EXTERNAL ‘SIGNALS’ NEEDED TO FURTHER STIMULATE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCESSES

1. Background to the Present Two Peace Processes.

At a time when most of Burundi’s neighbouring countries are experiencing ongoing and escalating internal conflicts, Burundi’s security situation remains relatively good while a comprehensive process of dialogue and negotiations between all political and military opponents is in place internally and externally.

1.1 The Internal Process: After an intensive internal process of dialogue, which started in January 1997 and which (eventually) included virtually all internal Burundian Parties, an historic internal partnership was formed between the post-1996 coup-government of President Pierre Buyoya (representing the de facto minority power), and Frodebu, (the party which overwhelmingly won the country’s first democratic elections in 1993).

1.2 This Internal Partnership was made possible by:

• Pres. Buyoya declaring within days after taking over power in July 1996 (before the region imposed an economic blockade on Burundi), that his Government would start talks with all parties, including the rebels, and then taking active steps to put this commitment into practise by convincing most of his own support base to support the negotiations process again; after a lengthy battle within the mainly Tutsu Party Uprona on the issue, the bulk of the party came out in support of negotiations.

• A significant shift in the strategic approach of the mainly Hutu Party Frodebu, led by two key players, Mr. Leonce Ngendakumana, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and Mr. Augustyn Nzojibwami, Secretray-General of Frodebu, deciding to, instead of boycotting all co-operation with the Buyoya Government, rather engage it in working for the common goal of a peacefully negotiated solution.
  This strategic shift in both major camps made an internal partnership possibly. It needs to be stressed that neither side has sacrificed their own political programmes and objectives. It is more a case of having agreed to be political ‘opponents’ instead of political ‘enemies’.
  Although the situation in Burundi and relationship between the two new partners in government is still fragile, the commitment amongst the key leaders on both sides to make this Infernal Partnership work, is very deep.

1.3 This Internal Partnership resulted in the transformation of existing State Institutions to form a kind of Interim- or Pre-Transitional Government (until the external all-inclusive negotiations create more representative structures). This Government is legitimated by an agreed-upon constitution which is primarily based on the 1992 constitution. It has put in place a leadership and institutions through consensus, i.e. a President of the Republic (Maj. Pierre Buyoya), a First and Second Vice-President (respectively from Frodebu and from Uprona), a Cabinet equally divided between mandated representatives of Frodebu and Uprona members, a National Assembly, enlarged through the greater representation of civil society, without affecting the overall majority achieved by Frodebu in the 1993 democratic elections. The main advantage of this enlarged National Assembly would seem to be the fact that its broader representivity will result in the broader population taking tits deliberations more seriously. This creates the potential for this Parliament to play a more constructive and bridge-building role in the days ahead.

This Partnership:

1. is essential for the main opposing political forces (Uprona - including the Army- as well as Frodebu) to discover whether they are able to build a minimum degree of trust and confidence in one another; the fact that they were actually able during the lengthy process of internal dialogue to achieve a ‘minimum degree of trust’, made it possible for the stalled external all-inclusive negotiations process at Arusha to resume on June 15;
2. it needs to be strengthened, deepened and widened to ensure that there is real support for it not only amongst the key political role-players to continue with negotiations, but also amongst the broader population and key sectors who still view the process with deep suspicion and even antagonism;
3. it is a genuine principled agreement between political opponents who have merely agreed to co-operate in the interest of peace - without sacrificing any of their principled policy end-objectives; the only compromise was on strategy and not on principles;
4. the Partnership Agreement (after more than 7 months of intensive negotiations) represents a unique consensus on the transformation of State Institutions, creating a ‘Burundian-style democracy and a truly just society; this agreement goes a long way in meeting the demands of those external parties excluded from the internal process;
5. since this Internal Process is merely complementary to the external negotiations process an not an attempt to prevent all-inclusive negotiations, there is no doubt that the external process depends for its success on progress made internally; the Internal Process therefore should be actively supported by all external role-players to ensure the success of the final external negotiations process;

1.4 The external all-inclusive negotiations (presently at Arusha, Tanzania) have locked virtually all political parties into the process. In spite of serious problems raised by many of the parties with regard to the process, all the present participating parties seem to be willing to stay involved in the process for the time being.

2. EARLY WARNING DANGER SIGNS:

2.1 Exclusion of key rebel movement (FDD):

The fact that the main rebel group, FDD, which broke away from its political wing, the CNDD, led by Mr. Leonard Nyangoma, is presently not allowed to be present at the external Arusha process, seriously threatens the possibility of negotiating a truly durable peace. The FDD and its alleged ally, the Palipehutu rebel movement, are because of their exclusion presently ‘knocking on the negotiations door’ by stepping up armed action within Burundi. The longer they are excluded, the more difficult it will become to reach a cease-fire/cessation of hostilities or continue with the peace processes.

