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BURUNDI REPORT 9 November 1999

CHOICE OF NEW MEDIATION CRITICAL TO PREVENT COLLAPSE OF FRAGILE BURUNDIAN PEACE PROCESS

By JAN VAN ECK, senior consultant in conflict analysis and -resolution at `The Centre for Conflict Resolution', Cape Town.

Introduction.

The author has since June 1995 been actively involved in promoting the broader Burundian peace process. During these more than four years he has visited Burundi 27 times at an average of two and a half weeks per visit, has regularly attended the Burundian Peace talks in Arusha, Tanzania and has organised conflict resolution training and facilitation meetings and workshops for different Burundian parties in Kenya and South Africa. His Project, `Promoting Dialogue in Burundi' is supported by The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town. He is consultant in conflict resolution, conflict analysis and mediation.

This report is based on his most recent visit to Burundi and consultations with Burundians in exile in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi and meetings with Burundians held in Cape Town.

Contents

1. "A New Mediation for a New Millennium".

2. Essential requirements for creating a viable New Mediation Process.

2.1 The New Mediation Process must truly belong to the Burundians.

2.2 The New Mediation Process must be as NEW as possible.

2.3 The New Mediation must in perception and reality be truly non-partisan.

2.4 Qualities required from the New Mediator.

2.5 The New Mediation must create a climate conducive to negotiations.

3. Conclusion.

Summary

THIS report differs from previous reports to the extent that it is virtually exclusively devoted to the debate around the selection of a New Mediation for the Burundian conflict. This is done because the decision with regard to the New Mediation which will be taken by the East African Heads of States meeting scheduled for 29 November in Arusha, Tanzania, will determine whether Burundians will be able to continue to try and find a peaceful negotiated settlement or continue with their violent conflict.

It draws attention to the fact that while the internal Burundian security, economic and political situation is fast deteriorating and fragmenting, the spectre of a new and more disastrous regional war (one with even more pronounced ethnic overtones), is looming larger by the day.

It suggests that the likelihood of the present Burundian Peace Negotiations (which until now have taken place at Arusha in Tanzania) producing any durable and genuinely acceptable agreement between the parties, will become extremely remote unless a genuinely new and acceptable mediation is agreed upon on 29 November.

It argues that the feelings and wishes of the Burundian Government with regard to the New Mediation should weigh heavily when the region reaches a decision. In view of the fact that the present minority-led Government of Burundi stands to `lose' most in the negotiations process (e.g. sole power and control over state institutions), it will be virtually impossible for them to make the necessary concessions unless they (also) feel completely comfortable with the New Mediation Process. In fact, if they feel threatened or `targeted' by the New Mediation, it is likely that it may become impossible to keep the Government in the negotiations process.

It is not argued that the Government should receive any preferential treatment, or that the New Mediation should be biased in favour of the Government (that would be as unacceptable as the Process being biased in favour of the Government's opponents!). There exists, as far as the author knows, no example of any mediation or negotiations process having achieved success, where the Government involved in the conflict has either felt distrustful of, rejected by or uncomfortable with the mediation process - or where the mediation is imposed on it. None of the countries in the region which will be involved in deciding on the New Mediation for Burundi, would tolerate any mediator being chosen for their conflicts without their full agreement. (For obvious reasons, nobody has suggested that the mediator for the "inter-Congolese Dialogue", agreed upon by The Lusaka Accord, should be imposed on the Government of Pres. Laurent Kabila. Why should the Burundian Government be treated differently?).

If the Burundian Government is to be part of the solution to Burundi's crisis (and without it, there can be no solution), then the New Mediation to be decided upon, will have to be such that the Government can stay in the Process.

The region, the continent and the rest of the international community are indeed faced with a crucial `make-or-break' decision that will have a major impact on the long-term future both of Burundi and the Great Lakes Region.

In the final instance the peace process and the choice of the New Mediation belongs to `the patient', i.e. the people of Burundi.

1 "A New Mediation for a New Millennium".

The seriously deteriorating situation in Burundi necessitates the best possible mediation process to fill the dangerous vacuum left by the death of the Burundian mediator, Mwalimu Nyerere.

