TRENDS, CHARACTERISTICS AND ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF RESOLVING CONFLICTS

Address by Jan Van Eck, at a conference on The Great Lakes Crisis, arranged by the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg.

Introduction.

African leaders belonging to this so-called ‘ new generation’ included the President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, the Vice-President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, the Prime Minister of Eritrea, Issaias Afewerki and the (then) ‘new-comer’, Pres. Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

Today we are however confronted with a situation where all the countries whose leaders belong to this ‘new generation’ of leadership, are at war - mostly with one another. While Uganda and Rwanda have invaded the eastern DRC and are directly or indirectly involved in the ongoing and escalating Congolese rebellion against Pres. Kabila (the very same man chosen by Uganda and Rwanda in 1997 to replace the former dictator, Mobutu), Ethiopia and Eritrea are continuing to mass soldiers and arms along their common border. And although clashes thus far have been fairly restrained, the prospects are that it will become an increasingly devastating war. To further complicate matters, Uganda is actively supporting the overthrow of the Sudanese Government by supporting the Sudanese rebel group SPLA/M operating from southern Sudan. In achieving this objective of toppling the Khartoum Government, it is publicly and logistically supported by the United States Government.

Even more seriously, the conflicts started by these countries do not remain limited to the countries directly involved in the conflict, (as has been vividly illustrated in the present Congo crisis), but progressively draw in many other countries within - and even beyond - the immediate region. (Although this paper will not deal with Eritrea and Ethiopia, it needs to be noted that there are already signs that the same is happening in the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict).

Besides the role these leaders have played in initiating inter-state conflicts, one should also draw attention to the fact that neither Museveni, Kagame or Kabila have been able to bring political stability to their countries. On the contrary, their countries are racked by internal dissent and rebel incursions and an increasing inability and even in some cases an unwillingness to manage these challenges to their authority constructively.

Many regional observers are therefore asking the question whether there is indeed any chance of an ‘African Renaissance’, if the very people who were supposed to herald in this new era, show such an inability or unwillingness to manage their conflicts constructively.

With specific regard to The Great Lakes Region, a region that has for decades right up till today suffered from some of the most intractable and violent conflicts within the African continent, a ‘new generation’ leadership is desperately needed to bring stability. By this I do not mean just new faces, but leaders who will address the numerous problems facing their individual countries and the region as a whole, in a way which is genuinely ‘new’, and in a way that will produce long-term solutions. .

I will in this paper try and outline some of the negative policies, characteristics and trends that presently prevail both within the countries of the region and in the region as a whole, and which are preventing these leaders from developing their full potential to bring durable stability to their countries and the region as a whole. I will also make some suggestions of how both the national and regional conflicts could be managed in a less destructive and destabilising way.

(Note: For the purposes of this paper The Great Lakes Region includes primarily the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and Tanzania, while Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Sudan and Zambia are added to form the ‘Greater’ Great Lakes or Central African Region).

Negative Policies, Characteristics and Trends within The Great Lakes Region.

1. Legitimisation of the use of force and de-legitimisation of negotiations.

+ Internally.

As virtually all the governments in the region have come to power by forcibly removing the previous governments and have remained in power by the use of force against the numerous armed resistance movements that face them, the culture of using force as a legitimate and even preferable way of changing unacceptable governments and staying in power, has unfortunately become deeply entrenched.

What is even more cause for serious concern is the fact that the principle of negotiating with or even just talking to your enemy, has been and continues to be actively de-legitimised. Instead of pursuing serious negotiations with the former governments of Uganda, Rwanda and Congo, Museveni, Kagame and Kabila merely ousted the then rulers. While it was true that these previous leaders were either dictators, corrupt, brutal or guilty of heinous crimes such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the option of negotiating them out of exclusive power were either used half-heartedly or not even given a fair chance.