2.2 Economic decline will prevent implementation of agreements:

The present serious decline of the Burundian economy, due in part to the 5-year long crisis, and seriously exacerbated by the strangling two-year long regionally imposed economic blockade of the country, is resulting in Burundi not having the means to either maximally exploit the present positive climate for negotiations nor being able eventually to successfully implement whatever political settlement is agreed upon. E.g. transformation of the Army and other state institutions will not be possible in a situation where a dying economy cannot provide alternative sources of income for those who may have to be retrenched or redeployed.

This declining economic situation and the continuing struggle for survival, coupled to the fact that the punishing embargo is being maintained by some leaders within the region, in spite of positive and politically risky decisions and actions having been taken in favour of all-inclusive negotiations, is creating resistance not only to the regionally-sponsored negotiations process but to the principle of negotiations as well. The impression is being created that nothing less than the complete ‘capitulation’ of the Tutsi is demanded before sanctions will be lifted. This can and is easily exploited by those who oppose a negotiated solution.

2.3 Mounting persecution and insecurity of Tutsi in Region:

The persecution and numerous massacres of specially targeted Tutsi, whether as individuals or grouped together in camps for refugees, displaced or pespersed people by organised mainly Hutu militia groups based in eastern Congo since the end of the formal Genocide of about 1 million Tutsi in Rwanda, has convinced perceptions amongst Tutsi that the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide are still trying to "finish the job".

Although to a lesser extent, rebel groups operating from eastern Congo, have acted in a similar way in Uganda and especially Burundi, targeting citizens of Tutsi origin.

This (by now) deeply imbedded impression that the Tutsi population within Burundi (as well as Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC) are being attacked by a ‘well-orchestrated’ alliance of ‘genocidal’ anti-Tutsi mainly Hutu militias, continues to further increase the virtually paranoid fear amongst Tutsis that they are being faced with an organised force which wants to exterminate all of them.

The recent developments in Congo and the vociferous anti Tutsi propaganda emanating from formal Government channels in Kinshasa, e.g. "kill every Tutsi or person of Tutsi origin" will undoubtedly heighten the insecurity of fears in Burundi. This will enable opponents of the present internal and external peace processes in Burundi to say that it will be ‘suicidal’ for Burundians to go and negotiate with Hutu groupings who are ‘obviously’ supporting the regional strategy of other anti-Tutsi groups to exterminate them. This could further divide the most important mainly Tutsi Party Uprona, and most importantly, strengthen the anti-negotiations lobby within Uprona and the support camp of Pres. Buyoya.

It could also affect the Internal Partnership by implying that it is impossible to trust the internal mainly Hutu Party Frodebu as a partner in the Partnership, since they have many supporters within the external mainly Hutu groupings who seem to intent on exterminating Tutsis.

The ongoing crisis in Congo and its very dominant ethnic (Tutsi/non-Tutsi) dimension, could directly or indirectly seriously affect the Burundian peace processes.

2.4 Burundians are ‘merely’ trying to find a negotiated solution.

In spite of the fact that Burundians are presently involved in serious internal and external negotiations, it needs to be stressed that they are ‘merely trying’ (hard) to see if they can succeed this time in negotiating an agreement which will be truly durable, i.e. one that will be upheld by ‘both’ sides and not plunge the country into chaos again as happened before.

The fact that so many previous attempts since the early 90’s have not only failed dismally but have resulted in massive killings and ethnically-based massacres, have made Burundians sceptical about the possibility of negotiating truly durable agreements that will be accepted and adhered to by all parties. Former attempts which failed include the National Charter of Unity (1991), the first Democratic Constitution (1992), the first democratic elections (1993) and the unity government set up through the Convention of Government (1994).

Although the main sections of the opposing political groupings have decided to ‘try again’, powerful factions within these groupings are presently adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude. Should the internal and external negotiations processes ‘go haywire’, ‘prove’ that it is impossible to trust your opponents, ‘prove’ that compromise solutions are unachievable and will create a serious threat to the long-term security of their constituencies, these factions have the ability to end these processes at any stage.

This implies that, firstly, the negotiations processes have to be managed in an incredibly sensitive manner - if they are so succeed, and, secondly that a broader cross-section of the Burundians society needs to be involved in both internal and external processes.

