Narcotics Commissioner Harry J. Anslinger, in testimony before Congress in hearings on the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937). Resource: Schaffer, C.A Basic Facts About the War on Drugs, Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, (http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/basicfax.htm#q11).

^63. SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, (a replacement for the old Front Line States grouping), the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO) have discussed the need to combat cross-border crime, particularly small arms and drug trafficking, but as of yet nothing concrete has been formulated.

^64. Goldring & Klare, p. 20.