Although the DRC’s Pres. Kabila has recently hinted at the possibility of talking to the rebels (a statement soon afterwards contradicted by another Government Minister), the Congolese peace talks continue to break down because Kabila refuses to have the Congolese rebels included. His primary reason for excluding them is that they "do not constitute an internal, Congolese rebellion but are part of a foreign, i.e. Ugandan- and Rwandan-sponsored invasion" to oust him and establish "Tutsi ethnic control over eastern Congo".

In Uganda, where Pres. Museveni, after more than twelve years, continues to face ongoing and large-scale incursions in the north of the country by rebels from the Sudan-based Lords Resistance Army (LRA), the Congo-based Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west and the West Nile Bank Movement in the north-west, Pres. Museveni and his Government continue to steadfastly refuse to talk to or negotiate with any of the rebel movements.

In Rwanda, the Government led by Pres. Pasteur Bizimungu and the real power behind him, Vice-President Paul Kagame, have also categorically rejected any talks or negotiations with the various Congo-based rebel and militia groups which have destabilised large part of Rwanda - especially the north-western region. For example. when the Japanese Ambassador to Rwanda last year ‘gently’ suggested that talking to the armed groups might be wise in view of the ongoing instability, the Rwandan Government angrily and publicly denounced him. The Ambassador was withdrawn and the Japanese Government had to offer a private apology.

Both the Ugandan and Rwandese governments continue to commit themselves to ‘eradicating’ or ‘exterminating’ these rebels and state that they will not negotiate with ‘genocidaires, bandits, killers and rapists, who have committed heinous crimes’. And while this description fits many of these rebel groups, especially the Rwandese Interahamwe militia and the former Rwandese Army, who were directly involved in the genocide of 1 million Rwandese in 1994, writing off a few hundred thousand Rwandans as people you can never talk to or negotiate with, merely because a certain percentage of them are guilty of participating in the Genocide, will ensure that the present conflict will continue and accelerate. In a recent interview in ‘African Business’ (Feb. 1999), Pres. Museveni again reiterated his refusal to negotiate with his rebels, saying: "...they are terrorists, net rebels. ...they have committed untold atrocities against civilians."

In spite of the fact that both governments have proved themselves incapable of defeating these armed groups, the only ‘solution’ to the problem which they will consider at present is the use of force, not negotiations.

The only country in The Great Lakes Region whose government has decided to negotiate with all its opposing parties and the three rebel movements which have been trying to overthrow it by force, is Burundi. The Government of President Pierre Buyoya, who represents the minority as well as his former arch enemy, the majority party Frodebu, have recently formed a joint interim government of national unity after more than seven months of intensive internal negotiations. They are also at the same time involved in multi-party negotiations at Arusha, Tanzania under the mediation of former President Julius Nyerere. All internal, external, exiled and rebel groups are part of these negotiations - except the largest rebel movement, the CNDD-FDD. The Arusha process of Pres. Nyerere has until now refused them admission because, due to internal tensions, the movements leader, Mr. Leonard Nyangoma (who represented the organisation in Arusha until middle last year), was ousted as leader. While Nyangoma is no longer the leader of the rebel movement, he is still at Arusha, while the new leadership is excluded.

It is both ironic and tragic that at a time when the BurundianTutsi minority, after years of violent conflict, has (in complete contrast to the rest of the region), actually agreed to negotiate with all armed groups, groups with whom a mere two years ago they also refused to negotiate because they considered them as ‘terrorists, genocidaires, killers, bandits’, etc., the two main protagonists in the armed conflict, the Burundian Government/Army and the CNDD-FDD rebels are not allowed to meet and negotiate at the formal Burundian peace negotiations at Arusha.

In view of the fact that it is crucial to again legitimise all-inclusive negotiations within the region as a whole as the preferable way of solving conflicts, the Arusha Peace Process for Burundi is actually actively undermining this process by excluding the main rebel movement.

+ Regionally.

But the use of force is also employed to remove or try to remove rulers of neighbouring countries, whom are considered ‘hostile’, ‘not acting in the interest of their neighbouring country’ or merely ‘unacceptable’. There is a trend amongst some of the more influential leaders in the region that national sovereignty can be ignored under these circumstances, and that military intervention in a neighbouring country is in principle acceptable.