3. GROWING ECONOMY NEEDED FOR DURABLE PEACE.

3.1. Present situation:

The Burundian economy is ‘going down the drain’ due to the ongoing civil war and the regionally-imposed economic blockade imposed two years ago. Indicators include:

• reduced agricultural production in especially some of the most productive regions due to insecurity and the difficulty of obtaining seed and fertiliser and reaching markets;
• massively reduced foreign investment and humanitarian and development assistance which is directly worsening the divide between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’;
• seriously reduced exports to Burundi’s key economic partners, Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia; due to the embargo, regional countries are ‘taking over’ traditional foreign markets for Burundian products;
• the need to export and import goods by aeroplane (due to the embargo) has resulted in substantial increases in costs and a reduction in profits - further worsening the already high 40% inflation rate and a sharp reduction in foreign reserves;
• security needs of the Government to increase the size of its Army has further depleted available financial resources;
• the possibility of non-payment of civil service salaries and the declining value of the Burundian franc is creating potential instability both politically and in the work-place;
• the continued implementation of the embargo, in spite of the fact that Burundians have met all the conditions set for lifting it, is being used to undermine the different peace processes.

3.2 What is needed:

The lifting (or, at the very least, the suspension) of the embargo and a resumption of bilateral and other international investments.

Although this will not improve the economy immediately, it will:

• jump-start the economy by sending a powerful signal to Burundians that economic prospects will again improve;
• result in the numerous small businesses which are presently dormant, becoming re-activated and being able to again employ additional staff instead of retrenching;
• make civil servants and people from less productive regions less negative to political change since a growing economy will provide them with alternative employment opportunities should transformation necessitate some retrenchments;
• enable the State to accumulate the funds needed to implement some of the (costly) demands of the peace process, transformation; etc.

4. STABLE STATE INSTITUTIONS ESSENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION

4.1 Present situation.

4.1.1 Although the new Interim Government (Internal Partnership) has created political State Institutions which are truly representative of the two main opposing political forces in Burundi, the final legitimate State Institutions will only be set up once a final agreement is reached at all-inclusive negotiations.

4.1.2 In spite of this shortcoming, Burundi presently has a surprisingly stable and working State Administration - although it is in a much worse state than before the beginning of the crisis in 1993; there are no signs that the State will at any stage soon collapse and the predictions of the ‘Somaliasation’ of Burundi is just not based on fact; state functions are delivered as best as can be expected under the present circumstances; although the embargo has created a growing class of corrupt individuals and cartels, corruption is not yet rampant within the Administration.

4.1.3The fact that there exists relatively stable and efficient State Institutions provides a solid foundation upon which new and transformed State Institutions can gradually be build.
The importance of this fact cannot be overestimated if one looks at an evolutionary, instead of a revolutionary transition.

4.2 What is needed:

4.2.1 The new Interim Government has to continue to restore the authority of the state by proving that the interests and needs of the population are more important than the personal interests of the office-bearers. This relates to material, security and political needs and justice.

4.2.2 The new Government should step up its present programme of restoring the link between itself and the population by involving various sectors of civil society and especially the traditional system of the Bashingantahe (wise men) in the peace processes and the administration of the country.

4.2.3 The Government has to continue proving that it is able to maintain security in the country to ensure that the already serious security fears of the Tutsi minority (in Burundi in specific and the region as a whole) does not increase any further. The present increase in military activity by the FDD-Palipehutu alliance, due to the fact that it is presently excluded from the external negotiations process, could potentially seriously affect the peace process. (At the moment rebel actions seems to be aimed largely at the destruction of crops and property and not at civilians).

4.2.4 The Interim Government’s planned country-wide campaign from August to promote the internal and external peace processes as well as set up a two-way dialogue between itself and the general population, should be supported.

5. THE STATE OF MULTI-PARTY NEGOTIATIONS.

5.1 The holding of multi-party talks at the Tanzanian town of Arusha in June and July, has illustrated that virtually all Burundian parties and groupings (both internal and external) who were allowed to attend, were more than willing to meet and start negotiations.

5.2 It needs to be accepted that this will be a longer rather than shorter process if the aim is to reach solutions that will be honoured by all.

5.3 At this stage the different parties and groupings attending the talks are attending for a multiplicity of reasons, inter alia: to find a real solution; to have the embargo lifted; to ensure that nothing much will change; to mobilise support to have Pres. Buyoya removed; to get the support of regional role-players for their own parties; to get some positions in the ‘new dispensation’; etc.
Should the negotiations process continue to build momentum it is however likely that most players will increasingly put aside their own agendas and converge around a single objective: to negotiate a durable peace.

5.4 Problems with the Arusha Process.
Unless the process becomes truly acceptable to all parties and some real trust-building takes place, the possibility remains that some parties can still pull sooner or later. The failure to lift the embargo - in spite of all parties having shown their willingness to negotiate - will put serious pressure on the mainly Tutsi Party Uprona - a key party to the conflict - to withdraw.

Other problems mentioned by participants include that:

5.4.1 the process is biased in favour of certain parties and individuals.

