By JAN VAN ECK, senior consultant in conflict analysis and -resolution at ‘The Centre for Conflict Resolution’, Cape Town.

Introduction.

1. General Overview.

Based on this principled approach Burundi has and continues to make vast strides towards all-inclusive negotiations, both in the ‘Internal Partnership’ and externally in the ‘Arusha Peace Process’.

At a stage when virtually all other countries in The Great Lakes Region are in various degrees involved in what sometimes seem like intractable and escalating conflicts with no sign that their leadership are even willing to consider to talks or negotiate with their armed opponents, Burundi is the only country actively talking to and negotiating with all political groupings, whether armed or not.

Burundi is in the process setting an admirable example for its neighbours. If the Burundian Peace Processes are further empowered and given time to reach real and durable compromise agreements, Burundi can possibly provide a model whereby politically-motivated ethnic conflict can be ameliorated and inter-ethnic cooperation established.

And although the armed conflict between the Burundian Army and the rebel movements continues, it is clear that it is de-escalating significantly with only a few areas in the south and in the rolling hills of Bujumbura Rural still being unstable. The fact that the rebels cannot defeat the Army and vice versa, creates the kind of stalemate that further encourages a negotiated settlement.

2. The Burundian Peace Processes.

Fundamental Questions to be resolved.

• whether a durable and peaceful solution can actually be found with or without the voluntary consent of the political (predominantly Tutsi) minority;
• whether parties truly want to negotiate a compromise, ‘win-win’ solution or, having failed to defeat ‘the enemy’ on the battlefield, still want to defeat their enemies/opponents - this time at the negotiations table?
• whether the Burundian solution should be based on ethnic lines or not, i.e. whether negotiations should be between (i) two ethnic’ blocks’, i.e.two separate ethnic groupings, broadly- speaking a ‘Hutu’ and a ‘Tutsi’ grouping, or between (ii) multi-ethnic, primarily political groupings/cooperation pacts, that are committed to reaching a kind of ‘social contract’between the aspirations of both ethnic groupings;
• whether the future Burundian government system and the principle of one-person-one-vote should be based on the majoritarian principle or be more consensual, inclusive and representative;
• whether the minority and its leader(s) which presently have the real power, should hand over as much power as possible during the imminent formal transitional period, or whether the minority (especially the present President) will lead the transition, with those excluded from power having a formalised role in excersing checks and controls to prevent misuse of power and the maintenance of the status quo.

While the majority of the internal parties that formed the ‘Internal Partnership’ Government, have in most cases opted for the more pragmatic alternatives listed above, there are still debates raging both internally and especially amongst exiled Burundians and during the Arusha meetings, over these basically opposing strategic approaches. It would seem that these unresolved differences are one of the main reasons for the slow progress at Arusha.

2.1 The Internal Peace Process.

2.1.1 Trust-building by Partnership remains crucial.

2.1.2 Minority support for Peace Process is holding.

2.1.3 Divisions within the majority party ‘Frodebu’.

In response the exiled party leader, Dr. Jean Minani suspended the Secretary-General stating that his action to suspend had been done contrary to the party’s constitution, that he was usurping his position in the party and that he, by being involved in daily contacts and negotiations with the other partner in the government, had lost touch with his own party. In spite of various people both inside and outside the party to mediate in the dispute, no progress has as yet been achieved in reconciling the opposing groups.

In spite of the various allegations being made by the protagonists, the following seem to be some of the additional underlying causes of the division (also see Fundamental Questions to be resolved above):

• The divisions created by the signing of the ‘Internal Partnership’ in June 1998: not all ‘Frodebu’ members and leaders were totally happy with it; the issue of whether the partnership should be signed in Burundi or at Arusha (site of the Nyerere mediation efforts), caused big divisions especially once regional leaders such as Museveni, Mkapa and Nyerere, as well as the external ‘Frodebu’ President insisted that it should take place in Arusha; the fact that the Partnership documents were eventually signed in Bujumbura at the insistence of the secretary-general and most ‘Frodebu’ Members of Parliament merely solidified the existing tensions.
• Differences strategic approaches on the degree of cooperation with the other partner in the Partnership (the Government of Pres. Buyoya), with some wanting to ensure that nothing is done to further strengthen his position. Many ‘Frodebu’ role-players still want to have Buyoya removed from office before the transition commences.
• Differences between the processes applied in the ‘Internal Partnership’ and in the ‘Arusha Talks’, create divisions within all parties - in this specific case ‘Frodebu’. While those within ‘Frodebu’ internally who were driving the Partnership, completely accept the importance of trust-building between the ethnic/political groupings and are willing to compromise both on process and strategy, e.g. actively cooperating with Pres. Buyoya (as a strategic way of reaching their objectives of a democratic and just Burundi), external ‘Frodebu’ role-players (because they were not part of the lengthy process that led to the ‘Partnership) are less willing to do so.
• The fact that ‘Frodebu’ leadership is both inside and outside the country negatively affects the cohesion of the Party. Firstly, the internal group is more accommodating while the external groups (partly due to the fact that is located outside the country) is less inclined that way. Although this is quite natural, the resultant inability to communicate effectively does not promote cohesion.
• The perception that the Arusha Process was going to reach a firm agreement on Transitional Institutions and the persons who would play a leadership role during the transition (by as early as June this year), also created a - to be expected - competition for leadership positions within ‘Frodebu’. As it becomes clear that such decisions cannot be expected before the end of the year or even soon after that, may result in things calming down again.
• While the Internal Partnership, of which ‘Frodebu’ is an integral part, had and continues to have as its primary objective the building of cross-ethnic cooperation within a multi-ethnic Government (to illustrate that the two ethnic groups can cooperate and jointly govern the country), there are moves afoot amongst some ‘Frodebu’ and ‘Frodebu-sympathetic’ lobbies at