Some examples have been referred to above.

+ The example set by the international community.

It is indeed reason for deep concern that major powers in the international community, e.g. the United States and Britain, are by their regular use or threat of "imminent" force against foreign governments, e.g. Yugoslavia (over the Kosovo situation), Iraq, Sudan, etc., are setting a bad example by reinforcing the perception that it is legitimate to use force to settle conflict situations and remove ‘unacceptable’ governments or leaders,eg. Sadam Hussein.

Recent statements by the U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen, that "there can be no military solutions to the wars" (in Africa), and that "diplomacy is the only solution" is in sharp contrast to their actions around the world - including Africa. Especially if one bears in mind statements made by US Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright and others that the U.S. is supporting Uganda and the Ugandese-based Sudanese rebel movement, SPLA/M "to topple" the Khartoum government! The use or support of force by western countries in other African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, etc. are further examples of what appears to be a very confusing position. .

These actions and statements are sending the worst possible message to those leaders in Africa in general and The Great Lakes Region in general, who need to be urgently convinced and encouraged into accepting that the only way whereby conflicts can be resolved in a durable way is by negotiations - not by the use of force.

2. Failure to move towards Inclusivity and Political Pluralism.

+ Exclusion of defeated and exiled governments and their supporters.

The fact that virtually all governments in the region have forcibly driven the former governments from power, and made virtually no attempt to either include them in the new administration or at least treat them as legitimate opponents, has created a vast pool - both inside each country and within the region as a whole - of deeply frustrated and aggrieved former role-players, who, as a result of being treated as the defeated enemy, have merely in response turned to the use of force to oust those who ousted them.

This has become a virtually institutionalised cycle within the whole region.

The result is that the region is awash with armed groups, militias and even former national armies, who have been completely alienated and exiled from their own countries. Besides destabilising their countries of origin from their new host country, they also form a large and ready pool of soldiers who can easily be recruited by virtually any frustrated leader who wants to start a rebellion in some or other country. Examples of this happening within and beyond the region are numerous.

Because of the ease with which these rebel movements can move from one country to another, it is extremely unlikely that they will ever be eliminated or defeated by the use of force. They therefore need to be reincorporated in the body politic of their countries of origin.

+ Internal exclusion of supporters of the former governments.

Virtually all countries in the region are characterised by deep divisions based on ethnic, tribal, religious, regional and other sectarian grounds. (This is of course to a large extent the result of the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers when they divided Africa amongst themselves at the Berlin Conference), While some countries have at least learned to accept the reality, and are trying to manage this diversity (mostly unsuccessfully), many others still deny or try to wish away the existence of these divisions

More seriously, many of the new governments (who normally have come to power with the support of certain regions, tribes or ethnic groups, have, in what can only called an attempt to punish them, purposefully discriminated against those regions or ethnic and tribal groups who supported the ousted regime, by denying them development or positions in the new administration. In countries with scarce sources of income, and where governments are normally the largest source of employment, this promotes the belief that unless you oust the government which is punishing you and put your party in power, you will remain unemployed, underdeveloped, etc.

This has resulted in turning these frustrated regions and groups into fertile recruiting grounds for both political and military opposition groups of the new regime. (Northern Uganda is a good example of this).

+ Resistance to or rejection of political inclusivity or multi-partyism.

Due to the fact that the former ousted regimes and their supports were either driven out of the country or have been severely marginalised and demonised, the concept that the supporters of the previous "abhorrent" regime can form a legitimate "loyal" opposition has not been legitimised. On the contrary, most governments have ‘energetically’ taken various steps to ensure that they stay out of political life.

When Pres. Museveni in 1986, when he came to power, banned political parties (due to the destructive way in which they had historically manipulated sectarian divisions), he created his so-called non-party "Movement System" which was intended to provide a home or a sort of ‘umbrella’ for people of all political persuasions. In spite of its good intentions and the success it had in the beginning, virtually all supporters of other political parties have since left the "Movement", resulting in it becoming virtually a party to which only supporters of Pres.Museveni belong.