The death of the former Tanzanian President, and official mediator in the Burundian Peace Talks at Arusha, Mwalimu Nyerere has not only taken away one of Africa's foremost elder statesmen, but has also left the Burundian Peace Process without a strong and high-profile mediator.

His death however also creates an obligation to ensure that the process which he started does not collapse, and that he is succeeded by the most appropriate person/country available. Present developments in Burundi and in the region as a whole are of such a critical and polarising nature that anything less than a genuinely accepted and professional Negotiations Process will lead to the derailment of the whole peace process.

Burundi is presently the only country in the sub-region which has in place a peace process build on the principle of all-inclusiveness (although true inclusiveness has not yet been achieved due to some `technical' reasons). Should this process fail, it will not only have dire consequences for Burundi but will also have a seriously negative impact on the already highly unstable Great Lakes Region and the very fragile Lusaka Peace Accord.. In a region where the belief in all-inclusive negotiations as the only way to resolve conflict, is either non-existent, tenuous or viewed with suspicion, the collapse of the Burundian negotiations "experiment" will further undermine the fragile belief in all-inclusive negotiations.

Any undermining of the principle of all-inclusive negotiations can only result in countries and parties in the region again falling back on the well-known alternative of exclusion, repression, violence and war.

It should therefore be obvious that the New Mediation for Burundi, to be decided upon at the summit of the Regional Heads of State in Arusha on 29 November, will be a turning point in the future peace efforts in Burundi and the region. Unless the opportunity is grasped to create the best possible new mediation process (instead of merely making cosmetic changes), the chances of the Burundian Peace Process producing a durable and acceptable compromise agreement will not only be very slim, but may even be impossible.

The following are some of the most serious danger signals with regard to the present Burundian situation in general and the Peace Process in particular:

  • A serious deterioration in the security situation in the country is again resulting in a growth in ethnic polarisation, distrust and even hate speech. This undermines the climate which is necessary for genuine negotiations and promotes resistance to negotiations.
  • The continuing decline of the economy results in large-scale poverty, malnutrition, disease, etc. amongst the majority of Burundians, while a small elite is flourishing by increasingly monopolising the shrinking economic opportunities.
  • A growing opposition to and/or questioning of the usefulness and wisdom of continuing with the formal negotiations process, amongst the support base of President Pierre Buyoya. This resistance is largely based on the fact that the Arusha negotiations produced no positive results or `rewards' for the country, i.e. especially in the field of security and economic development. Unless the New Mediation is seen as more non-partisan and produces results in these areas - especially security, this opposition is likely to intensify and will eventually leave the Government with no choice but to withdraw from the mediation process.
  • Widespread speculation that a new and more destructive regional war with stronger ethnic overtones will break out, with Pres. Kabila and his Zimbabwean and Angolan allies targeting Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda ("to take the war back to where it came from", Kabila spokesmen say), is resulting in both the Burundian Government and its armed rebel opposition taking precautions in case this becomes a reality. Reports abound that the Burundian rebel movement, CNDD-FDD and the Rwandese former army (ex-FAR) and the Interahamwe militia (all presently based in DRC), are moving into Burundi and north-western Tanzania, with the Rwandese groups using Burundi as a staging post on their way to Rwanda. The objective would be to weaken Burundi and Rwanda internally before Kabila and his allies move eastwards. This spectre of a new regional war - and one specifically targeting Burundi and Rwanda this time, again `resurrects' the option of removing the Buyoya Government by force. This obviously (for the moment) undermines the commitment to and necessity for finding a negotiated settlement.
  • The massive relocation of hundreds of thousands of civilians into `protection' or `regroupment' camps, due to the growing insecurity especially around the capital Bujumbura, is resulting in increased poverty (as people cannot regularly cultivate their fields), disease, resentment and an escalating flood of refugees fleeing into Tanzania.
  • A seriously deteriorating relationship between Burundi and Tanzania due to the fact that thousands of Burundian rebels are, according to the Government, `allowed' to use the refugee camps in north-western Tanzania to launch attacks into southern and south-eastern Burundi. (The `Pan African News Agency' on 2 November confirmed that large numbers of Burundian refugees in Tanzania are armed and (also) "use their weapons to terrorise (Tanzanian) villagers". The Home Affairs Minister is quoted as saying that more than 450 000 Burundian refugees - amongst whom the armed groups operate - are not controlled in camps or other settlements). Although it is highly unlikely that the Burundian Government will officially initiate direct cross-border action against these armed groups inside and outside the refugee camps inside Tanzania, the strong public support in Burundi for such action could easily result in some rogue elements within the Army or other armed Burundian groups doing just this - and so creating an international incident and drawing Tanzania into the armed conflict. In spite of the fact that tension between the two countries does not automatically rule out the involvement of individual Tanzanians in the New Mediation, it does create problems with regard to Tanzania being seriously considered as a possible host for the New Mediation Process.