5.4.2 certain regional role-players have a ‘ready-made’ "solution " for Burundi and they merely want the Burundians parties to agree to these;

5.4.3 the parties are not free to negotiate with one another and reach ‘their own’ agreements;

5.4.4 while the leader of the main rebel movement, CNDD-FDD, Mr. Leonard Nyangoma is attending the Arusha talks, the the military leader of the FDD, (which recently broke away from the CNDD), and its leader, Jean-Bosco Ndarubagiye is not being allowed to attend the Arusha talks. It would be impossible to pursue the important issue of reaching agreement on a cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities in the absence of the person controlling the rebel soldiers on the ground;

5.4.5 regional role-players try to ignore, undermine or ‘kill’ the Internal Partnership, since they (incorrectly) seem to see it as an attempt to prevent all-inclusive negotiations;

5.4.6 organisational preparations and logistical back-up is extremely poor;

5.4.7 Arusha in Tanzania is not a neutral venue since Tanzania harbours Burundian rebels who attack Burundi from Tanzanian territory; (at a conference held in Arusha in January 1998, the mediator, Mwalimu Nyerere stated clearly that he had no objection to the venue being changed if it created a problem for some parties - this has however not been followed up with action);

Although many Burundians find the present process unacceptable, their criticism and frequently expressed opposition to "the Arusha Process" does not imply a rejection of the principle of negotiations but merely a criticism of aspects regarding the present specific negotiations process as represented by Arusha.

5.5 The way forward for Arusha.

5.5.1 All indications, after the end of the August Arusha 2 talks, are that the whole Arusha mediation effort will at its next session in October be broadened and strengthened, in an attempt to make it more acceptable to all parties, inter alia by: setting up five commissions headed by outside chairmen and vice-chairmen; the appointment of experts, resource persons, etc.;

5.5.2 The following should also be considered:

• all parties should be more regularly involved - on an equal basis - in participating in the planning of the negotiations process in order for all of them to feel that the process truly belongs to them;
• ongoing and regular communications between the mediation team and all parties (during and between negotiations sessions) should take place to create a better understanding, develop trust and prevent last-minute breakdowns;
• meetings of the plenary and the commissions could take place in different towns and countries;
• a fixed schedule of negotiations sessions should be agreed upon to make better planning possible;
• links between the internal and external peace processes should be formalised;
• more informal, private interaction between the different parties should be encouraged and facilitated to assist in the difficult task of trust- and consensus-building;
• Burundian civil society - both internal and external and truly representative of ethnic, regional and other realities in Burundi - should formally be represented in the negotiations to prevent a mere ‘elite’ agreement and instead ensure an as broadly-based agreement as possible.
• all attempts should be made to ensure that all political parties and groupings who have an interest in the resolution of the conflict and who have the ability to sabotage the implementation of an agreement, are included or made to feel included:
• where parties develop factions, all the factions should be made to feel that they are part of the process;
• while the creation of splits within parties you opposes may have short-term petty political benefits, negotiations require strong, relatively united parties who have can reach a durable consensus on their objectives and positions;
• although the presence of many very small parties may seem burdensome, as negotiations proceed it normally becomes clear which parties are the crucial one’s whose agreement is essential for durable solutions;
• parties and groupings who are consciously left out of the process automatically develop a vested interest in trying to sabotage both the peace process and the implementation of agreements.

6. CONCLUSION.

At a stage when virtually all Burundi’s neighbouring countries (Rwanda, Congo and Uganda), are experiencing seriously deteriorating internal conflict situations, and none of these countries have even started the process of talking or negotiating with their political and/or military opponents, Burundi at the moment is the only country trying to actively find a durable solution to its serious problems through internal and external negotiations.

Coupled with the fact that the leadership of the Burundian parties are resolutely committed to these two processes, all external role-players - especially those within the region itself - who are truly committed to help Burundians find a durable solution, have a responsibility to encourage and help all the Burundian parties - regardless of which parties they might personally prefer.

Because, however determined the Burundian parties may be to succeed with their two parallel processes, the attitude and actions of regional and other external actors may either sabotage or help the processes along.

After having been intensively involved in the Burundian crisis for more than three years, I truly believe that there is enough commitment and determination amongst Burundians to say that there is indeed a serious window of opportunity that can help Burundians to set a incredibly important and necessary example for the rest of their region, i.e. that it is possible to settle one’s differences through talks, dialogue and negotiations instead of through the use of force, the overthrow of governments and the ongoing policy of exclusion.

But above all: should this serious attempt fail, it is unlikely that the different conflicting parties in Burundi would ever consider it worthwhile to ‘try (negotiations) again’. That is why every possible obstacle in the way of successful negotiations should be removed as a matter of extreme urgency.

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