And, because any political activity by existing political parties is illegal, Uganda has for all practical purposes become a ‘no-party’ (i.e.) one-party State. This has resulted in mounting internal opposition and a demand for the legalisation of multi-partyism. The political divide in Uganda is now between the so-called "Movementists" of Museveni and the "Multy-partyists" of the opposition. And in spite of the constraints on political activity, the political debate between these two sides is extremely vibrant and in many ways resembles the kind of politics found in multi-party systems.

A decision by Pres. Museveni to later this year hold a referendum in which people will be able to vote whether they want multi-partyism restored or retain the "Movement" system, is increasingly being opposed by a growing and increasingly vociferous coalition of political and civil society organisations, who have decided to organise a boycott of this referendum. The Ugandan Minister for Energy recently issued an ominous-sounding statement that those Ugandans who were organising the boycott were "rebels", were "encouraging youths to take up arms", and were people who "did not respect the constitution".

In both Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC, both Governments have also been demonising their critics, e.g. the churches, as being supporters of the anti-government rebel forces.

In Rwanda, existing political parties will not be allowed to campaign in the soon-to-be-held local level, community elections - the first elections to be held in Rwanda since the 1994 Genocide. New political parties will also not be allowed to be formed in order to contest these elections.

While there are numerous ‘valid’ reasons why both governments are nervous to allow free party-political competition, the present positions will result in even greater exclusion and alienation of large sections of the population. This could easily result in more and more political opponents of the governments turning to armed opposition and therefore increasing instability.

In the DRC, unless the government agrees to starting an internal political process which will include all political parties, civil society and the armed rebellion, the country will become even more unstable than it presently is and the momentum to oust Pres. Kabila by force will accelerate.

It is interesting to note that Burundi has, within the limits of its ongoing civil war, allowed a multi-party system in which about twelve internal parties participate, while Sudan has recently taken the first steps towards legalising political parties.

+ Active interference and destabilisation of countries by their neighbours and international role-players.

Role of neighbours.

In spite of all the numerous problems with which individual countries already have to cope, their attempts to solve these problems are seriously undermined by the ongoing attempts by virtually all countries to influence events in neighbouring countries - and even further away - in a way which they (frequently mistakenly) believe will be beneficial, not to the country and the people in conflict, but to itself.

The dominant motivation behind this approach seems to be that some countries want to ensure that their neighbours have leaders and governments that will be reliable allies who will not allow their territories being used by their political and military opponents. This explains Rwanda and Uganda’s overthrow of Mobutu and the attempted overthrow of Kabila , Uganda’s support for the toppling of the Sudanese Government and the ‘tit-for-tat’ support by the Sudanese Government for the Sudan-based Ugandan rebel movement, the ‘Lords Resistance Army’.

In view of this wide-spread practice of interfering in the affairs of one’s neighbours, the persistent and increasingly ‘substantiated’ allegations that both Zambia and Uganda have actively been assisting the Angolan rebel movement, Unita, in its renewed war against the Angolan MPLA Government, cannot be summarily dismissed.

(The same pattern is already discernible in the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict where both sides are actively supporting those rebel movements and organisations which are opposing their enemy - even in Somalia).

Role of international role-players.

It should noted that the role of the so-called international community in many African conflicts has, at best been ham-handed and, at worst been totally counter-productive. In most cases the national interests of the intervening western countries, and not the interests of the people of the country in conflict, have determined the nature of the intervention. No wonder that the road of attempts by the international community to resolve conflicts in Africa, is littered with dismal failures. In many cases these failed interventions have left in their wake consequences that have made the conflicts even more intractable and difficult to solve.

But apart from the negative interventions by some international governments, attention should also be focused on the less spoken about but critical and frequently determining role played by large international and multi-national corporations. Since they are in these countries to make as much profit as possible, these corporations have on numerous occasions played a critical role in not only determining who should govern a country but also in determining which way a conflict should be resolved. And, as is the case with foreign government, their own financial interests weigh much heavier than the interests of the country in conflict. In some cases foreign governments and corporations from their countries, have even co-operated and adopted a strategy in conflict situations that serves the interests of both.