Arusha and elsewhere to create greater cooperation between those political groupings who are loosely referred to as the ‘Forces for Democracy’. While it is understandable that groupings who share similar objectives with regard to restoring democracy, should want to cooperate, the ‘problem’ (in the Burundian context) is that all these groupings are mainly Hutu groupings. Promoting such cooperation and talking of a common Front between these groupings will undoubtedly be interpreted by the Tutsi minority as an attempt to create a common Hutu front against the Tutsi. If this perception should grow and perception becomes reality, this could signal the beginning of the end of the willingness of the minority to continue with the peace process. While most internal ‘Frodebists’ understand the dangers which this perception of a ‘Hutu Front’ or ‘Hutu Power’ poses (especially in the wider regional context), those outside the country are less sensitive to the issue.

It needs to be mentioned that virtually all internal ‘Frodebu’ leaders, including those who oppose the Secretary-General, categorically commit themselves to a continuation of the Internal Partnership (albeit with a possible ‘nuance shift’; while the exact nature of this shift is unclear, it seems that ‘Frodebu’ wants to be a more visibly separate political party in the Partnership and fears being ‘swallowed up’ by its more powerful partner), a continuation of trust-building internally and externally, a rejection of creating what will be perceived as ethnic mobilisation through Hutu blocks, fronts or power groups.

Possible outcomes and consequences

1. If the opposing groups fail to reconcile and one or other group comes out as having been humiliated, a formal split within the ‘Frodebu’ cannot be ruled out.
2. If the less compromising wing in the Party takes dominance it could put strains on the Partner-ship and the ability of the ‘Partnership Government’ to present a united front at Arusha. Although this would obviously put strains on the Partnership, this can be overcome if managed well.
3. If reconciliation succeeds, and the underlying causes are merely swept under the carpet, the same divisions will again rear their head when future obstacles appear - something which is guaranteed to happen due to the demands of negotiations to think both ideologically AND strategically.

2.2 The Arusha Peace Process.

2.2.2 Progress in the four formal Arusha Commissions remains extremely slow with most not having completed more than 5-10% of their agenda items. This means that by the end of the year agreements cannot be expected on anything more than some basis framework document or Project of Society on which a formal Transition and Transitional Institutions will be based. A major obstacle in decision-taking seems to be the fact that all 18 parties at Arusha are represented in each Commission. A way out could be for the major parties to the conflict to set up separate informal communication channels between themselves, try and find consensus in informal meetings and then present this to the Commissions at Arusha for debate, discussion and possible adoption.

2.3 Obstacles to the Peace Process.

Obstacle One: Exclusion of a major rebel movement from the Arusha Process.

Stating that he would not accept leadership changes in parties attending Arusha, Pres. Nyerere is reported as stating that Mr. Nyangoma would continue to represent the CNDD-FDD at Arusha and that the other group could attend if they used a different name than CNDD-FDD. The problem is that both leaders claim that they are the legal ‘owners’ of the name CNDD-FDD and are completely unwilling to sacrifice the name to their opponent.

This deadlock continues with no solution in sight at this stage.

The result of this deadlock is extremely serious since what could arguably be described as the largest rebel movement, is now effectively excluded from the negotiations process. Evidence would indicate that they are presently by far the most active rebel movement inside Burundi.

Excluding them from the Arusha Process will make it impossible to reach any durable implementable agreements - especially a cease-fire.

It should be stressed that unless this rebel movement is included in the negotiations process, not only will the principle of all-inclusiveness be made a mockery, but the whole process this far could become a waste of time and money.

If the two rebel leaders and their supporters are not able to re-unify, then a way will have to be urgently found whereby both can attend Arusha. Neither should be excluded. In the meantime everything should be done to informally engage the excluded movement and enable it to interact with the other key parties at Arusha, to ensure that they retain their present commitment to negotiations.

Obstacle Two: Ongoing regional instability.

Since the war against Pres. Kabila was launched in August 1998, some CNDD-FDD rebels have however also moved across Lake Tanganyika into the central part of eastern Congo. In an attempt to secure Burundi’s transport route to the south from the rebels and prevent them from moving further north towards Burundi’s land border, the Burundian Army deployed troops in this limited border strip.