It should be clear from the above that unless the New Burundian Mediation Process becomes dramatically more attractive to the key parties, and especially to the Burundian Government (which has always felt that the previous mediation at Arusha was totally biased against it), these internal and external dynamics listed above will develop further momentum - leading to the effective termination of the external Peace

In brief, because the option of finding a solution through negotiations is in permanent competition with the `alternative' of finding a `solution' through military means, the New Mediation will have to be such that the negotiations option will become a much more attractive option than war, resulting in parties virtually being `seduced into the mediation/negotiations option. Merely making marginal and cosmetic changes to the present mediation process, will most definitely not achieve this.

2 Essential requirements for creating a viable New Mediation Process.

2.1 The New Mediation Process must truly belong to the Burundians.

The key Burundian parties must feel that it is truly their process and that they own it.

The role of the mediator and the mediating country is merely to provide a neutral environment conducive to negotiations, where Burundians themselves will be able to negotiate an agreement which is, firstly, acceptable to them - and not what is acceptable to the region, the continent or the international community. This implies that the New Mediation must be virtually exclusively designed to meet the needs of the Burundian protagonists and that the opinions of the Burundian parties should therefore be paramount in selecting a new mediator, process, venue, agenda, etc.

2.2 The New Mediation Process must be as NEW as possible.

It was the perceived partisanship of the Arusha Process which resulted and continues to result in the growing rejection of `Arusha' by the support base of the Burundian Government. To ensure that the Government can remain in the Peace Process (something which is essential if there is to be any negotiations process at all), the New Mediation must be such that the Government can easily sell it to its constituency. While it obviously makes sense, in the interest of continuity, to use elements of the previous facilitation team, the new team should be enriched by individuals from other African countries.

2.3 The New Mediation must in perception and reality be truly non-partisan.

The new mediation must be able to demonstrate that it is genuinely non-partisan, i.e. that it is equally sympathetic to (1) the justifiable frustrations and aspirations of the majority, AND (2) the equally justifiable fears and insecurities of the minority. If, for example, the Burundian Government feels that the New Mediation is hostile to them, negotiations will fail. And, without the voluntary participation by the Government, there will be no process. He/she should take into consideration the fact that the present Government obviously has most to lose from negotiations (it has e.g. to give up sole power and sole control over state institutions), while its opposition has most to gain. In view of this reality the mediation will have to go out of its way to convince all parties that they should try and reach a genuine compromise agreement and that the temptation to demand the maximum (i.e. to defeat `the enemy' at the negotiating table by producing a win/lose outcome), will produce neither a durable agreement nor peace.

2.4 Qualities required from the New Mediator.

During his term as mediator, former Pres. Nyerere, acted as a virtual full-time mediator, chairing all plenary meetings and also tightly controlling the activities of all the Committees at Arusha.

While this method of operation obviously remains an option in theory, consideration should be given to instead having an eminent African statesman, (with the

support of the country he comes from - if the country has the necessary resources), filling the position of Patron or Guarantor of The Process, with a small team comprising co-facilitators and mediation experts guiding and managing the process on a daily basis.

The critical role of the Patron or Guarantor would be to impress his moral authority on the Process, ensure international support for the Process, make it difficult for the parties to negotiate in bad faith, ensure the non-partisan nature of the mediation, deal with serious complaints from any of the parties with regard to the process, prevent external players from unduly interfering in the proper running of the Process and create a necessary link between the SADC/Zambia-led Lusaka Peace Accord in neighbouring DRC.