+ A failure to address the causes of instability and conflict in individual countries.

It is important to note that the grassroots and civil societies in virtually all countries are cut off from their rulers and governments and the decisions they take. This break between rulers and those being ruled can be called "the broken link". While this probably originated in the period of slavery when rulers, by selling their own people to slave-traders, alienated themselves from their people. This was subsequently reinforced during colonialism (when indigenous ‘rulers’ oppressed their own people on behalf of their colonial masters), during the post- independence governments and even under the rule of most present governments who, generally speaking, first look after their own interests and then after those of ‘their’ people.

It is important to bear in mind, when analysing conflicts in different countries, that it is normally the political elites who initiate and promote these national and inter-state conflict and not the general population of these countries.

For example, in the 1996/7 ousting of Pres. Mobutu in the then Zaire, and in spite of the large crowds that cheered Kabila on in his seven-month march to Kinshasa, it should be remembered that this was basically a ‘rebellion’ organised by neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda, and that the people of Congo (used to having leaders imposed upon them) were merely passive bystanders watching yet another leader passing by them who would also "disappear" into the far away and remote Kinshasa ruling elite.

Virtually the whole world enthusiastically supported the removal of the dictator Mobutu, (removing a dictator is after all a noble objective - even if the whole international community quite happily tolerated or supported him for 30 years!). Very few people took note of the fact that the happiness of Congolese was due to the fact that Kabila might introduce a more representative/democratic system of government, which - for the first time - might give them a say in the destiny (and wealth) of their country. Very few people took note of the fact that Uganda and Rwanda removed Mobutu because they hoped that Kabila would ensure that, contrary to Mobutu, Rwandese and Ugandese rebels and militias would no longer be able to use the Congo to launch attacks into their countries.

It was only once Kabila had proven that he would or could neither meet the expectations of the Congolese people for a democratic transition, nor address the security needs of Rwanda and Uganda, that the international community realised that long-term stability in Congo could only be ensured if these two expectations were addressed - and not by yet again removing the existing President. That is why these two items now feature prominently in the Congolese Peace Initiative, chaired by Pres. Chiluba of Zambia.

It is the failure to properly analyse the causes of conflicts in African countries or regions, that has resulted in so many well-meaning outsiders recommending, imposing and implementing totally inappropriate ‘solutions’ to these conflicts.

+ Manipulation, exploitation and mismanagement of the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic divisions.

While these two ethnic groups have for centuries lived together in Rwanda and Burundi, (and smaller numbers in parts of Uganda and eastern Congo), with the Hutu having been part of the Bantu migration from western Africa, and the Tutsi having been part of the migration of the Nilotic people from the north, it was the Belgian colonial rulers who formalised and entrenched the divide between these two groups by using what they considered the "superior" Tutsi to rule the "inferior" Hutu on their behalf. After the end of colonialism, sectarian politicians in both countries actively exploited and manipulated this Hutu-Tutsi divide for their own selfish ambitions to achieve power. After independence Hutu majority domination was established in Rwanda and Tutsi minority rule in Burundi.

As manipulation of this artificially created - and maintained - division continued, there were many attempts in both Rwanda and Burundi to forcibly change the ethnic composition of the governments. These attempts led to increasing inter-ethnic conflict resulting in numerous ethnic massacres and culminating in the Genocide of about 1 million mainly Tutsis in Rwanda by the Hutu regime in Rwanda in 1994 and the virtual extermination of the whole Hutu intellectual class in Burundi in 1972.

Hutu demands for access to government in Burundi resulted then President Pierre Buyoya holding democratic elections in 1993. A Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, was overwhelmingly elected as President. His assassination a few months later, the massacres of Tutsis and Hutus that followed, the bloodless military coup of 1996 which returned Pres. Buyoya and the Tutsi to full power, brought Burundi back to minority rule. Between especially 1972 and 1996 hundreds of thousands of Hutus went into exile especially in the then Zaire and Tanzania.