The biggest danger that Congo poses is the increasing mobilisation and unification of the numerous mainly Hutu and explicitly anti-Tutsi and even genocidal rebel movements against primarily Rwanda and Uganda.

Although relatively unlikely at this moment, the possibility is there that the Burundian rebels, due to their exclusion from the Arusha Process, will be drawn into this primarily anti Rwandese and anti Ugandan alliance of Hutu rebel movements. (It should be noted that most Hutus or Bantu in the region see the invasion of Congo by Rwanda and Uganda as an attempt to strengthen Tutsi domination in the region. The ‘anti-Tutsi expansion’ platform creates the opportunity for many other rebel groups - including Burundian rebels - to join the alliance - especially if the primary targetsof such an alliance remain Rwanda and Uganda - and not Burundi. But cooperation between the Burundian rebels and the broader Hutu rebel alliance, (which includes large numbers of genocidaire such as the ‘Interahamwe’ and former Rwandese Army who were involved in the 1994 Rwandese Genocide) , would however convince Burundian Tutsi that Burundian Hutu (rebels) in specific and even Hutu in general also support the philosophy of genocide. This would end trust-building and close the door to any further negotiations).

The statement made by Rwandan Vice-President Paul Kagame on 5 April, that ‘Rwanda will remain in the DRC as long as Rwanda’s national security is under threat’, coupled to the fact that Rwandan troops remain actively and even increasingly involved with DRC rebels in an attempt to oust Kabila, indicates clearly that Rwanda has no intention of withdrawing in the near future. (The same applies to Uganda, since both countries are increasingly being subjected to attacks by rebels groups belonging to the rebel Alliance, from eastern Congo).

Since both countries are seen as ‘fighting the Tutsi cause’ their continued and increasing involvement will even further increase the growing anti-Tutsi sentiments throughout the region. (This regionalisation of the Hutu/Tutsi ethnic conflict is further illustrated by the use of the terms Bantu versus non-Bantu instead of Hutu and Tutsi).

This ethnic mobilisation and demonising of Tutsis (empire builders) and Hutus (genocidaire) in the region can and could very easily affect the Burundian peace process, where the attempt to build cross-ethnic trust is still very fragile. An unresolved Congolese conflict which ensures that Rwanda and Uganda will remain active inside Congo and the consequences this will have on ethnic polarisation, remains a serious dark cloud on the Burundian peace horizon.

Obstacle Three: Financial strangulation of Burundi.

The results of this policy is massive inflation, lowering living standards, greater (ethnic) competition for scarcer resources and the possibility that the Government will not be able to pay the Army and the civil service (something which could directly cause civil unrest, long-term instability and growing criminality). This is also actively undoing whatever benefits the suspension of the sanctions could have had, by actively undermining investor confidence locally and internationally.

The argument that the Government would ‘merely use foreign funds to buy arms’ just does not hold water since the Government has been able to arm itself freely thus far without any foreign funds, while at the same time the region as a whole remains a permanent source of arms for anyone who needs them.

A declining economy, reduced service delivery by the State and increased hardship for the general population are not the kind of “rewards” Burundians deserve for courageously trying to make peace.

When it comes to reforming state institutions such as the Army, it would be virtually impossible to do so if soldiers retrenched (to make room for others) can neither be provided with severance packages or other fields of income, e.g. in the private sector.

It is time that the international community for once and for all reach a decision about whether they believe that the Burundians are serious or not about negotiating peace. The present approach of ‘a little bit of carrot and a lot of stick’ (to “continue applying pressure on them to continue the peace process” is not only insulting but also totally counter-productive and will not create the kind of envireonment conducive to peace-making. With so much darkness in so many countries in Africa where war is escalating, Burundians have brought a little bit of light. The flame needs to be kept alive and not be allowed to die a financial death.

Obstacle Four: Grassroots involvement needed to prevent a mere elite agreement.

If this is so - and most indicators would support this conclusion - then any agreement reached eventually at Arusha would in practice be merely an agreement reached between political elites. As the Arusha negotiations process vividly illustrated in the case of Rwanda prior to the 1994 Genocide, agreements reached between elites only (and in the Rwandan case sections from the ruling elite only), are useless.

That is why much more needs to be done to involve the broader Burundian population in the peace-making process. Before any agreements are reached at Arusha a broad debate amongst ordinary Burundians should be held so that they can give direction to their leaders on what their real wishes, concerns, fears, and concerns are. The most important contribution this could make is to have a moderating influence on the political elite who are frequently so obsessed with their political battles, that they forget what the people of the country really want.

And although most significant sections of those sectors with power, are presently part of the peace process, we need to remember that their support is not unconditional while other maybe less significant groups feel presently hostile to the process. It would be dangerous to just ignore what is potentially a dangerous ‘fifth column’. A real national dialogue could ensure that an even larger percentage of both the political elite and the population is included in any agreement.

Without such a process a truly durable peace will not be established.

3.0 Conclusion.

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