Some of the specific qualities which the new mediator/patron/guarantor should have, are the following:

  1. He/she should have an equally high moral standing in Africa and the rest of the international community as Mwalimu Nyerere had, to "make it virtually be impossible for anyone to openly reject him/her". This will help `guarantee' that all belligerents will participate in the New Mediation Process.
  2. He/she must be able to provide the Process with the kind of human resources and skills which will ensure the most successful mediation possible. He/she could also provide the support of his country - and other big powers - to play the role of guarantors of the process - something which is critical when the implementation stage of the agreement is reached.
  3. He/she should have first hand experience of a successful negotiation/mediation process to ensure that he/she will be fully aware of what constitutes good mediation and negotiation practise.
  4. He/she should accept that no political agreement could be implemented or even agreed upon if peace was not restored first and, therefore, that the issue of a cease-fire/cessation of hostilities should be a priority item on the new agenda. He/she must therefore be able to ensure that ALL significant armed groups/rebel movements, (contrary to the present situation at Arusha), will in future be officially represented, so that when a cease-fire is signed, there will actually be peace in the country;
  5. He/she should have the kind of relationship with the key countries in the region that directly impact on or are `involved' in Burundi, i.e. especially Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, that will make it possible for him/her to obtain their support in playing the most constructive role possible in the Burundian Peace Process.

2.5 The New Mediation must create a climate conducive to negotiations.

The New Mediation, and specifically the new mediator/patron/guarantor must actively use his high moral authority to create the most optimal and conducive climate for negotiations - not only within the mediation process, but also beyond. Amongst these tasks are the following:

  • Restore hope amongst Burundians that it is worthwhile negotiating by ensuring that the people of Burundi receive some `rewards' for trying to negotiate a peace agreement, e.g. an immediate resumption of bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation and massively increased humanitarian assistance due to the dire security situation. (The UN and nine of its agencies based in Burundi stated on November 1 that "Burundi has never needed the support of the humanitarian community more than it does now", and requested an amount of US$70million for the year 2000 to be able to deal with the dramatic increase in humanitarian need caused by the seriously declining security situation). Unless these calls for humanitarian aid and bi- and multi-lateral aid are heeded, the hope for peace amongst the ordinary Burundians will die. The New Mediator can play a pivotal motivating role in achieving this.
  • The ban imposed by the previous mediator on the resumption of bilateral and multi-lateral economic co-operation between the international community and Burundi ("before an agreement is formally signed in Arusha"), is slowly but surely destroying what is left of the Burundian economy. (Recent statements by the Belgian and French Governments that co-operation could - and will - restart `before an agreement is signed' is indicative that the ban imposed primarily by the US and the European Community, is not uniformly accepted). If African countries which are already extremely poor are to have any chance of making peace, destroying their economies and creating a virtual economic desert is unlikely to enhance their ability to make peace. In the Burundian case, the dramatic decline in virtually all resources and the massive competition for the few available crumbs, is merely strengthening ethnic competition and tension.

One of Burundi's biggest problems has always been the fact that everybody wants and needs a job within the Government and State Institutions due to the lack of alternative employment in the small and declining private sector. This fact has actively contributed to the struggle for political power since those who control power, can offer jobs. A growing economy which can offer alternative (i.e. non-governmental) job opportunities, would to some extent reduce this destructive (and literally) life and death struggle for power. This will be even more important when the Transitional Government starts the process of reforming state institutions. If we want to ensure that those who will have to be retrenched as a result of these reforms, will accept this, then steps have to be taken to make it possible for them to find alternative employment in the private sector.

  • The Burundian Government needs to be strengthened instead of weakened. (This also applies to all other parties: weak parties do not make good negotiations partners!).

It is high time that the region and the rest of the international community accept that the Buyoya Government, and especially the President himself, has gone out of his way to convince his own (minority) support base to negotiate since he took power in July 1996. His insistence on negotiations created serious divisions within his power base and eventually led to a formal split between the pro-negotiations and anti-negotiations groups in the largest and predominantly Tutsi party Uprona. The pro-negotiations lobby fortunately now controls Uprona and have been part of the Arusha Talks.