In Rwanda the Hutu majoritarian government was only ousted by the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) when it invaded Rwanda to stop the Genocide. The RPA comprised mainly Tutsis who had fled to Uganda after the Hutu take-over of power at independence and the accompanying purges of Tutsis, thirty years ago. The defeat of the then Hutu government by the RPA, and the forced fleeing of the government, the army and its private militias into Mobutu’s Zaire, resulted in the installation of a Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda.

As a result of these developments in both countries, numerous predominantly Hutu rebel movements were formed or harboured in the massive refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. Since 1994 they have waged an ongoing war in an attempt to remove the governments in both countries.

At the same time, Pres. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, because he helped the mainly Tutsi RPF to oust the Hutu government in Rwanda and because his mother is of Rwandese Tutsi origin, was increasingly being accused by both political and military Hutu leadership, of being the main driving force behind what was seen as a policy of Tutsi domination in the region. Based on certain statements made by him over the years, he was and still is seen by many Hutus as having a secret plan of creating a so-called ‘Hima’ (Tutsi) Empire’ in The Great Lakes Region. This would allegedly include Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the Kivu Provinces in eastern Congo.

This perception was reinforced in 1996, when the Mobutu Government wanted to send the Congolese Tutsis of Rwandese origin, who had lived in eastern Congo for centuries, "back" to "their country of origin", i.e. Rwanda. As a result of this threat to fellow-Tutsis and the fact that Mobutu allowed all the Hutu rebel movements to attack Rwanda and Uganda from inside Congo, the mainly Tutsi Army (RPA) of Rwanda, with the active support of Pres. Museveni, invaded then Zaire and ousted Mobutu. The same process is repeating itself in the war to remove Kabila.

Although in both the war against Mobutu and Kabila, many Congolese joined in this endeavour, it was quite clear to the Congolese that the majority of soldiers as well as those in command of the rebellion against both Presidents, were Tutsis from Rwanda.

The fact that the relatively small Congolese Tutsi communities in the east were never completely accepted by Zaire/Congo, the resentment that a foreign Rwandese, mainly Tutsi Army (backed by Rwanda) had invaded their country, the fear that the real motivation behind this invasion was to bring about Museveni’s alleged ‘Hima’ (Tutsi) Empire, created a serious anti-Tutsi backlash both within Kabila’s government and amongst the population.

Within months after the anti-Kabilla rebellion was launched in August 1998, when it became clear that Rwanda and Uganda were behind the attempt to oust him, Kabila ordered all Rwandese Tutsis to leave the Congo immediately. Government calls on the Congolese people to kill Tutsis, resulted in thousands of Tutsis being murdered. It was at this stage that the Hutu/Tutsi divide developed a broader regional and a far more dangerous character than before. Whipped up by statements by Presidents Kabila and Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and others, that the real reason for the invasion of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda was to create this so-called ‘Tutsi Empire’, countries and groups who had never trusted the Tutsi stated that the conflict had now changed from a mere Hutu/Tutsi conflict into a Bantu versus non-Bantu one. This new definition had and continues to have the potential to embroil the whole of sub-Saharan Africa in what could become the most devastating conflict Africa has ever experienced.

Attempts by the internal anti-Kabila Congolese rebel movements to reduce the number of Rwandese within their ranks, and the withdrawing of Ugandan and Rwandese forces to a buffer strip in the east of the Congo (to prevent Congolese-based Hutu rebels from attacking them), has had some effect in reducing the Tutsi image of the Congolese rebellion. Much more will have to be done to prevent the concept of a ‘Bantu/non-Bantu’ divide from taking root.

While the internal and external negotiations process between predominantly Hutu and Tutsi political and military groupings, which has been initiated by Burundi’s President, Pierre Buyoya and his new partnership government, will make a serious contribution towards preventing this new divide from growing, the inability of Rwanda and Uganda to manage this divide in a similar way, may have serious consequences.

It is a source of great concern that of all anti Tutsi or ‘non-Bantu’ political and military groupings could start co-operating and even unify, and develop a common objective to topple all Tutsi-dominated governments (Rwanda and Burundi) and Tutsi ‘sympathetic’ governments (Uganda).

Should this happen, then the Burundian Peace Process runs a real risk of being sucked up into this regional ethnic conflict. Burundi will only be able to escape these consequences if (1) it is able to further strengthen the commitment of both Hutu and Tutsi to the still fragile internal and external peace processes, and (2) if the attempts by African leaders to bring all parties involved in the Congolese conflict (including the Congolese rebels), to negotiate a cease-fire and the start of an internal political process.

Proposed Appropriate Interventions that could Resolve the Regional Conflicts.

1. Can a conflict in an individual country be resolved in isolation from the rest of the region?

In the first instance one has little choice but to answer in the affirmative, since if the answer was no, it would make the task of trying to resolve the crises of the region as a whole something beyond the abilities of those of us who consider ourselves mere mortals!

But, in the second place, I believe it is indeed possible if the following is done: (1) a truly appropriate process, supported and preferably designed by the parties themselves, must be put in place in the individual country; (2) the interests - both positive and negative - of the neighbouring countries must be taken into consideration in an attempt to ensure their support for the process; (3) the parties must be given the opportunity to develop a genuine commitment to "their" process; (4) the peace process must increasingly produce the kind of positive returns which ongoing conflict could not do.

The case of Burundi is an appropriate example. After the start of the rebellion in Congo, and especially when the Government of Pres. Kabila and Pres. Mugabe started turning on the tap of anti-Tutsi sentiments, the pressure on the Burundian President and his government to support the Rwandese, Ugandese and Congolese rebel war to oust Kabila mounted severely. Pres. Buyoya and his new interim government however consistently refused to be drawn into the war against Kabila.

The reason was that he had recently, over a period of more than seven months of tough negotiations, been able to form a new ‘interim government’ between the two main opposing political parties, i.e. the mainly Tutsi party ‘Uprona’ and the mainly Hutu party, ‘Frodebu’. He knew, and ‘Frodebu’ made this clear, that if the Burundian Army was send into Congo to support Rwanda and Uganda in trying to topple Kabila, the new internal partnership and ‘interim government’ would collapse. Similarly, the multi-party Burundian peace process in Arusha would either fall apart or be rendered useless.

He and his government were therefore able to resist the pressure to enter the war against Kabila because they had developed a strong enough commitment to their own peace process, not to sacrifice this on the altar of a war against the President of a neighbouring country. Had the peace process not made such progress, had there not yet been this new internal partnership, it cannot be ruled out that Pres. Buyoya might have succumbed to the extreme pressure applied by Rwanda, Uganda and his own support base support base to get involved.

2. Principles on which any interventions should be based.

Many interventions, however well-meant, have failed because these have not been based on the correct premises or principles. Interventions are frequently undertaken to ‘quickly prevent further bloodshed’ or get some or other ‘ideal’ settlement signed as soon as possible. Such interventions fail because they are crisis-driven and not process-driven. The following are some guidelines I have selected, which if followed, are likely to ensure that a proper process is put in place: (A bad process cannot produce a positive, i.e. durable result).

2.1 The objective should be to allow the conflicting parties to reach a truly durable, i.e. mutually acceptable compromise agreement.

2.2 Intervenors should under no circumstances be perceived to be partisan - regardless of whether the government of the day is legitimate or not.

2.3 Interveners should ensure that they are fully informed about the causes of the conflict, remain fully informed about the day-to-day developments within the conflict and, most importantly, the impact these developments had and continue to have on the state of mind of the different parties. This requires a near permanent hands-on involvement on the spot to enable ongoing interaction with role-players in all parties. Interventions can only succeed if the intervenors genuinely believe that all parties have a - to them - valid case that deserves equal consideration.

2.4 A good process is one that is suited to the peculiar circumstances of the specific country and which has the support of all the parties. Parties must feel that they own the process.