But opposition to the present negotiations process and Arusha in particular is growing apace even within those circles that supported Buyoya's decision to negotiate, due to the fact that the Arusha Talks have not produced any positive results/benefits/rewards: the war not only continues but escalates, insecurity and fear is growing, the economy is again being strangled by a new international embargo (which replaced the two-year long regionally imposed embargo) and the overwhelming perception of the Tutsi community that the Arusha Process is completely against them.

It needs to be stressed that even if the Government of Pres. Buyoya is not perfect (it obviously is not - even they agree upon this themselves!), there is nobody else within the present Burundian Government who is as committed to finding a negotiated compromise agreement and is at the same time able to take the Army with him, than Pres. Buyoya. As the saying goes: `this is as good as it gets' (regardless of whether this is good enough!).

It would therefore be critical for the New Mediation to treat the Buyoya Government for what it is: the present Government of Burundi, and a Government that has been saying openly and clearly that it is willing to negotiate an agreement in which power will no longer be monopolised by a minority but shared by all. Instead of spreading suspicion and rumour that the Government is "playing games' or is "buying time' (this has been the pattern in certain circles untill now), it is high time that the Government's stated commitment is accepted at face value - until its actions prove the contrary!

  • Burundi needs to be formally included in the Lusaka Accord and its implementation. It has after all exactly the same security concerns with regard to the DRC as Rwanda and Uganda, who are included. Although it was never part of the Ugandan/Rwandan attempt to oust Pres. Kabila, it has since the outbreak of the DRC war had soldiers in the eastern DRC, primarily in the strip along Lake Tanganyika (according to the Government, to protect its transport route to the southern Zambian port of Mpulungu and to stop the Burundian CNDD-FDD rebels from moving into Burundi). With the Government of Pres. Kabila increasingly accusing Burundi of complicity with Rwanda and Uganda and Burundi increasingly being infiltrated by rebels based in the DRC, it makes no sense to exclude Burundi from the Lusaka Accord.

Apart from the above reasons, excluding Burundi seems to imply that peace in Burundi and the DRC can be established regardless of developments in these two countries. As is the case with Rwanda and Uganda, there can be no peace in the DRC unless there is peace in Burundi - and vice versa.

  • The growing animosity between Burundi and Tanzania over the Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania has to be urgently addressed to prevent any further deterioration in relationships and the possibility of an international incident on their common border. Burundian allegations that Tanzania `allows', `turns a blind eye to' or even `actively supports' Burundian rebel movements using the refugee camps in specific and Tanzanian territory in general for the purpose of arming themselves, receiving training and launching attacks into Burundi go as far back as at least 1995 - and continue. Tanzania has consistently denied all these allegations and has warned Burundi that it would retaliate appropriately if it should venture into Tanzania. With the present influx of about 500 Burundian refugees fleeing into the Tanzanian camps per day (according to the UN), the situation between Tanzania (as the country harbouring a few hundred thousand Burundian refugees and rebels) and Burundi (as the recipient of rebels attacking from Tanzanian soil), is unfortunately reminiscent of the situation that prevailed between the then Zaire of Mobutu and Rwanda - prior to Rwanda's invasion into Zaire to attack and dislodge its military opponents in Zaire.

A potential flashpoint as serious as this one cannot just be allowed to continue to fester - if we want to remove all situations that could negatively affect or even derail the peace process.

Conclusion:

The above analysis is being made available to various policy-makers and role-players in an attempt to illustrate why it is absolutely critical that a genuinely New Mediation is required if we are serious about stabilising the Burundian situation in specific and the Great Lakes Region in general.

 

 21 November, 1999.

Author's contact numbers:
JAN VAN ECK
Tel. ++27-21-6899777 Fax. ++27-21-6899579 Mobile: ++27-825555376
E-mail: jvaneck@iafrica.com

Further copies of the report are available from:
Elizabeth Myburgh, Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town.
Tel. ++27-21-4222512 Fax: ++27-21-4222622 e-mail: emyburgh@ccr.uct.ac.za

Copies of this report may be made available to other interested persons and institutions.
 
 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa
Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: mailbox@ccr.uct.ac.za