2.5 Parties must be given as much time as they need to reach an agreement. Only if they are given time will they be able to develop the minimum degree of trust and common ground which is needed to ensure an agreement which they will voluntarily and genuinely sign and uphold. Agreements signed under undue external pressure are unlikely to be durable. Imposed ‘solutions’ cannot produce positive results.

2.6 While carefully selected forms of pressure can and frequently do play a positive role, these must again not be perceived as partisan, should seldom if ever include the threat of foreign military intervention and should be balanced by rewards for any steps (however small) taken in the right direction.

2.7 A good process should be all-inclusive and no party which has (or could develop) the potential to make or break a settlement, should be excluded or ignored.

2.8 While the principles of a good process should apply to interventions in all countries, the uniqueness of each country will require that the final agreements reached, with regard to for example the specific constitutional model, the way a cease-fire is reached and at what stage, the nature of the transitional mechanisms, whether there should be a government of national unity or not, the way and the pace at which state institutions are to be integrated (if exclusion is an issue), etc., will be unique to the circumstances prevailing in that country.

2.9 The parties must be ready and willing to negotiate.

2.10 Those who are in power - whether illegitimate or not and however difficult it may be - must be convinced that it in their interest to negotiate.

2.11 A fundamental principle of a successful process is that the agreement between conflicting parties is not merely an agreement between the political elites, but that as big a percentage as possible of the rest the party supporters, civil society and grassroots are involved in both the process and the final agreement.

+ Who should intervene: ‘Track One’ and ‘Track Two’.

‘Track One’: It has been customary for the international community to virtually exclusively use so-called ‘Track One’ interveners, i.e. official diplomats and special envoys of interested Governments and international organisations such as the UN and the OAU. They obviously lend importance to the intervention and, because of the ‘clout’/power/influence they have, they are able to apply considerable pressure on the conflicting parties. And, from my experience, they are quick - sometimes far too quickly - to apply this ‘clout’ to achieve their objectives and those of their Governments or Organisations. Because of this ability to use their ‘clout’, parties frequently feel that they have no choice but to agree with these ‘Track One’ intervenors both with regard to (i) the kind of peace process they should follow , (ii) the time-frame within which they must reach an agreement, and even (iii) the details of the final agreement which has to be signed.

‘Track Two’: I would like to suggest that, besides the ‘Track One’ interveners, much more use could be made of so-called ‘Track Two’ interveners, i.e. retired diplomats and political figures (who are as free as possible from their own government’s agenda), persons from the non-governmental conflict resolution/management/prevention field, etc. - persons who are willing to devote nearly all their time to the country and parties in conflict, are willing and able to either gain the trust of all the different parties, or at least of some of the parties and will use that trust to encourage the parties to find a peaceful resolution to their conflict. The ‘strength’ of the unofficial (‘Track Two’) facilitator, as someone has remarked, is in the fact that he has no power to make the parties do anything that they do not want to do - except the ability to persuade them. It is due to this that the parties will be more inclined to give him or her honest answers about possible processes and solutions.

From my own experience over the past nearly four years of playing the role of informal facilitator in the Burundian conflict and my ongoing and increasing involvement in the present internal and external peace processes, I believe that much could be gained from greater co-operation between ‘Track One’ and ‘Track Two’ facilitators on the basis that each one maintains his or her own role and independence of operation.

Conclusion.

In spite of the worrying increase in conflicts on our continent, the ‘African Renaissance’ is not only a worthwhile goal to strive for, but remains a realisable one. While some leaders may have failed (some of them in spite of valiant attempts to the contrary), the people of Africa have not failed. They have neither been empowered or given the opportunity to find real, home-grown and durable solutions to their country’s problems. In spite of the fact that all of Africa is independent from colonial rule, they have not yet in the true sense of the word been allowed to be the masters of their own peace-making processes.

This needs to change if we really care about Africa and the ongoing suffering and the unspeakable horrors that are caused by unresolved conflicts.

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